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I. INTRODUCTION
II. U.S. SUPREME COURT AND SIXTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
A. Title VII
1. Desert Palace, Inc v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
As a warehouse worker and heavy equipment operator, plaintiff Costa was
the only woman in her job classification and in her local teamster's
bargaining unit. Escalating difficulties with her coworkers led to
disciplinary action against Costa. After Costa and fellow teamster Herbert
Gerber came to blows, Caesar's Palace suspended Gerber, who had a
clean employment record, but fired Costa, who did not.
Costa sued for sexual harassment and sex discrimination, claiming that her
supervisor had stalked her, that she had been disciplined more harshly than
men who had committed the same offense, that her supervisors "stacked"
her disciplinary record against her, and that her supervisors used or
tolerated sex-based slurs about her. The district court dismissed the sexual
harassment claim, which was not an issue before the Supreme Court. As
to the sex discrimination claim, the district court had instructed the jury
that if Costa proved that sex was a motivating factor in her adverse work
conditions but that Caesar's Palace also had lawful reasons for its actions,
Costa could recover damages unless Caesar's Palace proved that it would
have treated her similarly had gender played no role. Caesar's Palace
appealed the award of damages Costa recovered at the trial court, won the
first round, then lost before the Ninth Circuit en banco
The Supreme Court concluded that the mixed motive instruction the trial
court gave was proper, and that contrary to the position Caesar's Palace
took, Costa did not have to present direct evidence in order to obtain a
mixed motive instruction. The court stated:
In order to obtain an instruction under § 2000(e)-2(m), a
plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice. '
Id. at 95.
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2. Johnson v. The Kroger Company, 319 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2003).
Johnson was a Kroger manager whose evaluations indicated that his work
over the years had been satisfactory but not outstanding. Difficulty
leading to litigation began in 1995 when Kroger transferred Johnson, who
was black, to a community with hardly any African-American residents.
Johnson initially protested the transfer because of the town's reputed racial
intolerance, but later agreed to the transfer.
Both accolades and deficiencies marked Johnson's history at the new
store. After assessing Johnson's performance and talking with others who
had observed Johnson's performance, upper management decided to offer
Johnson a different position better suited to his strengths as an employee.
Johnson refused the new position. Three months later, Kroger terminated
his employment.
The trial court granted summary judgment on Johnson's claims of racially
motivated denial of training, failure to promote, retaliation, and hostile
environment harassment, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding issues of
fact. Of particular interest in this case is the appellate court's analysis of
what constitutes direct evidence of discrimination. Johnson alleged that
he had the following direct evidence of discrimination:
• His direct supervisor had questioned whether having an
African-American manager in a nearly all white
community would be good for business.
• His direct supervisor commented to others that he did not
think Johnson was very capable.
• Upper management said Johnson lacked initiative.
• Upper management suggested that Johnson consider a
different position because he did not have an analytical
mind.
The court reiterated precedent defining direct evidence of discrimination
as evidence that requires a fact finder to draw no inferences. All of the
statements Johnson described as direct evidence, however, required an
inferential step in order to draw the conclusion that racial animus
motivated them. The court then engaged in a thorough and methodical
discussion of the McDonald-Douglas framework, and the means by which
a plaintiff can prove pretext.
3. Carter v. University ofToledo, 349 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2003).
Carter, an African-American professor, sued for race discrimination after
the University of Toledo did not renew her appointment as a visiting
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professor. She was not the only person whose appointment the university
did not renew. Carter claimed that the university's provost had said that
the interim Dean of the College of Education, under whom Carter had
worked, was "trying to whitewash the College of Education faculty." She
alleged the provost was struggling with the dean to appoint African-
American professors but that the College of Education's decision makers
were "a bunch of racists."
Ducking a knotty evidentiary question, the Court concluded that even if
the hearsay rule did not bar these alleged comments from evidence, they
were not direct evidence of race discrimination because the provost was
not involved in the university's decision concerning Carter's teaching
appointment. Without direct evidence of discrimination, Carter had to
prove her case under the McDonald-Douglas model. In response to
Carter's prima facie case of discrimination, the university had offered four
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its decision concerning Carter.
Carter then attempted to prove pretext using the provost's above-
referenced comments.
The trial court had found that the provost's alleged comments were
admissible non-hearsay because they were admissions against interest, but
that nevertheless, the remarks were too isolated to support a finding of
pretext. The Sixth Circuit agreed, concluding that even though a person
may not be a direct decision-maker, ifhe is a management-level employee
with the ability to influence the decision-maker, his remarks may come
into evidence. Here, the Court found that the provost's duty to oversee the
university's affirmative action process was sufficient to link him to the
decision in question. The court also found that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether the comments were too isolated to serve as
evidence of pretext, and overturned the trial court's summary judgment for
the university.
4. Abbott v. Crown Motor Company, 348 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2003).
Crown employed both Abbott, a white male, and Crump, a black male.
Crump filed EEOC charges claiming that his supervisors had racially
harassed him. When the company received service of the charge, one of
the supervisors warned Crump to watch his back. Meanwhile, Abbott
claimed that Crump had warned him about possible retaliation.
Ultimately, Crown discharged one of the supervisors. Crump then
resigned from Crown to take a better job at Coca Cola, and Crown fired
Abbott, who sued for retaliation.
The Sixth Circuit set out the familiar elements for a prima facie case of
retaliation, i.e. (1) protected activity; (2) defendant's knowledge of the
protected activity; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) causal nexus
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action,
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followed by the three ways of showing pretext, i.e., that the employer's
proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason (1) has no basis in fact,
(2) did not actually motivate the adverse action, or (3) was insufficient to
motivate the adverse action.
The Sixth Circuit then reversed the trial court's summary judgment for
Crown, noting that Crump had testified that on Crump's last day of work,
about a month before Abbott's discharge, one of the accused supervisors
had told Crump that the supervisor would get back at the people who had
supported Crump's charge of discrimination. In addition, Abbott testified
that a few days after his termination, a co-worker had informed him that
this same supervisor had said Abbott was fired because he "put his nose in
other people's business." Moreover, this same supervisor gave Abbott a
negative job reference, in violation of company policy. In these
circumstances, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a factual issue existed
concerning Abbott's retaliation claim.
5. Goldmeier v. Allstate Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2003)
Terry and David Goldmeier were Allstate Insurance agents. When
Allstate announced that agents' offices must be open Friday evenings and
Saturday mornings, the Orthodox Jewish Goldmeiers resigned. Although
the Goldmeiers claimed constructive discharge because of the new policy,
they resigned before it became effective and suffered no discipline or
discharge on account of it. Before resigning, they had informed Allstate
that the new policy imposed upon their religious beliefs and requested
accommodations.
Allstate initially insisted that the policy would be uniformly enforced.
Allstate suggested that the Goldmeiers hire other agents to staff the office
on Fridays or Saturdays. The Goldmeiers rejected this option because
their office expense allowance was limited and they did not want to entrust
the office's performance to others. After the Goldmeiers resigned,
Allstate offered to let them observe their Sabbath but work on Sundays
instead. Although the Goldmeiers had previously suggested this
alternative themselves, they now rejected it on the grounds that it came too
late and was not in writing.
The court analyzed the case under Title VII and the parallel Ohio anti-
discrimination statute. Setting out the standard for proving a prima facie
case of religious discrimination, the court noted that an employee must (i)
hold a sincere religious belief; (ii) inform his employer that his religious
belief conflicts with condition of employment; and (iii) be discharged or
disciplined for failing to comply. The court further referred to precedent
establishing that an employer's refusal to accommodate employees who
cannot work on particular days of the week because of their religious
beliefs is religious discrimination.
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The court then pointed out that Allstate had never required the Goldmeiers
to work on their Sabbath; instead, it had suggested an alternative that they
rejected. Comparing the case to precedent in which it had decided that
while requiring an employee to use some vacation time to avoid work on
religious holidays, requiring the employee to use all vacation time for this
reason was not a reasonable accommodation, the court easily concluded
that spending their entire office allowance from Allstate to hire additional
help would adversely affect the Goldmeiers. The court stopped short,
however, of concluding that the Goldmeiers were constructively
discharged, and affirmed the district court's summary judgment because
the Goldmeiers had suffered neither discipline nor discharge. The court
emphasized that discipline or discharge is a critical element for prima
facie case ofdiscrimination. The court noted:
Absent this requirement, a prima facie case would lie
wherever there was a sincere conflict, and compensation
would be due when, in addition, the employer does not
immediately adopt a reasonable accommodation. What a
successful religious discrimination claim would not require
would be any actual employer action to the detriment of the
employee. Employers who, while not offering a formal
accommodation, deliberately turned a blind eye to
employees' religiously motivated minor deviations from
the letter of company policy -- not an unusual situation, one
would imagine -- would suddenly find themselves liable as
civil rights offenders.
Id. at 637-38. The court further elucidated that the issue of reasonable
accommodation need not be analyzed until a plaintiff has established a
prima facie case, and that it is undue hardship to require an employer to
bear more than minimal cost to accommodate an employee's religious
beliefs.
6. Clayton v. Meijer, Inc., 281 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2002).
Meijer fired Clayton, a black truck driver, after Clayton had a serious
accident following his failure to shut the truck's back doors and remove
the dock plate upon driving away from the loading dock. As a result of
Clayton's negligence, a sixty-six year old female dock worker, who was
standing on the dock plate, fell four feet to the ground, broke her right
knee, and could not return to work because of her injuries. In his race
discrimination suit against Meijer, Clayton claimed that three white
employees who had caused essentially the same kind of accident were not
fired.
The Sixth Circuit examined precedent concerning what it means to be a
"similarly situated" employee in order to show disparate treatment. The
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court reiterated that the plaintiff and the employee with whom he seeks
comparison must be similar in all relevant aspects, although exact
correlation is not required. The court concluded that while all three of the
white coworkers had admittedly pulled a rig away from a loading dock
without closing the back doors and removing the dock plate, they were not
similarly situated because their conduct did not injure anyone else. The
court concluded that the severe injury to Clayton's coworker was a
differentiating or mitigating circumstance serious enough to distinguish
Clayton's conduct from that ofhis white peers.
7. Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Community College and Clayton Harris, 314 F.3d
249 (6th Cir. 2002).
Zambetti, a white part-time police officer at a community college, sued
for reverse discrimination, contending that three full-time positions he
wanted had gone to less qualified African-American applicants. The
college had a collective bargaining agreement with a union to which
Zambetti belonged. The agreement contained a seniority clause directing
the college to give first preference to more senior employees. It was
undisputed that the three African-Americans given full time positions had
more seniority.
The trial court found that Zambetti had not established a prima facie case
of reverse discrimination, but the appellate court reversed. The appellate
court noted that Sixth Circuit precedent required a reverse discrimination
plaintiff not only to make out his prima facie case, but also to show
"background circumstances [to] support the suspicion that the defendant is
that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." The
appellate court expressed concern that the "background circumstances"
element placed an impermissibly heightened pleading standard upon
victims of reverse discrimination, but did not specifically overrule
precedent stating that the additional element exists. The appellate court
also concluded that it did not need to address the plaintiffs interesting
argument that the "same actor" inference should not apply in a failure to
promote context.
B. Americans With Disabilities Act
1. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. _, 124 S. Ct. 513 (2003).
Hernandez worked at Raytheon's predecessor, Hughes Missile Systems,
for twenty-five years. After a 1991 drug test returned positive for cocaine,
Hernandez explained that he had been drinking beer and using cocaine late
the previous night. Because his condition nevertheless violated
Raytheon's workplace conduct rules, the company accepted his
resignation in lieu of discharge.
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Two years later, Hernandez presented himself for rehire. His application
included a reference from his pastor concerning his good conduct at
church and a reference from an Alcoholics Anonymous counselor stating
that he was in recovery. The application also disclosed that Hernandez
had previously worked for Hughes. Based upon a review of Hernandez's
file from his prior employment, Raytheon, a huge defense contractor,
refused to rehire him because he had been terminated for workplace
misconduct, i.e., appearing for work with impairing substances in his
system.
Hernandez filed an ADA suit, claiming that the company had unlawfully
rejected him because of his history of drug addiction, or, in the alternative,
unlawfully regarded him as being a drug addict. Hernandez belatedly
attempted to add a disparate impact claim to his disparate treatment claim.
While both the trial court and the Ninth Circuit rejected the disparate
impact claim as untimely, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless concluded that
Raytheon's application of a neutral policy barring rehire of employees
fired for workplace misconduct was not a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for rejecting Hernandez's application. The Ninth Circuit concluded
that such a blanket policy unlawfully screens out persons with a record of
addiction, even though they may have been successfully rehabilitated.
The Supreme Court held that "the Court ofAppeals erred by conflating the
analytical frame work for disparate impact and disparate treatment
claims," and that if the Ninth Circuit had correctly applied a disparate
treatment analysis, "it would have been obliged to conclude that a neutral,
no-rehire policy is, by definition, a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
under the ADA." It would then fall to Hernandez to prove pretext.
2. Chevron USA, Inc. v Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
Plaintiff Echazabal worked for maintenance contractors at Chevron's
refinery. When he sought employment directly with Chevron, a pre-
employment physical examination revealed hepatitis C. The job for which
Echazabal applied involved contact with substances toxic to the liver.
Chevron rescinded its job offer because the job would likely damage
Echazabel's liver. Chevron then asked the maintenance contractor for
which Echazabal worked to remove him from his current position at the
refinery. In response to Echazabal's ADA claim, Chevron raised the
"direct threat" defense, arguing that the ADA surely did not require it to
take on the inevitable cost of Echazabal's health or perhaps his life, or to
violate OSHA by knowingly hiring someone into a job that would
certainly hurt him.
The ADA allows an employer or prospective employer to defend a charge
of discrimination by showing that the allegedly discriminatory standard is
job-related and consistent with business necessity. The employee must
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"not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace." 42 U.S.C. § 121 13(b). The First, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits, as well as EEOC regulations have extended the "direct threat"
defense to cases involving persons who pose a direct threat to themselves.
The Ninth Circuit, however, agreed with the Seventh Circuit in concluding
that the direct threat defense did not apply to a person whose employment
threatened only his own health, because to hold otherwise would be too
paternalistic.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, rejecting Echazabal's
argument based upon expressio unius exclusio alterius, i.e., that since the
EEOC's regulation refers to a direct threat to others, one may not read it to
include a direct threat to the employee himself. The Court settled upon the
statute's own more spacious definitional category of legitimate
qualifications that are 'job related and consistent with business necessity."
In dictum, the Court suggested that the direct threat defense might be
expanded to prevent harm to others outside the workplace, querying that
otherwise "If Typhoid Mary had come under the ADA, would a meat
packer have been defenseless ifMary had sued after being turned away?"
3. Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
In this case, a unanimous Supreme Court analyzed the proper standard for
assessing whether someone is "substantially limited" in performing "major
life activities," and therefore disabled. Ella Williams, an assembly line
worker, developed carpal tunnel syndrome. Her position as a quality
control inspector aggravated this condition, causing her to miss work and
eventually leading to restrictions from work. When Toyota terminated
Williams for poor attendance, she sued under the ADA.
The Supreme Court devoted significant attention to analyzing the terms
"substantially limits" and "major life activities" as used in the ADA's
definition of disability. The Court found that "substantially limits"
excludes all impairments that interfere in only minor ways with
performing manual tasks. "Major life activities include only those of
central importance to most people's daily lives. The Court stressed that the
ADA's bar is high, and that a plaintiff must demonstrate an impairment
that prevents or severely restricts him from doing activities of central
importance to most people's daily lives. The Court stressed that
"substantially" and "major" must be strictly interpreted in order ''to create
a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled." This decision, like the
court's decision in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487
(1999), showed the Court's continued recognition that Congress intended
the ADA's protections to be narrower than they became during the decade
of litigation following its enactment.
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The Williams court disapproved of the Sixth Circuit's focus on Williams'
inability to perfonn manual tasks at work and its simultaneous disinterest
regarding similar inabilities in her daily life. The Supreme Court
concluded that the Sixth Circuit's focus upon the manual tasks peculiar to
Williams' position at Toyota, or any particular job, "are not necessarily
important parts of most people's daily lives." Id. at 693. Thus, the court
emphasized that the manual tasks that must be substantially limited are
those that are an everyday portion of most people's daily lives if a person
is to be ADA-protected.
4. Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care System, 355 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2004).
After recovering from surgery on a broken leg, Nurse Jo Ann Hedrick told
her supervisor she doubted she could still work as a general duty staff
nurse. A functional capacity evaluation confinned Hedrick's reservations
about her abilities. Specifically, she could not perfonn her fonner duties
because of limitations in bending and lifting. Hedrick therefore asked to
be placed upon the hospital's list of employees with have pennanent work
restrictions (dangerously known as "the ADA list"). The hospital tried to
find suitable employment for persons on this list.
Hedrick was offered one alternative position, but refused it because of the
salary. She refused a later offer of another alternative position because
she did not feel she could physically do the job. She responded in the
same way upon learning of four case manager vacancies in the
Department ofMedicine. She later accepted a temporary assignment as an
admissions nurse. Meanwhile, Hedrick filed a failure to accommodate
claim, upon which the court granted summary judgment in the hospital's
favor.
On appeal, the court analyzed whether Hedrick had presented direct
evidence of discrimination, noting that "the direct evidence and
circumstantial evidence paths are mutually exclusive; a plaintiff need only
prove one or the other, not both." Hedrick at 453 (citing Kline v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1997). The court
concluded that Nelson's supervisors' expressed concern that Hedrick's
medical condition might not allow her to perfonn duties as a case manager
did not constitute direct evidence of discrimination.
Significantly, the court also confinned its prior position that an ADA
plaintiff must establish that the action of which she is complaining
occurred solely because of the disability. The court further concluded that
a disabled employee who claims that she can perfonn a particular job with
reasonable accommodation has the initial burden of proposing the
accommodation and showing that it is objectively reasonable.
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Moreover, while reasonable accommodation may include reassignment to
a vacant available position, employers do not have to create new jobs for
disabled employees, or displace other employees to accommodate them.
The ADA requires only that an employer transfer an employee to a vacant
available position comparable to the employee's prior position.
Reasonable accommodation does not require promotion. Also, "although
an employee is not required to accept an offer to accommodate, if an
individual rejects a reasonable accommodation, the individual will no
longer be considered a qualified individual with a disability." (citations
omitted).
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for the
hospital as to the ADA claim, then turned to Hedrick's age discrimination
claim. Rejecting that claim as well, the court reiterated various prior
holdings in concluding that "the isolated fact that a younger person
eventually replaces an older employee is not enough to permit a rebuttable
inference that the replacement was motivated by age discrimination", and
that the plaintiff's "subjective view of her qualifications in relation to
those of the other applicants, without more, cannot sustain a claim of
discrimination." The court concluded with a strong reiteration of its prior
holdings that a court is not "super-personnel board," that the business
judgment rule is alive and well, and that the employer need only give an
honest explanation of its behavior rather than making perfect decision in
every instance.
5. Cotter v. Aji/on Services, Inc., 287 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2002)
Cotter, who suffered from colitis, worked for Ajilon, a temporary service,
for approximately four years. His working time was often interspersed
with medical leave. The last time Cotter attempted to return from medical,
leave, Ajilon's representative suggested that no work would be available
until later. The representative promised to try to find work for Cotter, but
asked him not to come to the office while the search continued. Soon
thereafter, the temporary agency terminated Cotter for lack ofwork.
Affirming the trial court's summary judgment in the employer's favor on
Cotter's ADA claim, the Sixth Circuit concluded after a succinct and well
articulated discussion that Cotter's colitis did not "substantially limit" any
major life activity, including Cotter's ability to work. The appellate court
also approved the trial court's dismissal of Cotter's "regarded as" claim,
quoting the court's statement from Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d
701 (6th Cir. 2001) that "proving that an employee is regarded as disabled
in the major life activity ofworking takes a plaintiff to the farthest reaches
of the ADA." Ross, at 709. In this context, the court further noted that
Ajilon had attempted to market Cotter to a client until shortly before his
termination, and that it had laid off thirty-one other employees during the
relevant time period because it could not place them with clients.
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6. Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2002).
Mahon, a steamfitter for TVA, suffered back mJunes then became
depressed. After a complicated series of events at TVA, Mahon found
himself in a position with severely restricted employment opportunities
and, as a practical matter, a loss of his seniority. A few months later, he
was downsized, and shortly after that, he sued TVA claiming disability
discrimination, both because he was actually disabled, and because TVA
regarded him as disabled.
Relying primarily upon Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) and Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527
U.S. 471 (1999), the court concluded that while Mahon's back impairment
caused him some distress and limited him in performing some activities,
the record did not show that he was severely restricted in any of them.
Mahon had admitted at deposition that despite his back impairment, he
could still do household chores, including cleaning gutters and repairing
plumbing, could walk a mile, and could work on his own car. Quoting
Williams, the Mahon court pointed out that Congress did not intend the
ADA to permit everyone who could not perform "some isolated,
unimportant or particularly difficult manual task" to qualify for its
protection.
The Mahon court also discussed what it means to be "substantially
limited" in the major life activity ofworking. Citing Sutton, the court said:
To be substantially limited in the major life activity of
working, then, one must be precluded from more than one
type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice.
Ifjobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or
her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from
a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different
types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a
broad range ofjobs.
Mahon at 591 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492).
After concluding that Mahon was not actually disabled, the court turned its
attention to his "regarded as" claim. To this claim, it applied the test
articulated in Sutton:
There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall
within this statutory definition: (1) a covered entity
mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or
(2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual non-
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limiting impairment substantially limits one or more major
life activities.
Mahon at 592 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489).
The court concluded that Mahon had not demonstrated that TVA held
mistaken beliefs about him. To the contrary, rather than viewing Mahon
through a lens of "myths, fears, or stereotypes", TVA followed the
specific recommendations of his treating physician, which is exactly what
the Supreme Court in Williams says an employer is supposed to do.
7. Black v. Roadway Express, Inc., 297 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2002).
Black, a trucker, injured his knee and required several surgeries. In his
ADA claim against Roadway, he claimed that the company refused to
accommodate the restriction that he drive only trucks with cruise control.
Basing its views upon a work release from Black's surgeon, Dr. Johnson,
Roadway took the position that Black had no work restrictions, and thus,
did not need any accommodations.
In analyzing whether Black was disabled under the ADA, the court noted
an affidavit from Black claiming that his knee impairment limited him in a
number of ways, including a constant limp and dysfunction of his knee if
he attempted to walk far. However, at deposition, Black had testified that
he could clean his house, do chores, take walks, shoot basketball, ride his
motorcycle around town, and if provided with a truck with cruise control,
do his job as a trucker -- a job involving tasks Black's affidavit claimed he
could not do. The court also noted that an affidavit of Black's surgeon,
Dr. Johnson, ran counter to Johnson's having returned Black to work with
no restrictions in the first place.
The court then examined the affidavit and report of a vocational expert,
Dr. Julian Nadolsky. According to Dr. Nadolsky, who relied primarily
upon Dr. Johnson's affidavit, without cruise control, Black was totally
disabled from employment as a truck driver and further, could not perform
a great many other jobs. Citing Doren v. Battlecreek Health Sys., 187
F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 1999), the court rejected Nadolsky's affidavit and report
as conclusory because Nadolsky simply reviewed what Black said rather
than performing any analysis of the number of trucking jobs or other jobs
for which Black was disqualified. The Sixth Circuit found no genuine
issue of material fact and upheld the trial court's summary judgment in
Roadway's favor.
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C. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
1. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S.
329956 (Feb. 24, 2004).
,2004 WL
General Dynamics and the union representing its employees entered into a
collective bargaining agreement under which the company would no
longer continue to provide health benefits to employees who subsequently
retired, unless the workers in question were currently at least fifty years
old. Cline and others, who were in their forties, sued under the ADEA.
Reversing a Sixth Circuit decision, the United States Supreme Court
concluded that the ADEA did not prevent an employed from favoring
older employees over younger ones.
The gist of plaintiffs' argument was that "age" as the ADEA uses the term
does not mean "old age" when teamed with the concept of discrimination.
Plaintiffs reasoned that any adverse action in which age was a
consideration would be impermissible. The Supreme Court disagreed, and
bluntly rejected the EEOC's contrary interpretation. The high court noted
noting that deference to an enforcement agency's interpretation is
necessary only when applying traditional devices of judicial construction
yields no clear sense ofcongressional content.
2. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema NA., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
After the defendant employer demoted the over-forty Swierkiewicz and
then decided to "energize" Swierkiewicz's department by promoting a
thirty-two year-old, Swierkiewicz became discontented and sent a memo
to his superior describing his grievances and asking for a severance
package. He received a call from his employer's general counsel, telling
him he could resign without a severance package or be fired.
Swierkiewicz refused to resign and was fired.
Sorema succeeded in getting Swierkiewicz's complaint dismissed and
having the Second Circuit affirm the dismissal on the basis of that circuit's
settled precedent requiring an employment discrimination complaint to set
out facts constituting a prima facie case. The Supreme Court struck down
this heightened standard of pleading, pointing out that a short, plain
statement of discrimination in the complaint was sufficient, that the
precise requirements of a prima facie case may not be clear until discovery
is completed and that FRCP 8 requires only that a complaint give the
defendant fair notice ofwhat the plaintiff is claiming and why.
3. Rowan, et. al. v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc., 2004 Fed. App.
0076P (6th Cir. March 11,2004)
Rowan and his co-plaintiff, Washington, worked at Lockheed's uranium
enrichment plant in Tennessee. After being laid off during a reduction in
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force, they sued for age discrimination but lost on summary judgment,
which the Sixth Circuit upheld. The primary issue before the court was
whether certain statements about age and retirement that management
personnel had made were sufficient to raise an inference of age
discrimination so as to defeat summary judgment.
The court concluded that the plaintiff's immediate supervisor having
called them "old farts" on a "fairly regular basis" did not constitute direct
evidence of age discrimination in this context, because the plaintiffs had
not established that these age-based slurs played any role in the decision to
select them for termination. Moreover, the supervisor was not a decision
maker in connection with their discharges, so his statements were
irrelevant. The court also discounted an alleged comment that upper
management had made on a golf course some seven years before the
plaintiffs' termination about bringing in "new blood." The court reasoned
that this was a stray statement, made long before the terminations and thus
not evidence of age bias in this instance.
On its way to upholding the trial court's summary judgment, the court
reiterated that in "reduction in force" cases such as this one, a plaintiff
must provide "additional direct circumstantial or statistical evidence
tending to indicate that the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge
for impermissible reasons." The court also discussed what constitutes
"direct evidence" of age discrimination, and summarized the intent of the
ADA, which is to protect older workers from inaccurate stereotypes. The
court also reiterated that age and years of service are "analytically
distinct" and that the decision based upon years of service is not
automatically an age-related decision.
4. Shah v. Deaconess Hospital, 355 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2004).
After a patient at Deaconess died following thyroid surgery, the hospital
conducted a peer review of Shah's conduct in the case and eventually
decided to revoke the hospital privileges he had held for over twenty
years. Shah sued for age discrimination under the ADEA, and for national
origin discrimination under Title VII. The trial court granted Deaconess a
summary judgment, concluding that Shah had not made out a prima facie
case. A question on appeal was whether Shah's hospital privileges made
him a hospital employee.
The court reasoned that federal anti-discrimination statutes protect
employees, but not independent contractors, and noted that three other
federal circuits had held that where a doctor denied hospital privileges is
an independent contractor, he does not have the anti-discrimination laws'
protection. Applying a common-law agency test, the court concluded that
Shah was an independent contractor. The court reasoned that since Shah
treated his own patients and contracted freely with other hospitals,
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Deaconess did not have the control over Shah that would be necessary to
make him an employee.
5. Brown v. Packaging Corporation of America, 338 F.3d 586 (6th Cir.
2003).
After Brown had worked for Packaging for nearly forty years, the
company promoted him to a non-union, temporary foreman's position.
The plant manager who promoted Brown had the authority to make and
did make this decision, but when he mentioned it to the company's vice
president, the vice president said that Brown not only lacked leadership
but had once been convicted of arson for burning down his own house.
The company had fired Brown after the conviction, but rehired him when
he threatened litigation. The vice president also told the plant manager
about Brown's having violated the company's policy against sexual
harassment by showing nude photographs of his wife to fellow employees.
Dismayed, the plant manager met with Brown and withdrew the
promotion. The plant manager told Brown he would remain a crew
leader, but did not mention the specific information the vice president had
shared. The plant manager chose an employee who was about forty years
old for the temporary foreman's slot originally offered to Brown. Trial
resulted in a verdict for the employer.
On appeal, Brown argued that he had presented direct evidence of
discrimination through his own testimony that the company's area
manager had told him he was not being promoted because the vice
president wanted younger people. The court concluded that this was at
most circumstantial evidence.
The court then turned its attention to the parties' dispute over the
burdensome jury instructions the trial court had issued, describing in detail
the complicated McDonald-Douglas test. Although Justice Nelson began
the majority opinion by stating that unlike his colleagues on the panel he
did not think McDonald-Douglas language belonged in jury instructions,
he did not find that the verbose jury instructions constituted reversible
error. The Sixth Circuit also concluded that the trial court was right to
admit evidence of Brown's arson conviction because it was not offered
solely to impeach credibility but also to demonstrate why Packaging Corp
withdrew the promotion.
6. Wexler v. White's Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2003).
Whites, a furniture retailer, hired Wexler when he was fifty-five and
promoted him to manager about two years later. Sales at the store Wexler
managed declined significantly, so Whites demoted him to a non-
managerial position. Wexler claimed that at the meeting in which Whites'
corporate officers told him about his demotion, they made several adverse
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references to his age. Wexler also claimed that when the company
announced Wexler's successor, the company's president emphasized the
successor's youth.
The district court granted Whites' summary judgment motion on Wexler's
age discrimination claim, and the Sixth Circuit's initial panel affirmed.
Upon petition for rehearing, however, the court en banc reversed in a five-
three split that resulted in some heated prose in the clashing majority
opinion and dissent.
The majority's opinion arguably weakens the business judgment rule by
concluding that even if the soundness of an employer's business judgment
is not to be questioned, factual controversy about the decision may call its
veracity into question. The majority also downplays the "same actor"
inference, saying it rejected "the idea that a mandatory inference must be
applied in favor of a summary judgment movant whenever the claimant
has been fired and hired by the same individual." The majority's opinion
also seems to water down the "same group" inference, which arose in this
case because the primary decision maker was older than Wexler.
Justice Krupansky's tart dissent furnishes a mini-treatise on the ADEA.
Krupansky begins by rounding on Whites' evidence:
• Upper management told him he was being asked to step
down because he was getting older.
• Upper management also told him at the demotion meeting
that he didn't need the stress and aggravation of
management problems.
• Another manager referred to Wexler's age and called him a
grumpy old man.
• At the demotion meeting, a manager told Wexler the store
was really going to be grinding its managers and making
them do things he did not think Wexler would want to do.
• Upper management said the management job must be
getting tiring for Wexler.
• When Wexler's successor was announced, upper
management referred to the youth of Wexler's successor.
Krupansky notes, in capital letters, that Wexler had admitted the
following:
• He never heard managers make anti-elderly comments.
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• He knew of no other Whites employees who had been
treated unfavorably because of age.
• He knew that upper management's practice had always
been to employ good people regardless of age.
Moreover, at the pertinent time, most of Whites' workforce was over forty
and nine of its workers were older than Wexler. A coworker of Wexler's,
who was some twelve years older, had declined an offer to manage a new
retail location for the company. Yet another Whites' employees worked
until his voluntary retirement at age seventy-nine. To a person, all the
witnesses described Whites as having a work atmosphere free of age bias.
Krupansky later thunders:
Conceding arguendo that an employer's subjective
dissatisfaction with the plaintiffs performance should not
be considered with regard to the plaintiffs job
qualifications at the prima facie stage, the defendant's
proffer of 'performance dissatisfaction' remains a sufficient
'legitimate non-discriminatory reason' justifying an
adverse employment action, which erases the presumption
of discrimination created by the plaintiffs proof of his
prima facie circumstantial case, and which allegation the
plaintiffmust disprove. The circuit majority has conceded
that much. However, it has incorrectly concluded that fact
question remains for trial concerning [proof of pretext in
this case] ...
At the pretext stage, the jury may not simply elect to
disbelieve the employer's proffered legitimate, non-
discriminatory explanation; rather, the plaintiffs evidence
must be sufficient to disprove it. (citations omitted).
Id. at 593-94. Krupansky concludes that Wexler could not possibly prove
pretext. In a final barbed volley, the Justice states [t]he prescription which
the circuit majority has engrafted upon the ADEA was unimagined by its
framers. Krupansky goes on to predict dire consequences:
Although a close scrutiny of the full potential implications
of the circuit majority's decision, including the specter of a
future Orwellian world of 'thought crime' proscriptions
enforced by the 'thought police,' is frighteningly
breathtaking in its sprawling dimensions, the more
immediate ramification resides in the risk of the chilling
effect that the court majority's new stricture will
necessarily impose upon employers within this circuit's
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geographical boundaries. An honest assessment by, and
open, free, and frank discussions among, business decision
makers about the merits and demerits of employees who
happen to be above age forty will be critically stifled, to the
absurd point that a decision maker will be required either to
avoid mention of the employee's age, or speak at his and
his company's peril if he makes even a passing reference to
the age of a worker who is manifestly suffering from some
evidently age-related, performance inhibiting infirmity
ranging anywhere from Alzheimer's disease to mild
hearing loss. Stated differently, it appears that, because a
majority of the judges of this circuit may consider age
references in the employment context to be offensive,
employers will now be subject to penalization for stating
the obvious.
Id. at 595-96.
D. Family and Medical Leave Act
1. Nevada Dept. ofHuman Resource v. Hibb, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
Hibbs, who worked for the Nevada Department of Human Resources,
sought FMLA leave to care for his wife after a car accident. The
department terminated him when he did not return after exhausting his
FMLA leave. The district court granted summary judgment to the
department on grounds that the Eleventh Amendment barred Hibbs's
lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's reversal, holding
that state employees may recover monetary damages in federal court for
FMLA violations. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the
Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against
non-consenting states, but that Congress may abrogate such immunity by
means of a clear statement. The court concluded that the FMLA was clear
statement.
The opinion contains a thorough discussion of the FMLA's express
purpose, which is to prevent gender discrimination where Title VII had
failed to do so. The court distinguished its earlier decisions in Board of
Trustees ofUniv. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) and Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000), in which it had
concluded that the Eleventh Amendment did bar federal age
discrimination suits against state actors.
The court explained that under an equal protection analysis, age is not a
standard requiring heightened review, so that the "rational basis" test is
sufficient. Gender discrimination, however, merits heightened scrutiny.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hibbs contains a good summary of the
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FMLA's legislative history, as well as several strong paragraphs
chronicling the long and frustrating history of limitations on women's
employment opportunities.
2. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002).
In its first FMLA decision, the Supreme Court concluded that an EEOC
regulation regarding notice was an impermissible extension of the FMLA.
Plaintiff Ragsdale requested medical leave after learning she had cancer.
Wolverine's leave policy allowed employees of Ragsdale's standing up to
seven months medical leave. Ragsdale could not return to work after
seven months. Wolverine never notified her that any portion of her seven
months' medical leave was FMLA-qualifying. Six days after her
termination, Ragsdale requested FMLA leave. When Wolverine resisted,
Ragsdale sued on the basis of an EEOC regulation that said that unless an
employer prospectively designates FMLA leave, the employee never
begins to exhaust her FMLA entitlement. An employee would, therefore,
be entitled to twelve weeks of FMLA leave in addition to any leave that an
employer failed to designate as FMLA-qualifying by giving appropriate
notice to the employee.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit joined courts in
the Eleventh, Fourth, Seventh, and Second Circuits in concluding that the
Department of Labor's regulation on this point conflicted with Congress's
intent for the FMLA. The Eighth Circuit's analysis in arriving at this
conclusion focused on the FMLA's specific language, which revealed that
the statute was not to disadvantage either the employee or the employer.
The Eighth Circuit concluded that Congress meant to provide a minimum
amount of leave for employees, not additional leave for employees. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision. Note
that this decision is contrary to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Plant v.
Norton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2000).
3. Perry v. Jaguar ofTroy, 353 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2003).
Perry, an auto parts counter-person for Jaguar, sought FMLA leave to care
for his thirteen-year-old son, Victor, who had been diagnosed with
attention deficit disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
Although Victor did not function as well as other children at his grade
level, he was able to dress and care for himself, ride the school bus, and
attend special education classes. Outside school, Victor engaged in
normal activities appropriate to his age, such as riding bikes, swimming,
and playing with neighborhood children.
Before 2001, Victor's mother or other family members had looked after
him during the summer, but work schedules then made this impossible.
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Perry argued that Victor had to be constantly monitored, thus no
affordable day care was available.
The employer initially granted Perry's request for leave, then notified him
that the leave was not FMLA-qualifying. The trial court granted summary
judgment, which the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that Perry had
failed to demonstrate that his son was incapacitated. The Court noted that
"[i]n order to have had a serious health condition, whether chronic or
permanent, Victor must have been unavailable to work, attend school, or
perform regular daily activities during the period ofPerry's leave."
The Court rejected Perry's argument that his son was incapacitated
because he could not perform daily activities as well as children without
his special conditions or attend a regular day camp, and required
extraordinary supervision. The Court concluded that the comparative
amount of supervision a child needs does not by itself dispose of the
question of whether a child can engage in regular daily activities, and
further commented that Perry's own description of some of Victor's
troublesome behavior (such as peeking into neighbor's windows, biking
on the service drive of a freeway, and calling video game companies)
indicated that he was not incapacitated.
4. Arban v. West Pub. Corp., 345 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2003).
Arban, a salesman for West, had a long history of gastrointestinal
disorders. After it came to light that Arban had misrepresented activity on
a customer's account, Arban received a warning letter. Months later, the
company counseled him concerning other policy violations that had
allegedly occurred after Arban received the warning letter. In mid-
December, the company decided to terminate Arban after the holidays. A
week after the company had decided to terminate Arban, he and his
supervisor went to visit a customer, and the supervisor gave a favorable
evaluation of that one meeting. The supervisor insisted that he did not tell
Arban that his deficiencies were cured or that he was back in good
standing, but Arban testified that he came away with that impression, and
believed he would not receive further discipline.
Two days after his field trip with his supervisor, Arban woke up with
gastrointestinal problems, obtained medical treatment, and advised his
employer's Human Resources representative that he needed time off. The
Human Resources department placed him on medical leave. Arban then
applied for long-term disability benefits. Shortly thereafter, West forced
Arban to resign, ostensibly because ofhis previous misconduct.
A jury awarded Arban over $200,000, including costs and fees. The Court
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict,
pointing out that although an employer "has the discretion to fire an at-will
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employee for poor performance, at trial Arban cast doubt upon both the
timing of and the reasons for the decision to terminate him."
The Court also considered the interesting question of whether front pay is
available under the FMLA. In light of some favorable precedent for this
remedy, and no authorities to the contrary, the Court concluded that the
FMLA does provide for front pay. Consistently with its prior decisions,
the court concluded that whether front pay is to be awarded is a question
of law, but the amount of the award is a question for the jury. In this case,
the trial court found that an award of front pay was not appropriate
because Arban had obtained similar but better-payment employment with
Mathew Bender, and was over-mitigating his damages. The court noted
that it is the plaintiff's responsibility when seeking front pay to provide all
the essential data needed to calculate a reasonably certain award.
Finally, Arban challenged the district court's refusal to award him
liquidated damages under the FMLA for West's alleged bad faith. The
Sixth Circuit found the trial court's decision in this regard was an abuse of
discretion, because it ran contrary to the jury's finding that West had acted
in bad faith.
5. Pharakhone v. Nissan North America Inc., et. ai., 324 F.3d 405 2003 (6th
Cir.2003).
Nissan had a documented policy that said employees on leave could not
work. Pharakhone, a production technician at a Nissan factory, claims he
told Baggett, his supervisor, that in the months ahead he would be needing
leave to look after his wife and their newborn, as well as to work in his
wife's restaurant during her recovery. Baggett claimed Pharakhone never
said anything to him about working in the restaurant while on leave. After
the birth of Pharakhone's child, Baggett phoned him and discovered he
was working at the restaurant. Pharakhone claimed that during this
conversation with Baggett, he learned for the first time that employees on
leave were not allowed to work. Nissan then sent Pharakhone a
memorandum threatening termination. Ignoring the memorandum,
Pharakhone continued working at the restaurant throughout his FMLA
leave. When his leave was over, Nissan fired him.
The trial court granted Nissan summary judgment, which the appellate
court affirmed. The court concluded that the factual disputes in the case
were not material, and held that an employee who would have lost his job
even if he had not taken FMLA leave did not have a cause of action under
the FMLA when his employer refused to reinstate him.
In this decision, the court interpreted 29 U.S.C. § 825.312(h), which
provides that an employer need not reinstate a person if application of a
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uniformly enforced policy against working while on leave is the reason for
refusal to reinstate.
E. USERRA (UNIFORMED SERVICES EMPLOYMENT REEMPLOYMENT
RIGHTS ACT)
Curby v. Archon, 216 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2000).
Curby was an auxiliary police officer who worked part time. He late
became a deputy marshal, which apparently convinced him that he was
something of a cowboy. Instances of Curby's misconduct included
shining his spotlight into a private residence because a friend had asked
him to and operating his own car with expired license tags. After the city
council removed him as deputy marshal, the police chief continued to use
him as an auxiliary police officer. He then went on military leave for over
two months. He continued working as an auxiliary police officer after he
returned, but only to a very limited extent. This was enough, however, to
annoy the city council, which pressured the police chief to remove him for
the same reasons it had wanted him removed as a deputy marshal. The
police chief therefore terminated Curby's employment as an auxiliary
officer only to have the mayor extend it because he felt sorry for Curby.
Curby sued for a number of alleged wrongs, including violation of the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 USC
§ 4311, which forbids discrimination against persons who have been
active military service, and provides them with job protection. Curby
made the ingenious but ultimately unsuccessful argument that under
USERRA, he had an absolute right to reinstatement of employment after
his military service, without having to prove that he was discriminated
against because ofhis military service.
III. KENTUCKY DECISIONS
1. Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Co. Housing Authority, 2004 WL 102343
(Ky. Jan 22,2004).
Brooks, whom the housing authority had hired as a clerk, sued after not receiving
a managerial position for which she had twice applied. At trial, Brooks lost her
race discrimination claims, but won her retaliation claim. The Supreme Court,
divided as to practically every issue in the case, upheld this result. In doing so,
the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding that the trial court
should have directed a verdict in the Housing Authority's favor as to the
retaliation claim.
Highlights ofthe Supreme Court's opinion include the following:
• Housing Authority Executive Director Austin Sims' inability to
remember why he decided not to fill the contested managerial
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position in 1987 was not fatal to the defense. Holding otherwise,
concluded the court, "would place an intolerable burden on
employers to document the reason for every employment decision
as insurance against future lawsuits." The court held that if an
employer cannot remember the actual reason for an employment
decision, it may rely upon "normal business practices and
exemplary reasons consistent with those practices" to articulate its
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action.
• In connection with the former point, the majority defended its
decision to admit evidence ofhabit or custom in this context.
• In the context of a retaliation claim, material modification in duties
and loss of prestige may amount to actionable adverse employment
action. (Brooks testified that after she filed a complaint of
discrimination, she was singled out and humiliated by having to
ask her supervisor for permission every time she left her desk for
any reason, and by having her break time reduced from fifteen to
ten minutes). The court concluded that because "greater
supervisory scrutiny carried an imputed diminished level of trust
and marked an objective decrease in prestige it was more than a de
minimus employment action." This was enough to get Brooks past
a directed verdict on her retaliation claim.
• In analyzing Brooks' retaliation claim, the Supreme Court noted
that the Housing Authority's decision-makers first learned of
Brooks' discrimination complaint in July 1991, with the adverse
actions complained of occurring in November 1991. The court
says "This lapse of time was too long to create by itself an
inference of causality." The court went on to find that requiring
Brooks to ask permission every time she left her desk and the
reducing her break time was sufficient evidence of causal
connection.
• The court analyzed the after-acquired evidence doctrine. After
Brooks sued, the Housing Authority discovered numerous
inaccuracies in her resume. The trial court thus denied Brooks
reinstatement and front pay, and refused to submit her constructive
discharge claim to the jury. The Supreme Court decided that the
trial court had made the right decision on this point, though for the
wrong reasons.
2. Robinson v. Back, 2003 WL 21106539 (Ky. App., May 16, 2003).
Robinson sued the Greenup Superintendent of Schools for sex discrimination and
for violating KERA because he refused to advance her application for a school
principal's position to the site-based decision making council. Judge Nicholls of
the Greenup Circuit Court entered summary judgment in the employer's favor.
The Court of Appeals concluded that issues of material fact existed concerning
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Robinson's gender discrimination claim. The trial court had relied upon the
election of remedies doctrine to preclude her claim, because she had previously
filed an EEOC charge that resulting in the issuance of a right to sue letter. Citing
to its earlier decision in Wilson v. Lowe's Home Center, 75 S.W.3d 229 (Ky.
App., 2001, the court noted that despite the existence of Vaezkoroni v. Domino's
Pizza, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 341 (KY 1995), the plaintiffs limited pursuit of an EEOC
charge did not constitute election of remedies in this case.
3. Kentucky Dept. ofCorrections v. McCullough, 123 S.W. 3d 130 (Ky. 2003).
McCullough sued the Kentucky Department of Corrections and her supervisor
claiming sex discrimination. Her lawsuit came after a difficult work history at
North Point Training Center. In 1987, McCullough had filed an EEOC charge of
sexual harassment, as a result of which the alleged harasser was demoted and
forced to apologize, prison policy was changed to permit women to work in
dormitory units, and McCullough became the first person to benefit from the
policy change. Between 1987 and her filing of the lawsuit in 1995, however,
McCullough was denied promotion twenty-six times, suggesting that her victory
with the EEOC may have been Pyrrhic.
At the trial of McCullough's claim for sex discrimination and retaliation, the jury
awarded her $120,000 in compensatory damages, with a matching sum in punitive
damages. In response to post-trial motions, the court set aside the punitive
damages award, but ordered North Point to promote McCullough to sergeant, and
awarded her $50,000 in attorney's fees plus costs.
The Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict, except to conclude that KRS 344 does
not allow for punitive damages in an employment discrimination context. The
Supreme Court specifically stated that by enacting KRS 411.184 and KRS
411.186, the General Assembly intended to preempt the common law on punitive
damages. The court went on to note that since passing those two statutes, the
General Assembly had enacted a number of other statutes to expressly allow for
punitive damages and their sections on remedies. Thus, if the general punitive
damages statutes were intended to allow for punitive damages for all causes of
action, then the specific inclusion of punitive damages as a remedy in other
statutes would be redundant and unnecessary. Such a result would violate the
"universal rule ...that in construing statutes, it must be presumed that the
legislature intended something by what it attempted to do." Since KRS 344 does
not provide for punitive damages in the employment discrimination context but
does provide for them in the context of housing discrimination, the General
Assembly was likewise presumably intending to make a distinction.
The Supreme Court also held that absent a contractual provision authorizing the
payment of interest, state agencies are not liable for post-judgment interest. In
apparent response to the plaintiffs argument that she was entitled to post-
judgment interest against the individual defendant, the court concluded that
interest could not be awarded against him because the judgment was against him
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in his official capacity.
4. Jefferson County v. Zaring, 91 S.W.3d 583 (Ky 2002).
Pursuant to a consent decree, the Jefferson County Police Department developed
two promotion lists, a "white" list and a "black" list. For each promotion, one
candidate was selected from the black list, and two from the white list. By the
time the consent decree expired in 1989, the police department's minority
members comprised eighteen percent of the total. After the consent decree
expired, only one list of candidates was submitted. From the mid 90s forward, the
police chief recommended thirty-five persons for promotion, from lists containing
the names of thirty-four white males and one white female.
Noting these statistics, the Jefferson Fiscal Court directed the police merit board
to examine the promotion system. Thereafter, an amended regulation was
adopted, but one of its key elements was seniority. This was inherently
disadvantageous to female and minority officers, who typically did not have
enough seniority to qualify for the appropriate promotion lists.
While the Fiscal Court studied the regulation, promotions were frozen, and some
sixteen vacancies in officers' ranks occurred. Plaintiffs Zaring and Hord were
among fourteen Caucasians in a group of twenty-four sergeants who applied for
seven vacancies for the position of lieutenant. When Zaring and Hord were not
chosen as lieutenants, they claimed reverse discrimination.
Since this reverse discrimination case arose out of a situation involving an
affirmative action plan, a slight variation on the usual analysis was required.
Otherwise the prima facie case test would simply eliminate all reverse
discrimination cases. This was a direct evidence case, since the police chief
admitted that he had not chosen Zaring and Hord because they were white.
Zaring and Hord thus met their prima facie burden simply by showing that they
would have been promoted if they had not been white.
As its legitimate non-discriminatory reason for failing to promote Zaring and
Hord, the Jefferson County Police Department asserted the validity of its
affirmative action plan. Zaring and Hord, therefore, had the burden of showing
that the affirmative action plan was not valid as the department claimed or that the
department's rationale was pretextual. Noting that affirmative action plans are
afforded a presumption of validity and that the plaintiff has the burden of proof,
the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the
Jefferson Circuit Court's judgment NOV in favor of the police department.
Justice Johnstone dissented, stating "it is a disgrace that the majority chooses to
sanction Chief Jones' race-based decision without any evidentiary foundation to
support it." Justice Keller concurs in the result because he believed Zaring and
Hord failed to prove they would have been promoted but for the intentional
discrimination; however, Justice Keller believed that impermissible job
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discrimination did occur, in that the police chief admitted that he had chosen
candidates for promotion based upon the color of their skin rather than upon their
qualifications.
5. American General Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 74 S.W.3d 688 (Ky. 2002).
Hall, one of five life insurance agents in American General's Hazard office,
claimed that her immediate supervisor sexually harassed her every day for over a
year by making explicit comments about their respective body parts, discussing
his sex life and his sexual fantasies about Hall, brushing against her, and exposing
himself to her. Soon after the episode of exhibitionism, Hall quit American
General and sought psychological treatment for numerous and serious disorders.
Hall sued American General in Perry Circuit court in August 1994, and in
October, sought workers' compensation benefits based upon the same events that
underpinned her lawsuit in the Perry Circuit Court. By April 1996, an
administrative law judge had awarded Hall workers compensation benefits
exceeding $82,000 in value.
The Perry Circuit Court granted summary judgment to American General on the
grounds that KRS 342.690(1) makes a claim for workers' compensation benefits
the exclusive remedy for an employee who avails herself of it. Hall argued that
because sexual harassment she had suffered resulted from negligence, the
exclusivity provision did not apply to her. The Court of Appeals reversed,
believing that the Supreme Court's decisions in Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co.,
Inc., 840 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1992) and Hardaway Management Co. v. Southerland,
977 S.W.2d 910 (Ky. 1998) undermined the exclusivity provision.
As the Supreme Court clarified, however, those cases simply hold that KRS
342.690 does not preclude someone who has suffered from discrimination from
bringing a claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS Chapter 344. What
KRS 342.690(1) does, however, is prevent a person who has accepted its benefits
from having yet another cause of action under KRS Chapter 344 for the same
occurrence. The Supreme Court reasoned that because the statute makes clear
that its remedy is exclusive, a plaintiff who exercises her right to that remedy
makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of any other remedy.
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A Review And Comment On The Department OfLabor's
Final Wage And Hour "White Collar" Exemption Regulations
Introduction
Unless an employee is "exempt," the FairLabor Standards Act ("FLSA') requires employers
to pay minimum wage and overtime for hours worked over 40 at time and one half an employee's
regular rate of pay. The FLSA contains several minimum wage and overtime exemptions, but
employers most frequently rely upon the "white collar" exemptions. 29 U.S.c. 213 (aXl). The
white collar exemptions apply to all employees properly designated as being employed in a "bona
fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity ... or in the capacity of outside salesman .
. . ." White collar exemptions also inclllde the special exemption for compllter employees.
The FLSA identifies the white collar exemptions, but does not provide clear definitions for
them. Accordingly, in applying the law, employers and COllrts have followed regulations issued by
the United States Department ofLabor ("DOL'). The DOL cannot possibly define every aspect of
the exemptions with particlliarity, considering the diverse nature ofworkplaces and their particular
jobs, with their multitudes ofvariations. Literally thousands ofsuits and claims have arisen Ollt of
these general terms, general regulations, and varied workplaces.
The DOL has not substantially revised its white collar regulations in more than fifty years.
In what many considered long overdue, the DOL attempted to design its April 20, 2004 Final
Regulations to address many employer concerns related to litigation, llDcertainty, and the modern
workplace. The regulations contain many positives for employers, but the DOL scaled back these
positive strides considerably from their 2003 proposed regulations. On balance, political pressllre
resulted in the regulations being unfavorable in many respects for employers.
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Under the formerregulations and under the new regulations, a white collar exempt employee
must meet a "duties" test and for most ofthe exemptions he/she must also be compensated by salary.
The new regulations, in some cases, modify the duties tests and the salary tests. The presentation
below will first cover the modified duties tests, followed by the modified salary test common to
several of the white collar exemptions. This presentation focuses primarily on the differences
between the new regulations and the former regulations. Every covered business will need to
become familiar with the basic aspects of these new regulations.
SOllIe II1;tml CIJIrijicatiolls
The DOL faced extraordinary political pressure during the proposed regulation phase ofthis
process. In the final regulations, the DOL clarified at the outset, in §541.3, the following:
• blue collar wolkers who perform repetitive wolk with their hands, physical skill and
energy will not be affected by the regulations; and
• police officers, detectives, emergency personnel, and a wide variety ofpublic sector
employees will continue to be non-exempt
Executive Exemptioll
Under the former regulations, if an employer compensates its executive at a salary of over
$250 a week (which includes just about every executive-type employee, and which was referred to
as the "short test") the exemption applies if the employee has the primary duty of managing the
enterprise or a recognized department or subdivision thereof Primary duty generally means thatthe
employee spends 50% or more ofhis/her time managing. The executive must also customarily or
regularly direct the work: oftwo or more other full-time employees.
The new regulations actually add an element for the employer to prove to use the executive
exemption. In addition to the foregoing, an employer must now prove that the executive has the
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authority to hire or fire other employees or have particular weight given to suggestions and
recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion, or any other change in status.
§541.100 (a)(4). The key portion of this new requirement is that the executive is not exempt unless
hislher recommendations as to employee status changes are generally given "particular weight" [d.
In most situations, this new requirement will not place a new burden on employers. However, it will
be necessary for employers to assure that executive recommendations play a meaningful role in
outcomes, even if the executive "does not have authority to make the ultimate decisions as to the
employee's change in status." §541.105.
The final regulations offer only one alternative to meeting the more formalized test under the
executive exemption, down from three such alternatives in the proposed regulations. Where an
executive owns at least 200!o ofthe enterprise, and he/she is "actively engaged in its management;'
then the employee can be an exempt executive. This alternative essentially means that the "primary
duty" and the "supervision oftWo or more employees" portions ofthe test can be bypassed for 20%
owners.
The final regulations also define somewhat more flexibly that which will constitute a
"primary duty," so as to pennit exemptions to apply even ifthe executive spends less than 50% of
his time on managing the enterprise. This more liberal application of the term applies to all of the
white collar exemptions. In general, under the proposed regulation the term "primary duty" means
the "principal, main, major or most important duty that the employee performs." A determination
will be made based on all the facts ofa particular case. Courts and investigators are to review the
relative importance of the duties, the amount of time spent on them, the employee's freedom in
performingthem, and whether there are differences in compensation to theexecutive forperfonning
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the executive duties. §541.700. Although the executive need not spend more than 50% ofhislher
time on exempt duties to be exempt, ifthe executive does indeed meet this threshold, then it appears
that he will be exempt
AB you are computing the amount of time spent on «management ofthe enterprise," and the
relative importance of them, focus on activities such as interviewing, selecting, and training of
employees; setting and adjusting their rates of pay and hours of work; directing their work;
maintaining production or sales records for use in supervision and control; appraising employees'
productivity and efficiency; handling employee complaints and grievances; discipliningemployees;
planning the work; determining the techniques to be used; apportioning work; determining the type
ofmaterials, supplies, machinery or tools to be used or merchandise to be bought, stocked and sold;
controlling the flow and distribution ofmaterials or merchandise and supplies; and providing for the
safety ofthe employees or the property. §541.103. Keep in mind, however, that unless the executive
owns 20% or more of the enterprise he/she still must customarily and regularly direct the work of
two or more employees for the exemption to apply.
AtI.,illistrtliire Exemption
Under the old regulations, the administrative exemption applied if the employer pays the
employee a salary of$250 a week and he/she has a primary duty ofperfonningoffice or non-manual
work directly related to management policies or general business operations. To become exempt,
the employee's primary duty must include "the exercise ofdiscretion and independent judgment:'
This exemption has been the most difficult one to apply.
The DOL abandoned its proposed new standard that would have merely required the
employee to hold "a position ofresponsibility" and opted to retain the old standard. Although the
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DOL did attempt to clarify the old standard by providing new examples ofexempt employees, this
retreat from the proposed new standard was disappointing to the management community.
An administrative employee will be exempt under the duties test if hislher: primary duty is
the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general
business operations ofthe employer or the employer's customers; and the primary duty includes the
exercise ofdiscretion and independent judgment with respect to matters ofsignificance. §541.200.
Work directly related to the management or general business operations ofthe employer relates to
"assisting with the running or servicingofthe business, as distinguished, for example, from wooong
on a manufacturing production line or selling a product in a retail or service establishment:'
§541.201. This includes "functional areas such as tax; finance; accounting; budgeting; auditing;
insurance; quality control; purchasing; procurement; advertising; marlceting; research; safety and
health; personnel management; human resources; employee benefits; labor relations; public
relations; government relations; computer network, internet and database administration; legal and
regulatory compliance; and similar activities." [d.
"Discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters ofsignificance" involves the
"comparison and evaluation ofpossible courses of conduct, and acting or making a decision after
the various possibilities have been considered." §541.202. Theadministrative employee must have
the "authority to make an independent choice," even if the choice can be reviewed and reversed.
§541.202 provides various factors to consider in determining whether an employee exercises
discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance, such as whether: the
work affects business operations to a substantial degree; the matters have a substantial financial
impact; the employee can deviate from established policies without approval; has authority to
negotiate and bind the company on significant matters; or provides expert advice.
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Examples ofadministrative employees include: insurance claims adjustors; employees in the
.financial services industry who gather and analyze information about customers; a team leader for
a major project, e.g., a closing or negotiation; an executive assistant who has been delegated
authority on matters ofsignificance; human resources managers; purchasing agents with authority
to bind the company; and buyers who evaluate reports on pricing and set prices. However, public
sector investigators, ordinary inspectors who perform specialized work along standardized lines,
examiners or graders will generally be non-exempt §541.203.
ProfessWlUll Exe",ption
The professional exemption has always included both creative and learned professionals.
Creative professionals include advanced fields ofartistic endeavor, such as musicians and graphic
artists. Under the old and regulations, the "learned professional" exemption will be most frequently
applied. The substance of the professional exemption has not changed. Learned professionals
include those employees who have as their "primary duty" consists ofwork "requiring knowledge
ofan advanced type in a field ofscience or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of
specialized intellectual instruction," as distinguished from a general academic education or from
training to perform routine tasks. §541.300. The DOL retained what was essentially the second part
of the test - that the employee also must perform work that includes "the consistent exercise of
discretion and judgment ... .'. §541.301.
In its final rule, the DOL expressly included language to permit full consideration of
knowledge that may "also be acquired by an equivalent combination of intellectual instruction and
work experience." The revised standard focuses on knowledge and how it is used, not necessarily
on a four year, specialized degree. §541.301. However, the DOL has made clear its intent not to
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change the professional exemption, both in its comments to the final rule and in testimony before
Congress.
The DOL has set forth definitions consistent with current law for the learned professional
exemption. The phrase "work requiring advanced knowledge" means knowledge that cannot be
attained at the high school level. §541.30 1. The phrase "field ofscience or learning" distinguishes
the learned professions from the mechanical arts where in some instances the knowledge is ofa fairly
advanced type, but not in a field of science or learning. [d. The phrase "customarily acquired by
a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction" generally restricts the exemption to
professions where specialized academic training is a standard prerequisite for entrance into the
profession. [d. The "best p'ima jilcie evidence that an employee meets this requirement is
possession of the appropriate academic degree." [d.
Computer E",plo~e ExemptiD"
TheDOL did not propose substantive changes for the computer employee exemption duties
test Congress recently addressed computeremployees and clarified their exempt status. In general,
computer employees, depending on their particular duties, can be exempt professionals, exempt
administrators, or exempt executives. To be exempt, the computer employee must havea high level
ofskill and expertise, to be distinguished from those who repair computer hardware or employees
in entry level positions that worlc with close supervision. §541.40 l. The exemption applies to: the
application ofsystems analysis techniques and procedures to detennine functional specifications;
the design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing or modification of computer
systems or programs or machine operating systems, or similar duties. §541.400.
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Outside Salespeopk
The DOL changed the outside sales employee exemption. Instead of focusing on whether
an outside sales employee spends 20% or more ofhis/her time on non-outside sales duties, the new
test would permit the employer to focus simplyon whether the employee has outside sales as his/her
primary duty. The employee must continue to be customarily and regularly engaged away from the
employer's place ofbusiness inperforming this primary duty. §541.500. Workperformed incidental
to and in conjunction with outside sales duties, such as planning, collections, and incidental
deliveries will continue to be regarded as exempt outside sales work. ld. Ofcourse, outside sales
employees are not subject to the salary requirements discussed below.
Highly COMpellsated EMplojf!e Ex2Mptioll
The DOL provided somewhat ofa safe haven for employers where an employee receives a
guarantee ofaHeast SI00,OOO ayear, up from $65,000 ayear in the proposed regulations. §541.601.
If the employee fails to reach $100,000 in compensation for the year, the employer may by the next
pay period in the following year make up the difference. §541.601(b)(2). If the employee does not
work the full year, the exemption can apply ifthe employer pays the employee a pro rata portion of
the $100,000 based on the portion of the year the employee worked. §541.60l(bX3).
In addition to the minimum pay, this exemption has a modified, employer-friendly duties
test The employee must perform office or non-manual work and must perform anyone or more of
the exempt duties or responsibilities of an executive, administrative or professional employee. In
other words, even if the employee does not meet the full duties test under these other exemptions,
helshe can still be exempt if one or more exempt dllties are performed. §541.601(a).
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Changes To The Salary Test
TheDOL has raised the minimum salary requirements and it has included employer-friendly
changes to the consequences for salary mistakes. The new salary requirement is $455 a week, up
from $425 a week in the proposed regulations. §541.600. Computer employees may be paid at this
salary level or at $27.63 an hour or more. §541.400(aXI). The test otherwise remains largely
unchanged. In general, an employee must receive hislher salary without reductions for the amount
oftime the employee worked each week. The exceptions to the rule continue to include situations
where and employee is absent for: a full day for personal reasons; a full day for sickness or
disability, if the deduction is made pursuant to a bona fide plan, policy or practice of providing
compensation for loss of salary occasioned by such sickness or disability; a portion ofan initial or
last week. of employment; or an FMLA absence. §541.602(b). Deductions can also occur for
penalties imposed in good faith for infractions ofsafety rules of major significance. [d.
Under the final rule, for the first time, an employer may make a deduction for a disciplinary
suspension of a day or more related to woIkplace conduct rules. §541.602(5). Such suspensions
must be imposed pursuant to a written policy applied uniformly to all woIkers. [d. Accordingly,
expressly reserving the right to suspend without pay and having thorough workplace conduct rules
will become perhap; even more important after the regulations become final.
The DOL made several favorable changes to the consequences of improper reductions.
Clearly, an employer will lose its administrative, professional, and executive exemptions if it has a
pattern and practice ofnot paying employees on a salary basis. §541.603(a). However, isolated or
inadvertent improperdeductions will not resuIt in loss oftheexemptions, ifthe employerreimburses
the employees for such improper deductions. §54I.603(c). [d. If a pattern and practice of not
paying salaries occurs, then the employer loses the exemptions only during the time period in which
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improper deductions were made, and only for employees in the same job classification working for
the same managers responsible for the improper deductions. §541.603(b). Furthermore, if an
employer has a written policy that prohibits improper pay deductions and publishes that policy, then
reimburses employees for any improper deductions, the employer will not lose exemptions unless
it willfully and repeatedly violates the policy or continues to make improper deductions after
receiving employee complaints. §541.603(d). The DOL added that its salary rules are not to be
"construed in an unduly technical manner so as to defeat the exemption." §541.603(e).
Conclusion
While this presentation has focused on the substance of the proposed changes, perhaps one
of the most significant aspect of the changes from a lay person's perspective will be that the
regulations have been re-organized and are much easier to review. The regulations are well-
organized under clear headings. Thus, the regulations themselves can be used as a ready-reference
tool as issues arise.
The most significant aspects of the changes from a substantive standpoint are as follows:
(1) unless an executive is a20% business owner, then the employer will want to
make sure that its executives have the authority to recommend outcomes on
employee status and those recommendations must be given particularweight
by upper level management;
(2) employees earning a guaranteed $100,000 a year or more will become
exempt ifthey perform any white collar duties and they performnon-manual
work;
(5) the new salary requirement is otherwise raised to $455 a week;
(6) proper policies prohibiting unlawful deductions and misconduct will be
necessary for salary deductions for disciplinary suspensions and for safe
havens from having one's employees ce-classified as non-exempt; and
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(7) absent gross abuse, employers who make occasional salary mistakes will be
permitted to correct them without being exposed to substantial class action
exposure for underpayment ofovertime.
The regulations provide some immediate negatives for employers through increased
executive requirements and increased salary amounts. They provide some potential future positives
for employers through decreased litigation and the $100,000 exemption as time/salary increases
march on and this exemption becomes more viable as a practical matter for employers.
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, INTRODUCTION
- Exemptions from federal minimum wage
and overtime laws.
- "White Collar" Exemptions - last
substantially revised over 50 years ago.
~ Background and Problems
) Under The Old Regulations
Employers were facing years of back pay
liability because of unclear regulations.
- Class actions were being filed because
one mistake could affect an entire class of
workers.
- The administrative exemption was difficult
to apply.
- The professional exemption was not quite
clear or flexible enough to adapt to the
modern workplace.
- The law was challenging to apply, even for
experienced HR professionals and labor
~ttorneys.
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'Basic Structure of the
Exemptions
- Salary Test and A Duties Test Must Be Met
- Salary relates to what a person is
essentially guaranteed every week if they
work.
- Duties relate to what a person does,
measured primarily against the three major
white collar exemptions.
~
, Executive Exemption
- This was the easiest exemption to apply.
- In general, if an employee spends 50
percent or more of his/her time managing a
department or a subdivision of a business,
and customarily or regularly directs two or
more employees, then he/she was exempt.
- The changes in the new executive
exemption are basically negative for
~mployers.
'
The Negatives of The New
Executive Exemption
- There is a new requirement.
- The executive must now have the authority
to hire or fire or have particular weight
given to suggestions and
recommendations as to the hiring, firing,
advancement, promotion, or any other
change in status.
- The recommendations must generally be
given weight. So the executive must now
,........_ ....pe in substance a supervisor, instead of
~erelydirecting work or scheduling.
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" The Positives of The New
) Executive Exemption
-- The new regulations flexibly define
"primary duty," as it relates to all white
collar exemptions.
- "Primary duty" means "principal, main,
major or most important duty the employee
performs.
- It will be based on the facts of a particular
case. The relative importance of the
duties, the time spent on them, an
r~llIIemployee's freedom in performing them,
-=-="-tlnd differences in compensation, are key
- The new rules essentially mean that if an
employee spends 50 percent of his/her
time on management duties, then the
exemption will apply. If not, then the
exemption can still apply.
~ Conclusions About The New
) Executive Exemption
- The easiest way to meet the exemption will still be
the 50 percent test, and make sure your
executives have the proper authority.
- When you are computing time spent managing,
management duties include intelViewing,
selecting, training, setting and adjusting pay and
hours, directing work, maintaining production and
sales records for use in supelVision and control,
evaluating employees, handling employee
CQITlplaints, disciplining, determining management
techniques to be used, apportioning work,
determining the type of materials, supplies.'
machinery or tools to be used or merchandise to
t'~all~ bought, stocked and sold, controlling the flow
~~nd d.istribution of ~.aterialsor merchandise and
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, The Administrative Exemption
- This exemption would have been
somewhat easier to apply, but the DOL
retreated from its proposal.
- The primary problem with the exemption is
that the employee must have a primary
duty that included the "exercise of
discretion and independent judgment."
This is the portion of the regulation that
would have been changed.
- The primary duty must involve performing
t'~.......office or non-manual work directly relating
-=.~o ""!anagementpolicies or to general
'
Key Definitions for The
Adminis.trative Exemption -.
- Work directly related to management or
general business operations relates to
assisting with the running or servicing of
the business, as opposed from working on
a production line or selling a product.
- Discretion and independent jUdgment with
respect to matters of significance involves
the comparison and evaluation of possible
courses of action, and acting or making a
decision on a matter that affects the
business operations to a substantial
~egree, involves expert advice, etc.
'
Examples for The
Administrative Exemption
- Insurance adjustors, financial advisors,
team leaders on major projects, executive
assistants with delegated authority and
buyers.
- The exemption does not include public
sector investigators, ordinary inspectors,
examiners or graders.
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, The Professional Exemption
- The professional exemption was probably
the most rarely applied of the three major
exemptions, and will continue to be the
most rarely applied under the new
regulations.
- There are creative and learned professions
under the old and new regulations.
Creative professionals work in advanced
fields of artistic endeavor.
"~IUaLearned professionals most frequently
-~=~pply in the business setting.
- Their primary duty must consist of work
requiring knowledge of an advanced type
in a field of science or learning customarily
acquired by a prolonged course of
specialized intellectual instruction and
study, as distinguished from a general
academic education or from training to
perform routine tasks.
,
I ne UUL UIO l\Iot ACtuallY
. Change The Professional
. '.
- Under the proposed regulations, the
professional would no longer have needed
to consistently exercise judgment and
discretion.
- The professional may now acquire his/her
knowledge "by an equivalent combination
of intellectual instruction and work
experience."
- This could shift some of the focus away
,--.;"._••••Jrom an advanced degree and towards
~ctual knowledge and how it is used on the
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-- Professionals still include lawyers, doctors,
teachers, accountants, actuaries,
engineers, architects, scientists, registered
nurses, and pharmacists.
'
Additional Professional
Exemption Definitions
-- Knowledge of an advanced type means
knowledge that cannot be attained at the
high school level.
- Field of science or learning distinguishes
the learned professions from mechanical
knowledge.
- Customarily acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized intellectual instruction
generally still restricts the exemption of
jobs where specialized academic training is
a standard prerequisite for the job.
- The requirement of an advanced or
specialized academic degree is still the
best evidence to support the exemption.
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~ Computer EmployeeJ Exemption
- These employees can be, depending on
the circumstances, professionals,
administrators or executives.
- They can be exempt professionals only if
they engage in advanced systems analysis
techniques, system design, programming,
or any combination of these duties. A high
level of skill and expertise is required.
'
Outside Salespeople
Exemption
- Under the old rules, where an employee
spent 20 percent or more of hislher time on
non- outside sales duties, then he/she
could not be exempt.
- Now the rule is simply that outside sales
should be the primary duty of the
employee.
- The employee must still be customarily and
regularly engaged away from the
employer's place of business in performing
this primary duty.
- Work incidental to outside sales calls,
including planning, collections and
incidental deliveries are outside sales work
that can be used to meet the 50 percent
GREIl~test.
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" Highly CompensatedJ Employee Exemption
-If you pay an employee 100k a year, up
from 65k a year, and the employee
performs office or non-manual work that
involves one or more of the exempt duties
or responsibilities of an administrative,
executive, or professional employee, then
they can be exempt.
-If you don't reach the 100k level for the
year, you can make up the difference in the
next pay period in the following year to
make up the difference. For mid-year hires
or terminations, the 100k level can be pro-
rated.
- This is a safe haven for employers who
have highly compensated employees who
liaI:fwRIAllMdon't quite fit into the most common
-=-=~xemptions.
, The Salary Test ,
- Outside sales employees, lawyers and
doctors do not need to be paid a salary.
- Computer employees may be paid at or
above $27.63 an hour.
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- Owners/executives at 20 percent
ownership who meet the test do not have
to be paid a salary.
- For the other white collar exemptions, the
standard salary test applies, with some
changes to the amounts and
consequences for mistakes.
- The salary must be paid without reductions
based on the amount of time the employee
has worked each week, except for full day
absences for personal reasons, full day
absences for sickness or disability, if the
deduction is made pursuant to a bona fide
plan, policy or practice of providing
compensation for loss of salary occasioned
by sickness or disability, a portion of an
initial or last week of employment, an
~MLA absence, or for infractions of safety
, Changes To The Salary Test
- The new salary requirement is $455 a
week, up from the proposed $425 a week.
- Deductions may occur for absences of a
day or more for suspensions related to
workplace conduct rules. The suspensions
may be SUbject to a deduction if they occur
pursuant to a written policy applied
uniformly to all workers.
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- Isolated or inadvertent deductions will no
longer result in lost exemptions.
- If an exemption is lost, then it will be lost
only for employees in the same job
classification working for the same
managers responsible for the improper
deductions.
- If the employer has a written policy
prohibiting improper pay deductions and
publishes that policy. and then reimburses
employees for improper deductions. the
employer will not lose the exemption
unless it willfully and repeatedly violates
the policy and continues to make improper
deductions after receiving employee
complaints.
- The new salary rules are not to be
construed in an unduly technical manner
so as to defeat exemptions.
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'Conclusions and
Recommendations
- This was to be a bold move by a more
management-friendly administration, but
political winds stood in the way.
- Make sure your executives have some
real power.
- There is perhaps less pressure to conduct
time analyses under a 50 percent rule.
- You will want to revise your policies on
suspensions and misconduct.
- You will want a new policy on deductions
from salaries for exempt employees.
- It may be time to correct some problems -
a window of opportunity.
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I. Cautionary Tales
• Personal Use Of Company Equipment Makes The Funny Papers
• Dean of Harvard Divinity School Resigns Because Of Computer Porn
• Disgruntled Workers Hack Company Computers
• Sexual Harassment Reaches Cyberspace
• "We1come to the E-mail Combat Zone"
II. E-mail and Computer Technology
• More than half ofD.S. companies engage in e-mail monitoring of employees
• 22% have terminated an employee for e-mail abuse
• 75% U.S. companies have written policies on e-mail, but less than half train
employees on the policies
• 14% of companies have been ordered by Court or regulatory agency to produce
employee e-mail (up 5% since 2001)
• One in 20 companies has defended a workplace lawsuit triggered by e-mail l
A. Why Monitor E-mail/Computer Use?
• In 2000, 82% of all employees admit sending/receiving personal e-mails on
company computers
• 25% admit surfing the Internet at least one hour per day
• Dow Chemical fired 50, disciplined 200 for widespread employee e-mailing
ofviolent and pornographic material
• Xerox terminated 40 workers for inappropriate internet use
• New York Times fired 22 employees for sending offensive e-mail3
1 Statistics copywrited by American Management Association, "2003 E-Mail Rules, Policies and Practices Survey",
www.amanet.org.
2 AMA statistics.
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B. Other Risks of Employee E-mail/Computer Use
• Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., et aI., New Jersey Supreme Court allows
claim against employer for anonymous harassing messages posted on work-
related electronic "bulletin board"
• Increased e-mail use for union organizing
• Internet allows wide-spread distribution of company trade secrets, confidential
information
• E-mails are retrievable and discoverable in litigation
C. Strategies for Limiting Liability
1. Develop company policy on electronic communications
• Advise employees there is no legitimate expectation ofprivacy
• Advise that all e-mail and Internet use is subject to monitoring and
search
• Advise that deleted and stored e-mails and "bookmarks" are subject to
monitoring and search
• Establish internal controls for routine monitoring of electronic
transmissions
• Consider use of filters for incoming/outgoing e-mails
• Don't forget company-owned laptops
2. Provide training for employees and supervisors on policies
• Update training regularly
• Provide written policy to new employees with signed
acknowledgement
3. Cover electronic communications in your client's anti-harassment policies
4. Upon termination, disable employee's on-site and remote access to
computer technology
3 Savage, Marcia, "Keeping Watch -- It's Not 1984, But Tools for Monitoring Employee Web Activity are Catching
On, Solution Providers Say," CRN, 10/2/00 Issue 914, WWW.CID.com.
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5. Limit access to trade secrets and personnel files; use encrypted codes to
prevent circulation
III. Visual Surveillance4
• Technology allows for "hidden cameras" to monitor employee activity and take the
place of supervisors' observation
• Video cameras in public places permissible; may be subject to contract negotiations
in union setting
• Employer may incur liability for surveillance in private places if no legitimate and
significant business reason
• Beware of audio (see Section IV)
IV. Telephone and Voice Mail
A. Why Monitor PhoneNoice Mail?
• Technology allows widespread dissemination of vOIce mail messages,
including harassing and threatening messages
• To increase productivity, efficiency, customer service
B. Wiretapping, Eavesdropping, and Monitoring of Telephone Conversations
• Subject to Title III, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets ActlElectronic
Communications Privacy Act prohibiting intentional interception of wire, oral
or electronic communication and intentional use ofmechanical or other device
to intercept oral communications
• Employees have private right of action to recover actual or liquidated
damages of $100 per day or $10,000, whichever is greater, plus punitive
damages and attorney's fees
• Prohibits third party from recording a conversation between two or more
parties when none of the parties to the conversation are aware of taping
• Exception under 18 USC §2510 when employer intercepts over telephone
extension used by employer in the ordinary course ofbusiness
- But see United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391 (6th Cir. 1995).
• KRS 526.010 defines eavesdropping as "means to overhear, record, amplify
or transmit any part of a wire or oral communication of others without the
4 Bales, Richard A. & Hamilton, Richard 0., Jr., "Workplace Investigations in Kentucky," Northern Kentucky Law
Review, Vol. 27, No.2 (citations omitted).
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consent of at least one party thereto via means of an electronic, mechanical, or
other device." Intentional use of a device to eavesdrop is Class D felony.
c. Monitoring Telephone and Voice Mail
• Establish policy, train and disseminate
• Comply with federal and state law when conducting monitoring
• Disable on-site and remote access to company telephone and voice mail upon
termination
V. Employee Performance/Productivity Monitoring5 : Computers allow monitoring of
time spent on a computer, keystrokes per timeframe, keystroke mistakes, customer
service phone calls
• Allows employers to obtain quantifiable data on employee performance, as opposed
to subjective evaluation
• Can improve efficiency and productivity
• While "Big Brother-ish," permissible when monitoring performed on company
property of employees' job functions with legitimate business reasons
5 See "Workplace Investigations in Kentucky," Northern Kentucky Law Review, supra pp. 261-63.
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TITLE VII JUMPS THE SHARK: RELIGIOUS HARASSMENT AND THE
SUPPRESSION OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH
David A. French!
1. What does it mean to 'jump the shark?" According to the common cultural
definition, the term (derived from a memorable episode of the television show
"Happy Days") means that moment - whether in a television series, political
campaign or public life - when the peak has been reached, when you know that from
now on, there is nothing left but the long, slow slide into oblivion. Arguably, Title
VII has reached that moment.
1.1. Until recent years, Title VII appeared to have irresistible cultural and legal
momentum. While racial, sexual and religious harassment had been outlawed for
many years, workplace "harassment" as an independent cultural force exploded
into the national consciousness in 1991, with Anita Hill's now-famous sexual
harassment allegations against Clarence Thomas.
1.2. In the words of one commentator, "legal filings grew exponentially after the
attention given to the issue of sexual harassment during the Clarence Thomas-
Anita Hill hearings. Government agencies quickly produced pamphlets that
urged victims of sexual harassment to file complaints and often defined "hostile
environment far more broadly than the law justified." See David E Bernstein,
Hostile Environment Law and the Threat to Freedom ofExpression in the
Workplace, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1,3 (2004).
1.3. Yet throughout the explosive growth in hostile environment harassment claims
there has always existed a latent defect in the law: as applied to particular
situations, Title VII restricted speech and expression protected by the First
Amendment ofthe United States Constitution.
1.4. Astute defense lawyers first noticed this defect more than a decade ago and
defended their employer clients by asserting a First Amendment defense -
without success. See, for example, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.
Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
1.5. Throughout the 1990s, commentators from left and right began to debate whether
the First Amendment limited the scope and application of Title VII. See Richard
H. Fallon, Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog
That Didn't Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REv. 1; Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law
Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 563 (1995); Suzanne Sangree, Title
VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment and the
First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461 (1995); and
1 Mr. French is the author ofA Season for Justice: Defending the Rights ofthe Christian
Home, Church and School (Broadman & Holman, 2002) and ofthe Foundation for
Individual Rights in Education's Guide to Free Speech on Campus (2004) and its Guide
to Religious Liberty on Campus (2003).
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Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Law Restrict,
85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997).
1.6. While private employers were free to regulate workplace speech without
constitutional implications, when the government compelled that restriction
through state and federal statutes and regulations, the "state action problem" was
resolved, and the Constitution applied.
1.7. Courts have echoed the commentators concerns by noting the obvious: "Where
pure expression is involved," anti-discrimination law "veers into the territory of
the First Amendment." DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass 'n, 51
F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1995). When anti-discrimination laws are "applied to ...
harassment claims founded solely on verbal insults, pictorial or literary matter,
the statute imposes content-based, viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on
speech." !d. At 596-597; see, also, Saxe v. State College Area School Dist., 240
F.3d 200,206-209 (3rd Cir. 2001) (Quoting DeAngelis and invalidating anti-
harassment regulations in public high school on the grounds ofoverbreadth and
vagueness).
1.8. While litigants continue to fail in their effort to erect a First Amendment shield
around alleged harassing behavior (See, e.g., Baty v. Willamette Indus., 985 F.
Supp. 987 (D. Kan. 1997); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847 (D.
Minn. 1993); Berman v. Wash. Times Corp., No. 92-2738, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16476 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1994)) the defense will become increasingly
viable because ofthe increase in religious harassment claims and the ever-
widening breadth of state and local anti-discrimination statutes.
2. Why do religious harassment claims represent an opportunity to finally apply the First
Amendment to anti-discrimination statutes? The reason relates not to the theoretical
conflict between the First Amendment and the relevant statutes but instead to the
practical application ofthe statutes to real-world workplace conflict.
2.1. Eugene Volokh accurately notes, "Religious harassment law is structurally
almost identical to racial and sexual harassment law: both punish speech when
it's 'severe or pervasive' enough to create a hostile, abusive or offensive work
environment based on religion, race, or sex, for the plaintiff and for a reasonable
person. And cases dealing with each body of law generally borrow heavily from
each other. What's more, both religious harassment law and racial and sexual
harassment law sometimes punish speech that's at the core ofFirst Amendment
protection, and sometimes punish speech that is constitutionally protected."
Eugene Volokh, Freedom ofSpeech, Religious Harassment Law, and Religious
Accomodation, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 57 (Fall, 2001).
2.2. The Sixth Circuit, in fact, applies an identical test to workplace harassment
claims: "The elements and burden ofproof are the same, regardless of the
discrimination context in which the claim arises ... In order to establish a prima
facie case ofhostile work environment based on either race or religion, [the
plaintiff] must establish the following five elements: (1) He was a member of a
protected class; (2) He was subjected to unwelcome racial and/or religious
harassment; (3) The harassment was based on race or religion; (4) The
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harassment had the effect ofunreasonably interfering with [the plaintiffs] work
performance by creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment;
and (5) The existence of employer liability." Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506,
512 (6th Cir. 1999).
2.3. Yet these similarities are somewhat superficial. While sexual harassment and
racial harassment claims can be and most certainly are made in response to
"offensive" speech that is also at the "core" of constitutional protection (such as
offensive political statements in favor of the Ku Klux Klan or against workplace
equality for women), the probability that harassment claims will restrict "core"
speech is much higher in the religious harassment context.
2.3 .1. A religious identity, unlike a racial or sexual identity is often idea or
belief-driven. In other words, unlike sex or race, a person can belong to a
protected religious class because ofthe beliefs that they hold - beliefs that
are subject to change.
2.3.2. Further, because ofthe increasing conflict between Christian
conservatives and the gay rights movement (especially over issues of
education, marriage and children), employers are faced with the unpleasant
prospect of clashes between two members of equally protected classes (if
your employer is in a state or city with a statute that prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation). What is an employer to do if employee A
argues that employee B's advocacy for gay marriage and gay adoption rights
creates a hostile environment for employee A, and employee B argues that
employee A's advocacy for the Federal Marriage Amendment and
explanation ofBiblical passages prohibiting homosexual sexual activity
create a hostile environment for employee B?
2.3.3. If there is any doubt that religious harassment doctrine can suppress
protected speech, consider the following examples:
2.3.3.1. Brown Transp. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 578 A.2d 555 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1990) (holding that religiously themed newsletter articles and Bible
verses on paychecks created a hostile work environment).
2.3.3.2. Hilsman v. Runyon, Appeal Nos. 01945686,01950499, 1995 WL
217486 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 31, 1995)(concluding that a claim that an
employer "permitted the daily broadcast ofprayers over the public
address system" over the span of a year was "sufficient to allege the
existence of a hostile working environment predicated on religious
discrimination")
2.3.3.3. Wilson v. Us. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that an employer appropriately terminated plaintiffwho
refused to conceal a graphic anti-abortion button and that refusal to fire
the plaintiffwould place an undue hardship on the company by creating
a hostile environment for the plaintiffs co-workers).
2.3.3.4. In the Matter ofSapp 's Realty, No. 11-83 (BOLl 1985) (holding by
Oregon Unemployment Commission that plaintiffhad been religiously
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harassed, not by derogatory comments, but instead by continual
religious discussions with a Seventh-Day Adventist co-worker).
2.3.3.5. Employment law experts advise employers to take a hard-line stance
against religious proselytizing. See Dean J. Schaner & Melissa M.
Erlemeier, When Faith and Work Collide: Defining Standards for
Religious Harassment in the Workplace, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J., Summer
1995 at 7, 26 ("repeated, unwanted 'preaching' episodes [by a Christian
employee] that offend coworkers and adversely affect their working
conditions" are a "bright line example" of religious harassment); Mark
A. Spognardi & Staci L. Ketay, In the Lion's Den: Religious
Accomodation and Harassment in the Workplace, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.,
Spring 2000, at 7, 21 ("[A]n employer must be vigilant in guarding
against the creation of a hostile environment as a result of the
unsolicited and/or unwelcome proselytizing ofreligious employees.")
These examples are cited in Eugene Volokh, Freedom ofSpeech,
Religious Harassment Law, and Religious Accommodation, 33 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 57,60 fn 12 (2001).
2.3.4. No one can credibly argue that proselytizing or wearing religiously
significant buttons or discussing religious morality or writing religiously-
themed articles is not "core" speech or expression protected by the First
Amendment. Nor - since the prohibitions in question are targeted
specifically at religious expression - are they content and/or viewpoint-
neutral time, place and manner regulations. In almost any other context,
state regulation of this kind would be flatly unconstitutional.
2.3.5. While it may initially appear that an employer would be well-served by
issuing a policy that either bans or dramatically restricts religiously-themed
workplace conversations, in reality, such a ban would have both practical
and legal problems.
2.3.5.1. First, because a ban strikes at the kind ofspeech and expression that is
most dear to vast segments ofthe American population, it is effectively
unenforceable.
2.3.5.1.1. Take, for example, the controversy over the recent hit movie
The Passion ofthe Christ. It is safe to say that - for
approximately a week - workplace conversations were dominated
by discussions about the movie and about difficult and
challenging issues surrounding the authenticity of Gospel
accounts and historic anti-Semitism in the Catholic and protestant
churches.
2.3.5.1.2. More significantly, the events of September 11,2001, caused
many Americans to examine the teachings of Islam for the first
time and led to countless workplace discussions of the "religion of
peace."
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2.3.5.1.3. Disputes regarding gay rights and "diversity" inevitably lead to
workplace discussions and conflict. In the last five years, I have
counseled more than a dozen individuals who had religious
objections to workplace diversity training programs - especially
programs that advocated for greater legal protection for and
societal acceptance of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered
individuals.
2.3.5.2. Second, such a ban may very well be illegal itself - an illegal failure
to accommodate religious practice. The combination of Title VII's
prohibition against religious harassment and its special protection for
religious practice can place an employer in a nearly impossible
predicament.
2.3.5.2.1. It is blackletter law that an employer has an obligation to
accommodate employee religious practice so long as such
accommodation does not result in undue hardship. As the
Supreme Court has further explained in Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) and Ansonia Board ofEducation
v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986), Title VII does not create an
absolute requirement for employers to accommodate religious
practices oftheir employees. Far from it, even a de minimis
burden on an employer can be "undue" and any accommodation
which causes an employer to incur financial cost has become
virtually a per se undue burden.
2.3.5.2.2. While the burden may merely be de minimis to exempt an
employer from his accommodation requirement, it still must be
real. Mere theories or assumptions will not suffice. See Julia
Spoor, Go Tell It On the Mountain, But Keep It Out ofthe Office,
Religious Harassment in the Workplace, 31 VAL. U. L.REv. 971,
987 (Summer, 1997) and cases cited therein.
2.3.5.3. The requirement that an "undue hardship" be more than merely
theoretical has resulted in a successful religious discrimination claim
from the termination of a vocally religious employee. In Brown v. Polk
County, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995), the plaintiff, a Christian, expressed
his faith openly and frequently in the office. He hosted prayer meetings
in his office, he encouraged prayer during departmental meetings, he
displayed religious items in his office, and he frequently referred to
Bible passages regarding his work ethic. His employer reprimanded
the plaintiff and ordered him to remove all religious items from his
office, including the Bible on his desk. The plaintiff was later fired.
2.3.5.3 .1. The plaintiff sued, alleging religious discrimination. In
response, the employer argued that the plaintiffs religious
activities constituted an undue hardship because they had the
potential to cause a division in the staff. Although the employer
offered witnesses who testified to a separation on staffbetween
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born-again Christians and others, these witnesses could not testify
that the separation caused a disruption in the work environment.
The plaintiff had been reprimanded out of a desire to avoid any
such disruption. ld., at 656-657.
2.3.5.3.2. Since the employer was unable to show any actual disruption
at work, and the decision not to accommodate the employee's
religious practices was made on the basis of speculation, the Court
found for the employee and reversed the District Court's dismissal
of the case. ld.
2.3.6. As a consequence ofpractical reality and legal doctrine, the excessively-
cautious prophylactic remedies so favored by employment law specialists
may not only be inapplicable to religious discourse at work, they may also
actually expose the employer to liability for failure to accommodate
religious practice.
3. Is there a practical solution to the constitutional and legal quandary of religious
harassment and religious accommodation?
3.1. As a practical matter, any company policies that restrict religious expression
should be tied to evidence ofactual workplace disruption and actual workplace
complaints.
3.2. By tying religious harassment problems to actual workplace disruption,
employers can avoid liability for religious discrimination claims based on a
failure to accommodate (such as the claim in Brown v. Polk). Moreover,
employers will bow to the reality that employees will continue - despite
prophylactic company policy - to discuss those issues that matter the most,
regardless of their religious content.
3.3. The practical solution, however, does not solve the long-term legal dilemma:
How does anti-discrimination law prevent genuine workplace abuse at the same
time that it respects longstanding First Amendment doctrine that prevents
government suppression of "core" speech?
3.4. Perhaps the answer lies in the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia v. Black,
123 S.Ct. 1536 (2003), a recent decision that - on its face - has absolutely
nothing to do with employment discrimination.
3.4.1. In Black, the Court upheld a Virginia statute that criminalized cross
burnings that were intended to "intimidate a person or group ofpersons." In
upholding the statute, the Court held that the statute fell within an
established category of unprotected speech - threats made with the "intent of
placing the victim in fear ofbodily harm or death." ld., at 1548. The Court
also noted that the prohibition was not aimed at a particular message, nor did
it single out "specific disfavored topics." Instead, the Court found that
cross-burning, as a matter of fact, was a "particularly virulent form of
intimidation" with a "long and pernicious history of impending violence."
ld., at 1549.
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3.4.2. The Court, however, refused to condone a provision of the statute that held
that cross-burning was prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate. Id., at
1550. As a result, future convictions under the statute would require actual
evidence of intent to "intimidate."
3.5. As one commentator notes, perhaps it is the question of intent that can salvage
Title VII from overreach and from ultimate constitutional oblivion. See
generally, Robert Austin Ruescher, Saving Title VII: Using Intent to Distinguish
Harassment From Expression, 23 REv. LITIG. 349 (Spring, 2004). A court (and
an employer, when determining whether an employee has violated an anti-
harassment policy) should seek to determine whether an employee had an actual
intent to harass and to create unacceptable working conditions for other
employees or whether that employee was seeking - however imperfectly - to
engage his or her colleagues in honest dialogue over admittedly sensitive topics.
In professor Ruescher's words, "[I]mposing a limited intent requirement lets the
First Amendment trump harassment when it should: in cases when the speech is
meant to express a protected idea ofpolitical, social or religious importance. It
leaves the bulk of Title VII speech where it belongs - in the category oflow-
value speech - so as not to imped Title VII's goal ofpromoting equality by
eliminating employment discrimination."
3.6. This solution is not only constitutionally appropriate, it is culturally correct. It
cannot be contradicted that this nation was founded, in part, by individuals who
were seeking the freedom to express what they viewed as the most important part
of themselves - their belief in God as they understood him. It would be tragic if,
ultimately, that freedom was stifled at the workplace - the very place where
many of us spend the majority ofour adult lives - by the banality of litigation-
avoidance policies. The intent inquiry may be more difficult to administer than
blanket bans, but it alone can begin to harmonize the seemingly contradictory
impulses of anti-discrimination law's quest for equality and the First
Amendment's quest for freedom.
4. Why has Title VII 'jumped the shark?" Because in its present incarnation it seeks to
create career equality at the expense of fundamental constitutional and cultural
values. As Americans become increasingly aware of government-imposed
prohibitions against expression of the thoughts and ideas that are most precious to
them, Title VII will steadily lose its legitimacy. But unlike the original shark, this
shark can be unjumped. If courts and employers seek to do the hard work of
determining intent rather than taking the easy path of oppressive prevention, then
Title VII can have new life and new legitimacy as an instrument of fundamentally
American values.
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Jerold Mackenzie worked at Miller Brewing Company for nineteen years, eventually achieving
executive status and a $95,000 salary. One day, he made the simple but career-ending mistake of
recounting the previous night's episode of the sitcom Seinfeld to his co-worker Patricia Best. In the
episode, Jerry Seinfeld cannot remember the name of the woman he is dating, but he does recall
that she said kids teased her as a child because her name rhymes with a part of the female
anatomy. Jerry and his friend George brainstorm, but the best guesses they can come up with are
the unlikely "Mulva" and "Gipple." Jerry's girlfriend breaks up with him when she realizes he doesn't
know her name. As she leaves him forever, Jerry finally remembers the elusive rhyming name and
calls after her, "Delores!"
Mackenzie related the details of this episode to Best, but she told Mackenzie she did not get the
joke. To clarify the somewhat off-color punch line, Mackenzie gave her a copy of a dictionary page
on which the word "clitoris" was highlighted. Best-who was apparently known to use salty language
at work herself-complained to Miller Brewing officials of sexual harassment, and Miller Brewing fired
Mackenzie for "unacceptable managerial performance." Mackenzie responded with a lawsuit alleging
wrongful termination and other wrongs. At trial, Miller Brewing officials acknowledged that the direct
cause of Mackenzie's termination was the Seinfeld incident and the ensuing fear of a sexual
harassment lawsuit. The jury awarded Mackenzie $26.6 million, including $1.5 million in punitive
damages against Best for *2 interfering with Mackenzie's employment relationship with Miller
Brewing. The verdict was later overturned on appeal because Wisconsin law does not have a law
banning "wrongful termination." [FNJ,]
Miller Brewing's firing of Mackenzie may seem like an absurd overreaction, but it was very much
consistent with the counsel of employment law experts. They advise employers to enforce a zero-
tolerance policy for any type of sex- related remarks by employees, especially those made by
supervisors or executives like Mackenzie. Consultant Beau Crivello suggests, "A rule of thumb is that
if you can't say it or do it in a house of worship or in front of children, then don't say it or do it at
work." [FN2] The rather startling message from the experts is that speech generally protected from
government sanction loses that protection the moment it enters the workplace. Frank Carillo,
President of Executive Communications Group, warns that just because you hear something in the
media "doesn't mean you can say it [at work]. The media has a certain license to say things that the
average person can't." LFN3] Consultant Monica Ballard concurs: "'People think that if they hear
something on TV or the radio, they can say it at work. But that, of course, is not the case.'" Lf.N4J
Jerold Mackenzie, among others, would concur.
The roots of all of this censorship lie in the "hostile environment" component of anti-discrimination
law. Beginning in the late 1970s, feminist legal scholars argued that the ban on employment
discrimination against women should include a ban on sexual harassment. [FNS] Sexual harassment,
they argued, includes the act of subjecting women to a "hostile work environment" by exposing
them to offensive speech. The speech need not be directed at any individual woman to constitute
harassment. For it to qualify as harassment of a woman co-worker, it is enough that the speech
could reasonably be construed as hostile to women generally. Furthermore, the determination of
whether a hostile environment existed does not depend on whether anyone intended to make any or
all of their female co-workers feel unwelcome. An innocently offered comment can as easily be
charged with creating a hostile environment as a deliberate slur or threat.
The feminists achieved a great victory when the Supreme Court held in 1986 that an illegal hostile
work environment exists when "the workplace is *3 permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult,' ... that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
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employment.''' [FN6] Thousands of lawsuits of varying degrees of legal merit followed. Legal filings
grew exponentially after the attention given to the issue of sexual harassment during the Clarence
Thomas-Anita Hill hearings. Government agencies qUickly produced pamphlets that urged victims of
sexual harassment to file complaints and often defined "hostile environment" far more b.roadly than
the law justified.
Many employers responded to the growth of hostile environment law by attempting to regulate the
potentially offensive speech of their employees. [FN7] The result was an implicit, but nonetheless
chilling, nationwide workplace speech code that banned any speech that could offend women. The
Supreme Court, perhaps realizing that it had opened a veritable Pandora's box of litigation, has
recently emphasized the commonsense notion that sporadic abusive language, gender-related jokes,
and occasional teasing is not enough to meet the legal test for a hostile environment. [[I~HU Prudent
employers still feel compelled, however, to enforce speech gUidelines that go well beyond what the
letter of Supreme Court precedent requires.
There are several reasons for this caution. First, as four Supreme Court justices have noted in a
related context, LFN91 the fuzzy gUidance provided by hostile environment precedents simply does
not give employers a clear indication of what they must do to remain within the confines of the law.
For example, while a single offensive joke will not create liability, some courts have held that a
pattern of jokes by different employees can create a hostile environment. IFN1Q1 The safest route
for employers, then, is to ban any banter with sexual connotations, lest the aggregation of speech
by different employees constitutes a hostile environment. Better to be safe (if silent) than sorry.
Second, and relatedly, the severe and pervasive liability standard is sufficiently vague, good counsel
sufficiently expensive, and trial judges and juries sufficiently unpredictable that employers feel
compelled to settle even highly dubious claims to avoid the risks and costs of litigation. After all,
juries *4 have awarded tens of thousands of dollars to plaintiffs in cases appellate courts later
dismissed. [ENll} While clearly meritless claims rarely survive federal appellate review, no sensible
attorney would advise his clients to depend on appellate courts-which can only overturn "clearly
erroneous" jury verdicts-to save them from unjustified claims. This is especially true because
fighting a claim to the appellate level can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, with the costs
disproportionately borne by the defendant. Victory may be sweet, but saving one's company six-digit
sums by avoiding litigation entirely is even sweeter. Risk-averse employers will settle pending cases,
and prevent future lawsuits by cracking down on potentially offensive speech.
Third, disgruntled employees or former employees can impose large costs on employers without
going through the effort and expense of filing a lawsuit simply by complaining of harassment to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC is legally required to investigate
every complaint of sex discrimination, no matter how weak or unconvincing a complaint seems.
Even a trivial complaint can lead to a broad investigation of the underlying claim, costing the
employer thousands of dollars in legal fees and lost time. And petty complaints are actually
encouraged by official government pronouncements that propagate overly broad definitions of what
constitutes illegal sexual harassment. For example, an official United States Department of Labor
pamphlet stated that harassment included cases where a co-worker "made sexual jokes or said
sexual things that you didn't like, so long as the jokes made it hard to work." LEN1:?] A very
sensitive or very religious individual may find that any sex-oriented remarks make it hard to work.
That individual is encouraged by government publications to complain of sexual harassment the first
time a co-worker tells a dirty joke. The offended worker will likely lose, but not before her employer
wastes resources in its defense.
Fourth, many states and localities have their own anti-discrimination laws with standards for hostile
environment liability that are sometimes significantly broader than federal law's requirement of
severe and pervasive harassment. For example, a New Jersey court held that under state law,
employees who forwarded one list of crude jokes to their colleagues via e-mail had created an illegal
"offensive work environment," even though this act would unlikely create liability under federal law.
[FN13] Even if state and local law are no broader than federal law, employers are at a special
disadvantage when a *5 hostile environment complaint is filed under state or local law because in
that circumstance, unlike in the federal system, administrative tribunals often make the initial ruling
on hostile environment claims. Because these administrative bodies are part of executive branch
agencies charged specifically with enforcing the relevant anti-discrimination laws, they naturally tend
to be more sympathetic to discrimination claims and less sensitive to free speech concerns than are
federal courts, which have broader responsibilities and are part of the judicial branch of government.
Hostile environment law has spread well beyond the sex discrimination context with claims
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successfully prosecuted for race, religion, and national origin harassment. One court, for example,
found that publishing religious articles in a company newsletter and printing Christian-themed verses
on company paychecks constituted "harassment" of a Jewish employee. [FN14] Another court found
that an employee who hung in her cubicle pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini and of Iranian
protestors burning the American flag was guilty of national origin harassment against an Iranian
American employee who happened to see the display. LENtS] Court rulings and EEOC guidelines
suggest that religious harassment includes both a religious employee proselytizing a co-worker and
a secular employee ridiculing a religious co- worker for the latter's beliefs. [EN161
As in the sex discrimination context, a hostile environment claim for race discrimination and other
types of workplace discrimination can arise even when the speech in question was not directed at
the plaintiff. For example, the EEOC charged a company with national origin harassment after a
Japanese American employee filed a complaint about the firm's advertising campaign. Some of the
company's ads featured images of a samurai, a kabuki, and of sumo wrestling to represent the
firm's Japanese competitors. The employee also charged that officials of the company called their
Japanese competitors "Japs" and "slant- eyes." The case was eventually settled for an undisclosed
amount. [EN!?]
Standards for racial and ethnic harassment are, at least, as vague as they are in the sexual
harassment context, which leads to unpredictable jury verdicts. Even highly questionable claims can
result in large verdicts, giving employers strong incentives to heavily regulate workplace speech as a
preventative measure.
*6 One especially meritless claim that led to a six-figure verdict involved Allen Fruge, a white
Department of Energy (DOE) employee based in Texas. Fruge unwittingly spawned a harassment
suit when he followed up a southeastern Texas training session with a bit of self-deprecating humor.
He sent several of his colleagues, who had attended the session with him, gag certificates anointing
each of them as an honorary "Coon Ass" [ENJ8]-usually spelled "coonass"-a mildly derogatory slang
term for a Cajun. The certificate stated that "[y]ou are to sing, dance, and tell jokes and eat boudin,
cracklins, gumbo, crawfish etouffe and just about anything else." The joke stemmed from the fact
that southeastern Texas, the training session location, has a large Cajun population, including Fruge
himself.
An African American recipient of a certificate, Sherry Reid, Chief of the Nuclear and Fossil Branch of
the DOE in Washington, D.C., apparently missed the joke and complained to her supervisors that
Fruge had called her a "coon." Fruge sent Reid a formal (and humble) letter of apology for the
inadvertent offense, and explained what "Coon Ass" actually meant. Reid nevertheless remained
convinced that "Coon Ass" was a racial pejorative, and demanded that Fruge be fired. DOE
supervisors declined to fire Fruge, but they did send him to "diversity training." They also reminded
Reid that the certificate had been meant as a joke, that Fruge had meant no offense, that "Coon
Ass" is slang for Cajun, and that Fruge had sent the certificates to people of various races and
ethnicities, so he clearly was not targeting African Americans. Reid nevertheless sued the DOE,
claiming that she had been subjected to a racial epithet that had created a hostile environment, a
situation made worse by the DOE's failure to fire Fruge.
Reid's case was seemingly frivolous. The linguistics expert that her attorney hired was unable to
present evidence that "Coon Ass" meant anything but "Cajun," or that the phrase had any racist
origins. And Reid presented no evidence that Fruge had any discriminatory intent when he sent the
certificate to her. Moreover, even if "Coon Ass" had been a racial epithet, a single instance of being
given a joke certificate, even one containing ,a racial epithet, by a non-supervisory colleague who
works 1,200 miles away does not seem to remotely satisfy the legal requirement that harassment
must be "severe and pervasive" for it to create hostile environment liability. Nevertheless, a federal
district court allowed the case to go to trial, [FN19] and the jury awarded Reid $120,000, plus
another $100,000 in attorney's fees. LEI",J2Ql The DOE settled the case before its appeal could be
heard for a sum very close to the jury award.
*7 Even if a disgruntled worker decides not to take a case all the way to a jury, he can still impose
costs on his boss or his ex-boss by alleging that he was subjected to a hostile environment, even if
he has scant supporting evidence. For example, a gay man named John Dill put his former
employer, CPA Referral, in a pickle when he filed a complaint of employment discrimination with the
Seattle Human Rights Department (SHRD). Dill claimed that his ex-boss, Bryan Griggs, had created
a "hostile work environment" for homosexuals in violation of a local anti-discrimination ordinance.
According to Dill, Griggs' offensive behavior consisted of playing conservative and Christian radio
shows that Dill felt conveyed an anti-gay message, posting a letter from a congresswoman in which
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she endorsed the military's policy of excluding gaysl and having a note on his desk reminding
himself to lobby against allowing gays to adopt children. Dill acknowledged that Griggs did not know
he was gay and that Dill never told Griggs that any of Griggs' actions offended or upset him.
Dill had been employed by CPA Referral the previous fall l but Griggs had laid him off when business
slowed. Griggs allowed Dill to come back to work as a volunteerl promising him the first available
paid job. Much to Griggs' surprise l Dill suddenly tendered his resignation in a letter stating that "I
feel I must 'come out' and stop playing 'don't askl don't tell.'" [FN21] In his letterl Dill explained that
he was leaving CPA Referral for "a supportive environment."[fI''t:?_2J He then filed his complaint, and
the SHRD launched a full investigation of CPA Referral.
The befuddled Griggs told the SHRD that he listened to the conservative talk shows to make sure
they played the advertising he had paid for, and that he posted many letters from politicians to
encourage political participation among his employees. Another gay employee signed an affidavit
swearing that he had never perceived any anti-gay animus in the workplace. There seemed to have
been no evidence that Dill suffered anti-gay discrimination, and a cynic might surmise that Dill filed
the complaint mainly to get revenge on Griggs for having fired him. Dill eventually withdrew his
complaint, but only after Griggs had spent thousands of dollars on legal fees defending himself and
his company. LEN23J If Dill's goal was to punish Griggs, he managed to achieve it even without
being formally vindicated by a court.
Most hostile environment employment cases have focused on whether the behavior at issue crossed
the line from merely annoying or offensive conduct *8 into conduct sufficiently severe and pervasive
enough to meet the law's definition of creating a hostile environment. A few private employersl
however, have unsuccessfully tried to claim First Amendment immunity from speech-based hostile
environment claims.
The first reported hostile environment lawsuit in which the defendant invoked a free speech defense
involved Lois Robinson, a welder at a Florida shipyard, who brought a case in federal court alleging
that her employer, Jacksonville Shipyards, countenanced a hostile environment by permitting photos
of nude and partially nude women to be displayed in various areas of her workplace. [E!\"-2_41 She
also complained about sexual and discriminatory remarks made in her presence about her and other
women and about indecent and obscene graffiti directed at her. [FN25] Jacksonville Shipyards
responded that the First Amendment protected at least some of this speech and asked the judge to
prohibit Robinson from relying upon constitutionally protected speech to support her hostile
environment claim.
The judge denied that the First Amendment protects workplace speech from employment
discrimination law. LFN261 The judge then issued an incredibly broad injunction that banned from
the Jacksonville Shipyards' workplace not only pornography I but also any "sexually suggestive"
material. IFN2Z1 Employees on lunch break could no longer read Cosmopolitan magazine or Danielle
Steel novels, or listen to Eminem or Britney Spears on a Walkman.
The court found that the First Amendment did not protect the workplace speech at issue for several
reasons, none of which are persuasive. First, the court asserted that the company was not
expressing itself through the offensive expression of its employees. What the court failed to discern
was that because the company was being held liable for the speech of its employees, the relevant
question was whether the employees' speech was constitutionally protected. There is no doubt that
the Constitution protects such speech from government regulation, even when the speech conflicts
with a broader regulatory scheme like hostile environment law. IFN2JU The court failed to recognize
that employers may assert a First Amendment defense on behalf of their employees and may have
their own First Amendment right to refuse to prohibit workplace speech. IFN291
*9 Next, the court opined that the nude pinups and expressions of hostility toward women in the
shipyard were not protected speechl but were discriminatory conduct in the form of creation of a
hostile work environment. Here, the court was correct insofar as it pointed out that speech can
sometimes be considered conduct-for example, threats, intimidation, libel, and other forms of
misconduct engaged in through speech do not receive First Amendment protection. Similarly, "quid
pro quo" harassment (e.g' l "sleep with me or else!") is not protected by the First Amendment.
ArguablYI the government may even regulate as action harassing speech targeted at a particular
individual for discriminatory reasons. But merely labeling speech "discrimination/, as the Robinson
court did, does not make it discrimination. Posting a nonobscene pinup or expressing a politically
incorrect opinion is protected outside the workplace, and the mere change in venue from the
sidewalk to the office cannot convert such protected speech into unprotected discriminatory action.
Given that most adults spend much of their time in the workplace and given that almost any speech
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beyond the most banal is likely to offend someone, allowing the government to regulate any
offensive speech that occurs in the workplace would invite an incredibly broad assault on the
freedom of speech.
The Robinson court next contended that regulation of offensive workplace speech was a permissible
regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech. The government can regulate these aspects of
speech, such as restricting parades and protests to certain times of the day or limiting the volume of
a megaphone in a residential area. But time, place, and manner restrictions can only be valid if they
do not regulate speech based on the speaker's viewpoint. For example, a rule disallowing the use of
megaphones during protests in residential neighborhoods may be valid, but a rule forbidding
megaphones only when they are used to criticize affirmative action would be illicit viewpoint
discrimination. Hostile environment law clearly discriminates based on viewpoint. LEI',t3_QJ For
example, hostile environment law potentially penalizes the expression of the viewpoint that "women
are stupid and incapable of being physicists," but not that "women are brilliant and make excellent
physicists." Therefore, hostile environment law cannot be considered an appropriate time, place, and
manner regulation.
Finally, the court insisted that plaintiff Robinson was a "captive audience" in the shipyard and
therefore the First Amendment did not protect speech that offended her. Yet, we are all at times
captive to expression we find offensive in the sense that we must take action to avoid seeing or
hearing it. Nevertheless, that speech is still constitutionally protected. Of course, avoiding some
types of offensive speech is relatively easy while avoiding *10 offensive workplace speech by finding
new employment can be difficult and costly. But if courts accepted Robinson's view that the First
Amendment does not protect offensive speech that is very difficult or costly to avoid, much of
modern First Amendment law would need to be discarded. For example, contrary to Supreme Court
precedent, strikers would not have the right to picket outside their workplace, and anti-abortion
protestors would not have the right to assemble outside abortion clinics. [FN3l] The Supreme Court
has even protected the right of an individual to wear a jacket displaying the phrase "Fuck the Draft"
inside a courthouse where many people who will see the profanity are truly a "captive audience" in
that they are legally reqUired to be there. [FN32] If offensive speech is thus protected when
avoiding it would require committing a crime by refusing to show up in court when required, surely it
must also be protected when avoiding it would only involve sWitching jobs. Even if the captive
audience rationale could be used to justify speech restrictions in the workplace, any such restrictions
would have to be viewpoint-neutral, which, as noted above, hostile environment law's restrictions
are not.
Despite the seemingly fatal weaknesses in Robinson's First Amendment analysis, many other courts
have relied on it in rejecting First Amendment defenses in hostile environment cases. [FN33] Most
commonly in cases favorably citing Robinson, the plaintiff had been SUbjected to a pattern of severe
individualized harassment, and the First Amendment defense applied only to a fraction of the
behavior that allegedly created a hostile environment. However, nothing in Robinson limits its
application to cases in which constitutionally protected expression is only a minor element. One
court, in fact, cited Robinson favorably in a case where the plaintiff's sole allegation was that her
opponents for a union position had circulated a satirical flyer during an election campaign. LFN34]
The satire featured a picture of the plaintiff's head superimposed over an anonymous woman's
naked body. This was tasteless, to be sure, but it was also political speech clearly protected by the
First Amendment, as indicated by a landmark Supreme Court opinion protecting an even more
offensive satire of Jerry Falwell that appeared in Hustler magazine. [FN35]
*11 Just as the injunction granted in Robinson created an unprecedented prior restraint (proactively
censoring speech before it is spoken) on sexist speech, the California Supreme Court recently upheld
an unprecedented prior restraint on racist speech. A jury had found that an Avis Rent-A-Car outlet
had engaged in employment discrimination in part by allowing an employee to repeatedly utter
racial epithets targeted at the Latino plaintiffs. Besides awarding damages, the trial court issued an
injunction prohibiting Avis employees "from using any derogatory racial or ethnic epithets directed
at, or descriptive of, Hispanic/Latino employees of [Avis]." [EN3JH An appellate court limited the
injunction to the workplace and attempted to narrow the scope of the injunction via a proposed list
of specific words that the district court could ban. Not satisfied that these modifications made the
injunction comport with the First Amendment, Avis appealed again.
A 4-3 majority of the California Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's decision. The three
dissenters argued that the injunction amounted to a prior restraint on constitutionally protected
speech. They pointed out that U.S. Supreme Court precedent showed that prior restraints are not
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allowed for speech that might, but won't necessarily, be illegal. The reason for this rule is that such
restraints have a chilling effect on what could have been legal, protected speech. For example, a
single future pejorative use of a racial epithet, although banned by the injunction, cannot be the
severe and pervasive harassment required to create an illegal hostile work environment; in some
contexts it might be severe, but a single comment cannot be "pervasive." For that mattert racial
epithets can be uttered in contexts that do not evince hostility. For example, epithets could be
mentioned during "diversity education" or could be used ironically, yet these uses of the epithets
would be banned by the injunction's prior restraint. Justice Clarence Thomas urged his colleagues to
hear Avis's appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court because of the "troubling free speech issues" raised
by the case, [FN37] but he was not successful and the injunction stood.
The ultimate outcome of the battle between the First Amendment and the speech-regulating aspects
of hostile environment law thus remains unresolved and will remain that way until the U. S.
Supreme Court chooses to resolve the issue. No court has yet held directly that the First
Amendment prohibits workplace speech from being the basis of Title VII liability if that speech would
be protected in other contexts. However, four Supreme Court justices have suggested that hostile
environment law sometimes violates the First *12 Amendment, IEN381 and other federal courts
have expressed alarm at hostile environment law's growing conflict with the freedom of speech.
LFN39]
Federal courts have also been sympathetic to First Amendment objections to prophylactic measures
ordered by state and local governments to avoid creating a hostile environment in the public sector
workplace. For example, courts have held that prohibiting prisoners and on-duty firefighters from
reading Playboy unconstitutionally restricts expression, despite claims that allowing these
pornographic magazines to be read creates a hostile work environment for female prison guards and
female firefighters. IEN.10J
In the absence of definitive Supreme Court gUidance, however, hostile environment law marches on.
In February 2002, for example, Anchorage, Alaska, fearing lawsuits by female firefighters, banned
from its firehouse not only Playboy and other pornographic magazines, but also the slightly racy
men's magazine Maxim. [FN411 And the law continues to grow. The latest trend in this expansion is
employees suing employers for not preventing hostile environments allegedly created by patrons.
For example, the EEOC has declared that twelve Minneapolis librarians were subjected to a sexually
hostile work environment when they were exposed to pornography accessed on the Internet by
library patrons. If courts agree with the EEOC, all libraries, public and private, will need to ban
Internet access to "offensive" sites or face hostile environment liability. LEN42.]
There are signs that the public is growing impatient with the corrosive effect of hostile environment
law on freedom of expression. One of the more amusing manifestations of this disquiet is an episode
of the animated series South Park. After a visit from the "Sexual Harassment Panda," the children of
South Park begin to sue each other for harassment over minor insults. Eventually, the children
pursue deeper pockets: the school where these insults take place. The school is bankrupted, while
Kyle's attorney father, who represents the plaintiffs, becomes wealthy. This leads to the following
exchange:
Father: "You see, son, we live in a liberal democratic society. The Democrats [sic-it was a mostly
Republican EEOC and Supreme Court] created sexual harassment law, which tells *13 us what we
can and cannot say in the workplace, and what we can and cannot do in the workplace."
Kyle: "But isn't that fascism?"
Father: "No, because we don't call it fascism."
[ENal]. Professor, George Mason University School of Law. This essay is based on remarks
presented in a lecture at Ohio Northern University on April 10, 2003, sponsored by the Faculty
Enrichment Committee and the Federalist Society and is drawn from Chapter 2 of David E.
Bernstein, You Can't Say That!: The Growing Threat to Civil Liberties from Antidiscrimination Laws
(2003). The Law and Economics Center at George Mason University School of Law prOVided helpful
funding.
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PREAMBLE
A colleague ofmine, Wendy Bryant, a partner with Greenebaurn Doll &
McDonald, PLLC, has prepared the outline on this topic for several past Employment
Law Institutes. The last time she prepared the update, in 2002, she covered, in depth, all
relevant cases which had been decided for a time period beginning as early as 1998 and
concluding with the early part of2002. This Outline is not intended to be a restatement
of that information, but rather an update ofrelevant cases since that time period.
INTRODUCTION
Workplace harassment has been, and remains, a heavily litigated subject matter.
Although courts have begun to recognize national origin, racial, and religious-based
harassment, the overwhelming majority of cases still concern sexual harassment.
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court adopted an entirely new analytical
framework for harassment cases in Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998),
and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Most of us practice in
either the Kentucky state and/or federal court system and in the Sixth Circuit. This
outline discusses the key cases which have been rendered in the last couple ofyears from
the Sixth Circuit Court ofAppeals and Kentucky federal and state courts as related to
workplace harassment.
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SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES.
1. Wiseman v. Whayne Supply Company, F.3d ,2004 WL 62498
(W.n. Ky. Jan. 12,2004).
The Plaintiff in this case brought a claim of sexual harassment against her
employer alleging that she was in a hostile work environment. Specifically, the Plaintiff
made the following allegations:
A) Her manager picked at her, made her feel worthless and degraded;
B) Her immediate supervisor told her she could not go to training
because she would not be accepted because she was a woman;
C) The men in her area were mean to her and talked down to her;
D) She was not invited to meetings;
E) Her manager called her a liar, would not speak to her at times, and
told her she was incompetent; and
F) Her immediate supervisor was generally mean to her and told her
there was no time to discuss the yearly performance standards.
There was also a big misunderstanding as to whether the Plaintiff resigned her job
or the Company eliminated her position.
The Court found the following to be elements of a hostile work environment claim:
A) Employee is a member of a protected class;
B) Employee was subject to un-welcomed sexual harassment;
C) Harassment was based on employee's sex;
D) Harassment created a hostile work environment; and
E) Employer failed to take reasonable care to prevent and correct any
sexually harassing behavior.
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The Court cited at length from Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17
(1993), and made the following points which would be relevant to any claim:
A) A hostile work environment occurs ''when the workplace is permeated
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment," id at 21;
B) The "totality" of the circumstances must be viewed when determining if
the alleged actions were sufficiently severe or pervasive - Court looks at
work environment as a whole, not just the individual acts of alleged
hostility; and
C) Relevant Factors: frequency of conduct, severity, is it physically
threatening or humiliating; or a mere offensive utterance and does it
unreasonably interfere with an employee's work performance. Id. at 23.
The Court found that Plaintiff's claim was fatally flawed because she
could not tie the "intimidation, ridicule and mistreatment" she felt to the fact she
was a woman.
Quotes from the Court:
A) "None ofPlaintiff's allegations actually specify any gender specific
words, phrases, or connotations. The absence of such remarks or
connotations creates a significant evidentiary problem for Plaintiff."
B) "Typically, harassing behavior must contain gender derogatory language
to be actionable. Some evidence must suggest that the harassment is
sexual in nature. One cannot assume that harassment is sexual."
C) "Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the
workplace but is directed only at discrimination because of sex. In Title
VII actions it is important to distinguish between harassment and
discriminatory harassment in order to ensure that Title VII does not
become a general civility code."
D) "Men and women can both be ignorant, stupid, lazy and worthless. A trier
of fact cannot infer that harassment emanated from an anti-woman bias
merely because a man directed that harassment toward a woman."
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Other Issues/Points In Case:
A) Court recognized that Title VII and the KCRA have similar purposes and
it is common to look to the federal law and cases when construing KRS
Chapter 344.
B) Even ifhostile work environment had been established, there was no proof
that the offender was Plaintiffs supervisor and liability could have been
established only by showing the Company knew or should have known of
the harassment and failed to implement prompt, appropriate and corrective
action.
C) Even if the actions were deemed to be by Plaintiffs supervisor, no
liability existed because the supervisor's "harassment" did not result in a
tangible adverse employment action. Upon reporting the allegations,
Plaintiff was not discharged, demoted or undesirably reassigned.
Therefore, the affirmative defense is available to the Company because (1)
it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correctly prompt any sexually
harassing behavior, and (2) the Plaintiff failed to take advantage of the
opportunities.
2. Akers v. Alvey, 338 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2003).
Cindy Akers was hired as a family services worker with the Kentucky Cabinet for
Families & Children in July of 1997. In August 1998, Donald Alvey was promoted to be
the supervisor of the office where she worked. Eighteen (18) days later, Akers made her
first complaint of sexual harassment.
Akers claimed, in her lawsuit, that Alvey did the following:
1) Made lewd gestures with his tongue and hand while moaning;
2) Commented daily about Akers' physique;
3) Got close to Akers;
4) Attempted to look down Akers' blouse;
5) Questioned Akers about masturbation and about her sex life with
her boyfriend;
6) Expressed in front of other employees that he would like to have
sex with Akers;
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7) Made comments to Akers about her co-workers' sexual histories
and physiques;
8) Sent explicit e-mail messages; and
9) Described his last episode oforal sex in great detail.
Akers claimed Alvey engaged in thirty (30) acts of inappropriate conduct in a two
and one half month period.
The Cabinet investigated, found the complaints to be unsubstantiated, but did
remove Akers from Alvey's supervision by transferring her to another office. Akers
claims she was never accepted in her new office due to the ongoing complaint against
Alvey and resigned.
This case went to the 6th Circuit on an agreed order between the parties. The trial
court permitted the Plaintiffs sexual harassment hostile work environment claim to go to
a jury, but granted summary judgment on her other claims.
Court's Analysis.
1) The Sixth Circuit reversed the summary judgment on the tort of outrage
claim, thereby allowing it to go to a jury. As such, this case presents an
interesting factual scenario for those trying to get around the long line of
cases summarily dismissing tort of outrage claims.
2) The Sixth Circuit discussed, at length, a claim of "retaliatory harassment."
To establish a claim of retaliation, the Court stated Akers must prove:
a) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII;
b) the exercise of that protected right was known to the employer;
c) the employer thereafter took an employment action adverse to the
Plaintiff, or that the Plaintiffwas subjected to severe or pervasive
retaliatory harassment by a supervisor; and
d) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action or harassment.
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The Court then discussed "retaliatory harassment." The issue was whether
"Alvey's post-complaint harassment" was retaliatory. The post-complaint investigation
lasted two weeks and during those two weeks, Akers alleged that Alvey retaliated against
her by (1) refusing to speak to her, (2) instructing other employees not to associate with
her, (3) withholding her mail and inter-office memoranda, and (4) criticizing the way she
handled her cases.
The Court noted that "severe or pervasive supervisor harassment" following a
sexual harassment complaint can constitute retaliation. The Court held:
A) this severe or pervasive test in the retaliation context is the same as in the
sexual/racial discrimination contexts;
B) harassment must alter the conditions ofthe victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment;
C) the test has an objective and subjective component: reasonable personal
standard and the victim must subjectively regard the environment as
hostile.
In this case, the Court held that a claim had not been sustained for retaliatory
harassment, but found the call to be a close one based upon the facts. The Court noted
that in an earlier case wherein a retaliatory harassment claim was stated, the facts
involved more than "simple teasing, offhand comments and isolated incidents." In
Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2000), the supervisor
called the plaintiffmore than thirty (30) times for the sole purpose ofharassing her, sat
outside her office and stared in the window at her, and thew nails on her home driveway
on more than one occasion. Id. at 793. That case was described by the Court as
"egregious." The facts ofthis case were determined to fall somewhere between teasing
and isolated incidents and egregious conduct which is redressable.
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There was an interesting dissent in this case which is worth reading.
3. American General Life & Accident Insurance Company v. Hall, 74 S.W.3d
688 (Ky. 2002).
Plaintiff claimed that her supervisor subjected her on a daily basis to unwelcome,
sexually explicit comments about their respective body parts, his sex life, and his sexual
fantasies about her. Plaintiff also indicated her supervisor brushed up against her breasts
and on one occasion, exposed his genitalia to her.
In addition to filing a lawsuit on sexual harassment hostile work environment, the
plaintiff also filed an application for workers' compensation benefits based upon the
same allegations as her sexual harassment claim. She was awarded thirty-eight (38)
weeks of temporary total disability benefits ($15,805.72), and four hundred, twenty-five
(425) weeks ofpermanent partial disability benefits ($66,291.50).
*Court held that because the Plaintiff had pursued and
accepted workers' compensation benefits, she was
precluded from bringing a sexual harassment hostile work
environment claim.
4. Clark v. United Parcel Service, 286 F.Supp.2d 819 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
Two female employees brought claims of sexual harassment hostile work
environment. One employee alleged the occurrence ofthree incidents over two and one
half years, while the other employee alleged seventeen incidents over a two year period.
Although the Court eventually held that the plaintiffs did not make out their
claims, a large portion of the analysis was dedicated to the employer's affirmative
defense. UPS had a reporting procedure, which neither plaintiff utilized, and upon
hearing the complaints, did a prompt investigation and removed the harasser.
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The Court held a "generalized" fear of retaliation for reporting a sexual
harassment claim is not enough to excuse an employee from complying with the
Company's policy on reporting.
The Court also held that the knowledge oflow-Ievel management personnel about
harassing incidents cannot be attributed to the employer. The Court specifically noted
that the knowledge oflow-Ievel supervisors who are not in a position to reprimand or
terminate the wrongdoer will not be imputed to the company.
The Court also held that individual supervisors are not personally liable under
KCRA.
5. Dauley v. Hops of Bowling Green, Ltd., 2003 WL 1340013 (Ky. App. 2003).
The plaintiffwas a part-time server at Hops restaurant. When hired, she was
given a copy ofthe restaurant's sexual harassment policy. The manager later received
complaints from female employees that the plaintiffwas acting toward them in a
sexually-offensive manner. The manager first told Dauley he would have to let her go,
then offered her an opportunity to return to work, pending an investigation. She refused
and filed a breach of fiduciary duty and retaliatory discharge claim.
The Court, in an analysis of the wrongful discharge claim, specifically found that
KRS 344.280(1) was intended to protect those making claims of sexual harassment, not
those charge with committing the offense. As such, a wrongful discharge claim would
not be sustained.
6. Grego v. Meijer, Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 676 (W.D. Ky. 2002).
Plaintiff worked for two months with the company. During that time period, two
co-workers allegedly sexually harassed her by doing the following:
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1) making offensive sexual gestures and comments;
2) winking at her;
3) making kissing faces;
4) asking her out;
5) touching her shoulders and back;
6) telling her they would like to have sex with her;
7) telling her "I'd like you to ride me like a horse, or a bus ... so you can
have my baby"; and
8) blocking her way from exiting a freezer.
Other female employees also complained about the two employees.
The Court held that the standard for co-worker harassment had been met as there
was proof she was in the protected class, unwelcome sexual harassment had occurred and
the harassment was based on her sex. Even though the acts lasted only two months, they
were deemed pervasive during the two months.
The Court also found that it was a jury issue as to whether the company had acted
appropriately and promptly.
The Court also held punitive damages were available under the KCRA.
7. Kentucky Department of Corrections v. McCullough, 123 S.W.3d 130 (Ky.
2003).
The Court held that punitive damages are not available under KCRA, Section
344.450. Further, the Court held KRS 411.184 and 411.186 do not make such damages
available.
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NATIONAL ORIGIN HARASSMENT.
1. Simoudis v. Ford Motor Company, 29 Fed. Appx. 314, 2002 WL 193933 (6th
eir.2002).
The Plaintiff is a Greek-American who claimed he was subjected to a hostile
work environment as a result ofbeing told jokes about homosexuals and Greeks, and
because he was called offensive names referring to his Greek heritage.
The Court held that to prevail on a claim ofnational origin harassment, a plaintiff
must show:
a) he was a member of a protected class;
b) he was subject to unwelcome harassment;
c) the harassment was based on his national origin;
d) the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with his work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile or offensive work environment; and
e) the employer failed to take reasonable care to prevent and correct
any harassing behavior.
Citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
The Court spent some time discussing the Burlington and Faragher cases as
related to employer liability and agency principles. The Court stated:
1) Employers are liable for hostile work environments created by
supervIsors:
2) Affirmative defenses are available to employers when no tangible adverse
employment action has occurred; and
3) No affirmative defense is available if a supervisor's harassment
culminates in a tangible employment action.
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RACIAL HARASSMENT.
1. Gibson v. The Finish Line, Inc. of Delaware, 261 F.Supp.2d 785, 91 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1629 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
The Court adopted same test for racial hostile work environment as sexual hostile
work environment:
Plaintiff must establish that (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she was
subjected to unwelcome racial and/or religious harassment, (3) the harassment was based
on race or religion, (4) the harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with the
plaintiffs work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work
environment, and (5) the existence of employer liability.
The complaint arose because Plaintiff was discussing, in the workplace, her
decision to convert from Baptist to a Black Muslim. Discussions were held about
learning about the Nation ofIslam. A co-worker later told other workers that the plaintiff
was a racist and her religion was worse than the Ku Klux Klan. An altercation occurred
at a later date which led to the termination of the Plaintiff.
The Court found no actionable hostile work environment because the plaintiff
testified she did not subjectively regard the environment as abusive. In a deposition, she
indicated she viewed her co-workers' comments as "silly," "immature," and "not that
serious."
The Court allowed her retaliation claim to go to the jury.
2. Johnson v. Box USA Group, Inc., 208 F.Supp.2d 737 (W.D. Ky. 2002).
Plaintiffbrought a racial hostile work environment claim based on two incidents:
1) Caucasian supervisor referred to him on one occasion as "boy"; and
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2) Caucasian supervisor repeated a joke told by an African-American co-
worker and said the words "ghetto kool Aid" in front of the Plaintiff.
Court ruled this was not enough to make out a hostile work environment
claim.
3. City of Louisville v. Lumpkins, 2003 WL 1232082 (Ky. App. 2003).
This case centered around three African-American teenagers who obtained
summer jobs as lifeguards. The alleged the following:
1) They were always assigned to predominantly African-American populated
pools because their supervisor told them they would "fit in better;"
2) They were assigned the dirtiest cleaning jobs;
3) They were excluded from an after-hours party for staff;
4) They were frequently called "boy"; and
5) On August 11, 1997, they were called "niggers" by their supervisor.
The jury awarded each teenager $167,000 for embarrassment and humiliation.
The City appealed.
The Court analyzed the situation as a racial hostile work environment claim and
indicated that the totality of circumstances were to be reviewed, not individual acts of
harassment and hostility. The Court did conclude, however, that ajury instruction was
erroneous inasmuch as it did not contain an admonition that an insolated incident is
insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment (unless extremely serious). The
matter was remanded for a new trial.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR") has became more widespread
after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). In Gilmer, the Court held that an employee was
compelled to arbitrate his age discrimination claims against his employer
pursuant the arbitration clause contained in a securities registration agr.eement
that he signed. Although Gilmer did not deal with the issue of arbitration
agreements in general employment contracts, employers saw the decision as a
green light to include such agreements in employment contracts.
In 2001, the Supreme Court addressed that issue in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (2001), holding that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
and its policy of favoring, encouraging and enforcing the resolution of disputes
through arbitration, did indeed extend to arbitration of matters between most
employers and employees (excluding only transportation workers engaged in
"interstate commerce").
Moreover, the Supreme Court spoke again on the issue of arbitration in EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 754 (2002). In this case, the Supreme Court found
that the EEOC could bring suit, seeking back pay, reinstatement, compensatory
and punitive damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act on behalf of an
employee against his employer - - even though the employee had signed, at the
time he was hired, an agreement to arbitrate all employment disputes.
(The Circuit City and Waffle House decisions are discussed at greater length
below.)
II. ARBITRATION
A. In the event that workplace disputes cannot be resolved through internal
ADR programs or external mediation, employers can submit unresolved
disputes to arbitration.
B. While an employer and an employee can in theory agree to submit to
arbitration any given dispute, it is preferable to have an agreed, mandatory
arbitration plan in advance.
C. When parties decide to arbitrate a dispute, they submit the dispute to an
impartial arbitrator or panel of arbitrators for resolution. Unlike the process
of mediation, an arbitrator makes a determination of the dispute and the
determination is normally final and binding.
D. Even though an arbitrator's decision may be challenged in court, courts
apply a highly deferential standard when reviewing an arbitrator's decision
and generally uphold the award unless there has been fraud, corruption,
procedural unfairness or the arbitrator has exceeded his authority.
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III. CONSIDERING ARBITRATION
A. An employer should consider the following factors when it is deciding
whether to require employees to arbitrate workplace disputes:
1. Quantity ofpotential employment-related lawsuits
If an employer historically has experienced, or expects in the future
to experience, a high number of employment-related lawsuits,
arbitrating those disputes instead of litigating them will likely result
in lower expenditures of time and money.
2. Protection of reputation for vigorously defending adverse claims
Many employers prefer to litigate rather than settle disputes with its
employees to convey the message that they will defend the integrity
of their company against adverse claims. Arbitration is enough like
litigation and unlike settlement to maintain an employer's reputation
for not backing down to employees' grievances. Arbitration has the
advantage of being generally less time consuming and expensive
than litigation.
3. Desire to avoid employee-friendly jurisdictions
If the jurisdictions in which the employer is often sued are employee
friendly, an employer may achieve more success by arbitrating
employment-related disputes.
On the other hand, an employer who is likely to be sued in an
employer-friendly jurisdiction may avoid a significant amount of the
time and costs associated with litigation through frequent success
on summary jUdgment.
4. Effectiveness of arbitration given the culture and environment of the
workplace
An employer should be cognizant of how employees will perceive
the use of arbitration to resolve workplace disputes. If employees
do not trust dispute resolution processes outside of the court, they
may be reluctant to agree to submit disputes to arbitration.
IV. DRAFTING AN ARBITRATION PLAN: ESSENTIALS
A. As with any ADR program, an employer must ensure that its arbitration
program will appear neutral and in fact operate fairly from a substantive
and procedural standpoint. Some of the things that an employer should
include in any arbitration plan to ensure its fairness are:1
1 See National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (NRRED) and Due Process Protocol,
discussed in Section VII, infra, for a more complete list of the provisions that should be included in an
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1. Bilateral policy
The policy should subject both the employee and the emp~oyer to
arbitrate certain claims that they may have against each other.
2. Division of costs associated with arbitration
Employers should ensure that arbitration is a financially viable
method of conflict resolution for its employees. Therefore, the costs
of the arbitration should be divided in a way that an employee does
not have to pay an unreasonable amount, if any amount at all. The
Sixth Circuit's decision in Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317
F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (en bane) is discussed below.
3. Procedure for selecting a neutral arbitrator and the forum for
arbitration2
Employers are cautioned to include all the parties to the dispute in
the process of selecting an arbitrator and the place where the
arbitration is to be held. In addition, the parties should choose an
arbitrator that is experienced and trained in dealing with the types
of disputes that arise in the workplace.
4. A list of the types of employees by job category that are subject to
arbitrating their workplace disputes
5. A list of types of claims that may be arbitrated
Even though the list need not be exhaustive, it should provide the
employee with an indication of the types of statutory and common
law claims that may/must be arbitrated.
6. Ensure the availability of the same remedies that would have been
available to the employees had they litigated their claims
7. Clear notification to employees about their right to be represented
at an arbitration hearing
The policy should allow employees to be represented by counsel at
an arbitration hearing. In addition to promoting fairness concerns,
employees should be encouraged to be represented by counsel
because attorneys will often help the arbitration process to run
more efficiently.
arbitration policy to limit the potential that a court will find it unenforceable.
2 In Garrett v. Hooter-Toledo, 295 F. Supp. 2d 774 (N.D. Ohio 2003), the court concluded that an
arbitration provision that required the plaintiff to attend an arbitration in Louisville, Kentucky, when her
home and place of work was Toledo, Ohio, imposed an unreasonable and unfair requirement on the
employee. See also Geiger v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2<1 {S.D. Ind. 2001)
(administration of arbitration program by one dispute resolution company that was chosen by employer
made arbitration agreement unconscionable).
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8. Ensure that employees are aware ofand understand the plan
To this end, an employer should include a separate signature page
in the employment application or contract that specifically
references and incorporates the arbitration program.
V. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ARBITRATION
A. Circuit City Case
As previously noted, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gilmer did not resolve the
issue of whether mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts
were enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
("FAA"). In 2001, the Supreme Court resolved that issue in Circuit City
Slores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (2001).
The facts in Circuit City involved a sales counselor, Adams, with Circuit
City Stores, Inc., who signed an employment application that explicitly
stated that aU claims that may arise out of his employment must be
submitted to arbitration. The language of the application was clear about
the types of claims that would be settled by arbitration and that the
arbitrator's decision would be final and binding. After two years of
employment with Circuit City, however, Adams filed an employment
discrimination lawsuit against the company in court, asserting claims
under California state laws. In response, Circuit City filed an action in
federal district court under the FAA to compel Adams to arbitrate his
claims pursuant to the arbitration clause in the employment application he
had signed. The district court concluded that Adams was obligated to
arbitrate his claims pursuant to the arbitration clause that he agreed to by
signing the employment application.
Adams appealed the district court's decision and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court, holding that the scope of the FAA did
not cover arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Therefore, the court
concluded that Adams did not have to arbitrate his employment
discrimination claims. Contrary to the conclusion of all the other federal
Courts of Appeal that had dealt with this issue, the Ninth Circuit reasoned
that the statutory language of the FAA excepted all contracts of
employment from its reach.3 Due to the Ninth Circuit's creation a circuit
split on the issue, the Supreme Court agreed to resolve the debate.
The Supreme Court began with an explanation that the FAA was enacted
in response to judicial hostility toward the enforcement of private
arbitration agreements. From this, the Court reasoned that unless the FAA
applied broadly, its purpose would be thwarted. The Court relied upon § 2
3 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that the FAA enforces arbitration agreements in
employment contracts except for those directly involving transportation workers. AspJundh Tree Co. v.
Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995). See Circuit City, 121 S.Ct. at 1306-07 (citing all the Courts of
Appeal that have decided this issue).
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of the FAA for textual support of the statute's broad coverage, which
states:
[A] written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of a contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2. Despite the broad language in § 2, the Court recognized that
the source of the debate over the FAA's coverage was in the exceptions
listed in § 1. The relevant portion of § 1 of the FAA states that:
nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
9 U.S.C. § 1. In support of the argument that the FAA did not apply to
··,employment contracts, Adams relied upon the phrase, "or any other class
of workers engaged in interstate commerce." The Court, however,
reasoned that this phrase is an explicit reference to the categories of
"seamen" and "railroad employees" that precede it. According to the Court,
the inclusion of the phrase that Adams relied upon simply refers to
employment similar in nature to that of seamen and railroad workers -
broadly, transportation workers.
The Court concluded that a broader reading of "any other ... workers
engaged in interstate commerce" would defeat the intent of § 2 of the
FAA. The Court pointed out that when a court interprets provisions of a
statute, it should interpret those provisions in light of the whole statute and
the purpose behind it as evidenced by the text. Given these reasons, the
Court held that the FAA enforced arbitration agreements in employment
contracts except for those contracts affecting transportation workers.
B. An Application of Circuit City: Employers
In the short term, Circuit City provides employers with the confidence that
valid mandatory arbitration agreements in general employment contracts
are enforceable under the FAA. Therefore, employees who sign
employment agreements that contain valid arbitration clauses will be
obliged to arbitrate any employment law claims that are covered by the
agreement.
While mandatory arbitration agreements are enforceable under the FAA,
however, the validity of specific agreements may still be challenged based
upon internal flaws. To avoid those types of challenges to mandatory
arbitration agreements, employers must concern themselves with drafting
a contract that has proper consideration and mutuality, and that is not
unfairly weighted against the employee. To this end, there should be
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provisions in the agreement that address issues like fee sharing, choosing
a neutral·arbitrator, appropriate remedies and bilateral applicability.
C. Recent Court Decisions
1. In Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003)
(en bane), the Sixth Circuit addressed the appropriate standard
courts should apply in determining whether a cost-splitting provision
in an arbitration agreement undermines the purpose of federal anti-
discrimination legislation. The court adopted a "case-by-case"
approach that requires potential litigants to "be given an
opportunity, prior to arbitration on the merits, to demonstrate that
the potential costs of arbitration are great enough to deter them and
similarly situated individuals from seeking to vindicate their federal
statutory rights in the arbitral forum." Thus, "if the reviewing court
finds that the cost-splitting provision would deter a substantial
number of similarly situated potential litigants, it should refuse to
enforce the cost-splitting provision in order to serve the underlying
functions of the federal statute." The case-by-case analysis
includes an assessment of: (1) the job description and
socioeconomic background of potential litigants; (2) the average or
typical arbitration costs; and (3) the costs of litigation as an
alternative to arbitration.
2. In Cooper V. MRM Investment Co., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 8622
(6th Cir. May 3, 2004), the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court
decision denying the employer's motion to compel arbitration. The
plaintiff worked as an assistant manager at a KFC and signed an
"Arbitration of Employee Rights Agreement" that provided:
Because of the delay and expense of the court
systems, KFC and I agree to use confidential binding
arbitration for any claims that arise between me and
KFC, its related companies, and/or their current or
former employees. Such claims would include any
concerning compensation, employment (including, but
not limited to any claims concerning sexual
harassment), or termination of employment. Before
arbitration, I agree: (i) first, to present any such claims
in full written detail to KFC; (ii) next, to complete any
KFC internal review process; and (iii) finally, to
complete any external administrative remedy (such as
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
In any arbitration, the then prevailing rules of the
American Arbitration Association (and, to the extent
not inconsistent, the then prevailing rules of the
[FAA]) will apply.
The plaintiff alleged that she was forced to quit her job because of
harassment. After the EEOC dismissed her charge, she filed suit in
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP © 2004
F-6
federal court. The employer moved to compel arbitration. The
district court, applying Tennessee contract law, concluded the
agreement was unenforceable because: (1) it was a contract of
adhesion; (2) the agreement was unconscionable; (3) the
agreement was insufficiently bilateral; (4) the agreement was
invalid under federal law because it did not make it clear the plaintiff
was waiving her right to a jury trial; and (5) as a matter of policy,
Title VII claims belong in court, not in arbitration. In addition, the
district court concluded the agreement was unenforceable because
it incorporated the AM rules that would likely impose undue costs
on the plaintiff that she would not have had to incur in court,
rendering arbitration an inappropriate forum.
In reversing the district court's order, the Sixth Circuit concluded the
arbitration agreement was not a contract of adhesion, was not
unconscionable, and did not lack bilaterality under Tennessee law.
In addition, the Sixth Circuit determined that an arbitration provision
did not have to include a provision expressly waiving the
employee's right to a jury trial in order to be enforceable.
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit rejected the lower court's statement that
Title VII claims belong in court rather than in arbitration under the
Supreme Court's holding in Gilmer. The court, however, remanded
for further findings regarding whether the likely arbitration costs
under the AAA's rules prevailing on the date that the employer filed
its motion to compel arbitration rendered the agreement invalid
because the arbitration would have been prohibitively expensive to
the plaintiff.
D. Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in Collective Bargaining
Agreements
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Supreme
Court held that a union could not waive an employee's statutory rights in
spite of a mandatory arbitration clause in a collective bargaining
agreement ("CBA"). More recently, in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corporation, 525 U.S. 70 (1998), the Court readdressed the issue of the
enforceability of a mandatory arbitration agreement in a CBA. The Court,
however, was prevented from deciding the issue due to a successful
challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement itself.
In Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2001), the Court of
Appeals held that a provision in a CBA requiring arbitration of statutory
claims was enforceable. The court relied upon language in Wright, which
stated that an employee could be compelled to arbitrate statutory claims
as long as the wavier of the employee's right to adjudicate such claims in
a federal forum is done in a "clear and unmistakable" manner.4
4 Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP © 2004
F-7
In light of the decisions briefly discussed' above, employers should be
aware that a court may allow an employee to assert his/her statutory
claims in a judicial forum in spite of an arbitration agreement in a CBA.
Regardless of whether a court will enforce an arbitration agreement in a
CBA, however, an employer should make sure that the waiver of its
employees' right to sue is "clear and unmistakable."s
E. EEOC's Authority to Bring Suit Against an Employer on Behalf o.f
Employees - The Waffle House Decision
Prior to January 15, 2002, lower courts consistently ruled that the EEOC
was not bound by an arbitration agreement in seeking injunctive relief
(e.g., reinstatement), but the courts were split on the issue of the EEOC's
authority to seek money damages on behalf of an employee who has
signed an arbitration agreement.
On January 15, 2002, the Supreme Court addressed these issues in
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 754 (2002). The Court held that an
agreement between employer and employee to arbitrate any employment-
related dispute or claim did not bar the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief on behalf
of employee in an enforcement action under an Americans with
Disabilities Act claim.
The facts of Waffle House are straightforward. Waffle House required that
its employees must each sign an agreement requiring employment
disputes to be settled by binding arbitration. After the Plaintiff, Eric Baker,
suffered a seizure and was fired by Waffle House, he filed a timely
discrimination charge with the EEOC.
The EEOC alleged that his discharge violated Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). They subsequently filed an enforcement
suit, to which the Plaintiff was not a party. The EEOC's suit against Waffle
House alleged that the Company's employment practices, including
Baker's discharge "because of his disability," violated the ADA and that
the violation was 'intentional and done with malice or reckless indifference.
The complaint requested injunctive relief to "eradicate the effects of
[respondent's] past and present unlawful employment practices"; specific
relief designed to make Baker whole, including backpay, reinstatement,
and compensatory damages; and punitive damages for malicious and
reckless conduct.
Waffle House petitioned under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to stay
the EEOC's suit and compel arbitration, or to dismiss the action, but the
District Court denied relief. The Fourth Circuit concluded that:
1) the arbitration agreement between Baker and respondent did
not foreclose the enforcement action because the EEOC
5 Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
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was not a party to the contract, but had independent
statutory authority to bring suit in any federal district court
where venue was proper; and
2) the EEOC was not prevented from seeking victim-specific
relief in court.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this matter. The Supreme
Court determined that an Agreement between employer and employee to
arbitrate any employment-related dispute or claim did not bar the EEOC
from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief on behalf of employee in an
enforcement action under the ADA. The employee had notengaged in any
conduct, such as seeking arbitration of his claim or entering into
settlement negotiations with an employer, that might have the effect of
limiting any relief that the EEOC might obtain in court.
The Court based its decision on the fact that the ADA directs the EEOC to
exercise the same enforcement powers, remedies, and procedures that
are set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when enforcing the
',ADA's prohibitions against employment discrimination on the basis of
disability. Following the 1991 amendments to Title VII, the EEOC was
given the authority to bring suit to enjoin an employer from engaging in
unlawful employment practices, and to pursue reinstatement, backpay,
and compensatory or punitive damages, in both Title VII and ADA actions.
Thus, these statutes unambiguously authorize the EEOC to obtain the
relief that it sought if it could prove its case against Waffle House.
The Court opined that "[n]either the statutes nor this Court's cases
suggest that the existence of an arbitration agreement between private
parties materially changes the EEOC's statutory function or the remedies
otherwise available," and that "[d]espite the FAA policy favoring arbitration
agreements, nothing in the FAA authorizes a court to compel arbitration of
any issues, or by any parties, that are not already covered in the
agreement. The FAA does not mention enforcement by public agencies; it
ensures the enforceability of private agreements to arbitrate, but otherwise
does not purport to place any restriction on a nonparty's choice of a
judicial forum."
VI. BEYOND ARBITRATION -INTERNAL ADR PROGRAMS
A. The programs described below are examples of internal, or "in-house,"
ADR programs that are suggested by the American Arbitration Association
("AAA").6 The employer, however, is not limited to these suggestions.7 It is
important that any in-house ADR program that an employer chooses to
implement has the agreement of its employees, will meet the needs
6 See American Arbitration Association, Resolving Employment Disputes: A Practical Guide (2003).
7 See Kirk Blackard, Assessing Workplace Conflict Resolution Options, Dispute Resolution J., Feb/April
2001, at 57 (extensively discusses internal ADR options).
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identified within its workplace, and operates fairly. An employer may be
creative in designing an ADR program as long as these concerns are
reflected in its development and implementation.
Open Door Policies
With open door policies, a chain of command is established to deal with
employees' reports of employment-related problems. The chain of
command consists of various levels of employees who are trained to deal
with sensitive issues that arise in the employment context, such as sexual
harassment. Employees are made aware of these designated individuals
and the employer's procedure for addressing an employee's complaint
once it is made.
Ombudsmen C'Ombuds")
An ombuds is a neutral third party from within the company who is
charged with the responsibility of investigating employment-related
grievances Qrought by employees. Once a grievance has been
investigated, an ombuds recommends a way to settle the grievance.
Peer Review
Peer review involves a panel of persons from within the company that
work together to address the employment-related complaints of their
peers.
Internal Mediation
A neutral third person from within the company, trained in mediation
techniques, is assigned to help the parties to a workplace dispute discuss
and resolve their differences to a mutually agreeable resolution.
B. Benefits of Implementing Internal ADR Programs
• Avoids timely and costly litigation: In-house ADR programs can
resolve a vast majority of workplace disputes; thus, the need to
resort to litigation is significantly decreased.
• Privacy: The potential for public exposure of alleged or actual
workplace problems, information and practices is increased when
an employment-related dispute is litigated. If disputes are submitted
to in-house ADR programs, the likelihood of public exposure is
reduced significantly (confidentiality can be a requirement of
internal resolution).
• Addresses the specific needs of the company: Employment-related
problems arise in many different forms and contexts. Contrary to
external sources of dispute resolution such as litigation, in-house
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ADR programs can be tailored to address the variety of workplace
disputes that arise in a given employment setting.
• Early ,resolution of disputes: Early resolution can avoid the
escalation of disputes that results in litigation and the problems
associated with it, including high costs, emotional resistance to
compromise, and public exposure.
c. Implementing an Internal ADR Program
• Design
Employers should utilize legal counsel and/or agencies that work
with employers to implement in-house ADR programs. For
guidance, employment law practitioners and agencies like the AAA
have models and examples of in-house ADR programs that have
been used by other employers.
• Training
Employers should properly train persons within the company who
will help facilitate the ADR program. They should be trained to
properly address the types of issues they will be confronted with
when workplace disputes are presented to them.
• Fairness
Proper implementation of and training for an in-house ADR
program is essential to its appearance of neutrality and fair
operation. If employees do not trust the ADR program, they will not
agree to submit their grievances to it for resolution. An in-house
ADR program obviously must be readily utilized to generate a
reduction in employee lawsuits.
VII. EXTERNAL ADR PROGRAMS
If internal ADR programs have been exhausted without resolving a dispute, or an
employer decides that its company experience or culture does not lend itself to
an internal ADR program, employers should consider using external ADR
programs like mediation and arbitration to resolve employment-related disputes.8
Courts have generally upheld the use of external mediation and arbitration as
long as the programs are fair in appearance and operation. The Due Process
Protocol and the National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes
8 See American Arbitration Association, Resolving Employment Disputes: A Practical Guide (2003).
Another form of external ADR that has become more popular is fact-finding. Fact-finding is an
investigative process where an impartial third person or team examines an employees complaints,
investigates the complaint, and then issues a non-binding report on its findings. The report is presented
to the parties to the dispute with the goal of helping the parties to see their dispute documented in an
objective format.
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("NRRED"), which were developed by the AAA and a host of representatives
from organizations and agencies that provide, endorse, and/or use ADR
programs, provide guidance for employers to ensure that their ADR programs
comply with these fairness concerns.
Finally, employers should be aware that their advocates must prepare for
mediation and arbitration hearings in similar fashion to trial preparation. For
example, informal discovery should be conducted, a strategy should be
developed, recent case law on the issue of dispute should be consulted, and
document production may be required.
VIII. CONCLUSION
An employer should consider the issues listed below when contemplating
whether to implement any ADR program, whether internal and/or external
resources will be used to facilitate the process.
1. Costs
"Employment disputes constitute one of the largest sources of litigation in
the' courts today.9 Litigation is generally expensive and the increase in
employment-related disputes will only increase the costs associated with
it. ADR is a less costly and time-consuming way to resolve workplace
disputes.
2. Privacy
Unlike the process of litigation, internal and external ADR programs are
designed to resolve disputes privately. The private nature of ADR lessens
the likelihood of an employer's reputation being tarnished through public
knowledge of its workplace disputes.
3. Variety
Not all employment disputes are alike; thus, the method of resolution for
disputes should accommodate for these differences. The different forms of
ADR offer the opportunity for an employer to be creative about the means
by which it will attempt to resolve workplace disputes.
4. Potential for more grievances
The lower costs, decrease in time, and informality of ADR when compared
to litigation make it easier for employees to report workplace disputes.
Therefore, more employees may be willing to seek remedy for workplace
disputes. The increase in grievances, however, may not be as costly to an
employer as a few resource-exhausting lawsuits.
9 See Deborah Billings, DOL Seeks to Expand Use of Mediators to Resolve Disputes under Employment
Laws, Daily Labor Report, Jan. 2,2001, at AA-1.
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5. Fairness (Real and Perceived)
Once an employer has decided to implement an ADR program, the
program must appear and operate in a fair manner, ensuring that
employees' due process rights are realized despite the fact that their
grievances are pursued outside of the courts. Employers are encouraged
to seek assistance from professionals with experience in ADR in the
development of their ADR programs to ensure that their program complies
with the law and are best suited to address the employment-related
disputes that arise in their workplace.
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ISSUES ARISING FROM THE TEMPORARY WORKFORCE
The many current and evolving legal and policy issues relating to the very
significant phenomenon of the use by American employers of "contingent" workers is
well beyond the scope of a one-hour presentation. Many of these issues are emerging
contemporaneous with other changes in the American workplace, brought on by global
economic and business conditions. These issues promise to become increasingly
significant in the immediate future.
Other issues, especially issues involving the implications of the classification of
worker status under the various employmentlbenefits statutes are already presenting great
challenges for employment law practitioners and our clients.
These "second tier" legal and policy issues, including the evolution ofhow the
employer-employee relationship is characterized/defined, and, more particularly, the
issues of definition ofthe terms "employer" and "employee," under various laws, as well
as defining the myriad workplace relationships other than traditional "employer-
employee," are becoming increasingly problematic for our clients. As we examine these
issues, it becomes apparent that employers' demand for and utilization ofthe various
types of contingent workers has far outpaced the development of legal theory and public
policy in these areas, with the result being that significant "gray areas" exist, where
employers can face substantial legal exposure. As these issues are considered, and as
litigation begins to bring them into clear relief, attorneys are increasingly being called
upon to advise clients in areas where the rules have not been fully developed. We will
identify and discuss some of these areas today.
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Finally, there is a "third tier" of issues, where the law is more established, but
where industry standards may be not well-developed, and where our clients may have
insufficient experience or expertise to protect themselves from a variety of legal
exposures. We will focus on some of those issues today.
*** *** ***
The term "contingent workforce" applies to an area where even the process of
identifying and defining the terms can be difficult and confusing. Specifically, the term
"contingent worker," when referenced in the context ofthe modem American workplace,
is a term that has come to be used loosely to refer to a number of work arrangements that
differ from the traditional model of full-time, year-around employment with a single
employer. The term has been used to refer to anyone from the clerical worker hired
through a temp agency to fill an employer's short-term need, to the more "permanent"
employee who chooses to work on a part-time basis due to his/her individual or family
circumstances, or even to the retired executive who teaches a course at the local
university or performs business consulting services as an independent contractor.
Perhaps more important than the variety ofworkforce relationships that may be
referred to as "contingent" is the substantial and growing number ofAmerican workers
who now may be identified as falling into this category, both in raw numbers and as a
percentage of the total workforce. According to data from the U. S. Department of
Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics, and depending on the precise definition used,
contingent workers currently make up nearly thirty per cent (30%) of the total U.S.
workforce. This segment ofthe workforce is already very large and is growing; however,
public policy and legal theory have not come close to keeping up with the phenomenon.
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This reality promises to have a profound impact on American law, and on the American
economy, in the years to come.
These larger policy issues are "the elephant in the room" in any discussion about
the contingent workforce. However, while we will briefly identify some of these broader
policy implications, the bulk ofour time today will be spent considering a number of
legal and policy issues relating to the contingent workforce that are with us today,
including significant problems and legal exposures that are not being addressed
effectively by our clients, sometimes with very negative consequences.
Who is the Contingent Worker?
While the term "contingent worker," and thus the composition ofwhat we call the
"contingent workforce," has been used loosely, and has been subject to a variety of
definitions, the following categories ofworkers are often among those included within its
terms:
1. Agency temporary workers (temps)-workers from temporary
employment agencies who work for client businesses for special projects,
or to fill in for full time workers.
2. Leased workers-workers who work for leasing companies, who often
handle clerical or administrative functions for businesses, such as payroll,
human resources or benefits functions.
3. Standard part-time workers-workers paid on an hourly or salaried basis
who regularly work less than 35 hours per week for a single employer.
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4. Contract company workers-workers who work for and are on the payroll
of companies that, as a routine part of their business, provide services to
other businesses under contract, such as custodial, maintenance, security
or computer maintenance or programming services.
5. On-Call Workers-workers called in to perform duties on an as-needed
basis, such as workers supplied by union hiring halls or substitute
teachers.
6. Day Laborers-Workers who are referred to work for any of a number of
employers by waiting at a central location where employers pick them up
and transport them to a work site, to work for the day.
7. Self-employed Workers-Workers who are self-employed, but have no
independent contractor relationship with the individual for whom the
services are performed, such as shop owners, physicians, and even us
lawyers.
8. Independent Contractors-Workers who contract with businesses or
individuals to provide a product or service, such as realtors and
management consultants.
The Contingent Worker Explosion--the "Elephant in the Room"
On November 10, 1999, the U. S. Department of Labor's Advisory Council on
Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans issued its "Report of the Working Group on
the Benefit Implications of the Growth of a Contingent Workforce." In this report, the
Working Group presented its study of some of the important public policy issues that are
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implicated by the dramatic increase in the use of contingent workers by American
businesses. A primary issue addressed by the Report was the extent to which contingent
workers are currently covered under employer-provided health and retirement benefit
plans, and the implications of the rapid growth of the contingent workforce on the
provision ofthose key benefits to American workers.
Specifically, the Work Group referenced a recent study, in which 2/3 of the
responding employers indicated that they expected that organizations in their industry
would increase their use ofcontingent workers during the next 5 years. In addition, the
Work Group heard testimony regarding the explosive growth of one segment ofthe
contingent worker industry-"professional employer organizations"- a 30% per-year
increase for the preceding 5 years! These organizations, which allow companies to
"outsource" such functions as payroll and human resources, represent a major segment of
the contingent workforce, even though, for purposes ofmany employment laws, such as
Title VII, these organizations are typically considered to be 'joint employers" with the
business that contracts for their services. The Work Group also heard testimony
supporting the proposition that the intent, or at least the effect, ofthe use of contingent
workers is to avoid providing benefits to those workers. Specifically, the report indicated
that, on average, 62.4% ofregular full-time employees participate in employer-provided
pension plans. By contrast, only 2/3 as many employees ofcontract companies (41.8%),
one-half as many on-call workers(30.1 %), 1/3 as many regular part-time employees, and
1/12 as many temporary help agency employees (4.8%) participate in employer-provided
pension plans.
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Similar statistics were reported for employer-provided health plans. An average
of73.2% ofregular full-time employees currently participate in employer-provided
health plans. By comparison, only % as many contract company workers (55%), 2/5 as
many on-call workers (32.1 %), ~ as many part-time workers (17.1 %), and 1/10 as many
temporary help agency workers (7.4%) participate in employer-provided health plans.
A number ofreasons were suggested for these disparities; however, significant
testimony supported the conclusion that the effect of these statistics is that, in the near
future, our country will be forced to find alternatives to our traditional employment-based
system for delivering health and pension benefits. One phenomenon generated special
interest and concern: the significant percentage of the contingent workers who obtain
health and pension benefits through the employer-sponsored program of a spouse or other
family member. To the extent that some employers avoid the cost of fringe benefits
because they are available through their workers' spouses' policies, other employers are
subsidizing those benefits, and our employment-based system ofproviding health
insurance and retirement benefits is placed under additional stress. Given current trends,
there will soon be a "tipping point," and the current system may no longer be viable.
These factors, when coupled with the already oppressive cost to our business
clients ofhealth and pension benefits, and with the significant number ofAmericans with
no health or pension coverage, are raising legal and public policy issues that will have to
be addressed in the near term, and few ofthe proposed solutions look promising.
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Legal Issues Involving the Contingent Workforce.
While these "big picture" issues may present significant challenges, we are not
being requested to advise clients on them on a daily basis. However, the "second tier" of
issues arising from contingent workforce, i.e., the confusing and often conflicting
questions ofwho is an "employer," who is an "employee," and what these classifications
mean under various laws, are increasingly exposing our clients to significant risk. In the
past, employers who utilized contingent workers were primarily concerned with the
proper classification of those workers as common-law "employees" or as "independent
contractors," and with whether that determination would hold up to regulatory scrutiny.
If workers were mis-classified, the employer's liability was generally limited to negative
consequences under tax or employment-related laws (Title VII, Workers Compensation,
Unemployment Insurance). Today, however, the scope of classification issues and
employers' potential exposure is increasing exponentially, as is the complexity and
sophistication of the analyses employers are required to undertake. What has failed to
keep pace with these developments, however, is clear guidance, the creation oflegal
"safe harbors," or effective approaches for ensuring proper classifications. As a result,
our clients are often required to make decisions in these areas with little or no
appreciation of the consequences of their actions, at their peril, and without any
understanding that they may need to seek legal advice.
It is not surprising that our clients are confused. An array of federal, state and
local employment laws address or regulate some aspect of the employer-employee
relationship; however, the definition of the terms "employee" and "employer" can vary
significantly from law to law. It can be said that, as a general rule, the various
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employment statutes and regulations will not apply to independent contractors (as defined
for purposes of the relevant statute) or to self-employed workers. However, the
determination as to any worker's status may vary from law-to-law, and may be most
difficult to determine.
With regard to each employment statute being considered, and consistent with
that law's definitional/coverage schemes, employers are required to ask:
~ who is an "employee"?
~ who is the worker's "employer"?
No universal criteria exist that determine whether a worker is an employee or
independent contractor; indeed, different statutes often apply different standards and
definitions, which must each be considered and reconciled. Most such analyses however,
ultimately come around to the application of one of two broad "tests":
~ Common law test-focuses on the hiring party's right to control how the
worker's duties are performed. Considerations often include whether the
employer has the right to direct the manner ofperformance of the worker's
services, whether the worker receives training and instruction from the
employer, whether, in performing the services, the worker is capable of
making a profit or risks incurring a loss, whether the employer or the worker
supplies needed tools and equipment, and whether the payment for services is
based on time or on the achievement of objectives. [See, e.g., Glenn v.
Standard Oil Co., 148 F. 2d 51 (6th Cir.) (Ky. 1945); Decker v. Glasscock
Trucking 397 S.W. 2nd 773 (Ky. 1965)].
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~ "Economic realities" test-focuses on whether the worker is economically
dependent on the hiring party or is in business for him/herself. For example,
with regard to the application of this test to a determination of "employee"
status under ERISA, courts look not to the common law conceptions of that
relationship, but rather to the "economic reality" ofthe totality of the
circumstances bearing on whether the worker is economically dependent on
the alleged employer. [See, e.g., Baystate Alternative Staffing, Inc, et. al. v.
Herman, No. 98-1084 (1st Cir. 1999); citing Aimable v. Long and Scott
Farms, 20 F. 3d 434, 439 (11th Cir.1994); Carnes v. Dept. ofEcon.
Security, 435 S.W. 2d 758 (Ky. 1968)].
In addition, and regardless ofwhich ofthe two broad tests is applied, when more than one
employer has legal responsibility for a worker, and employment by one employer is
related to the employment by the other employer(s), a worker may be considered to have
"joint" or "co-employers." In such circumstances, both employers may have legal
responsibility for compliance with certain employment laws (and may, therefore, be
jointly liable for any violation(s».
Statutory Interpretations Impacting Contingent Workforce Status
Issues directly impacting the contingent workforce, primarily in the areas of
defining the employer-employee relationship and what that means for coverage under the
individual statutes, are currently the subjects of considerable conflict in the interpretation
ofnumerous federal laws. For example:
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Tax Status
The IRS has recently revised its long-standing criteria for detennining whether a
worker is an "employee" or "independent contractor". The new criteria represent a major
departure from the "20 Common Law Factors" test used by the Service for several
decades. The revised test is based on three criteria: a) Behavior Control; b) Financial
Control, and c) Type ofRelationship.
a) Behavior Control--the more control the employer has over the worker's
behavior, the greater the chance the worker will be classified as an "employee."
Questions to be considered include:
1. Does the employer have the right to direct and control how the worker
perfonns the task(s) for which the worker is hired? (Generally, the more control
exercised by the employer, the more likely the worker will be classified as an employee.)
2. Does the employer have the right to dictate or control how the work results are
to be achieved? (The more the employer has the right to control the details ofthe
worker's perfonnance, the more likely the worker will be classified as an employee).
3. How much training or instruction does the employer provide the worker?
(If the employer provides training on its operation, and how to perfonn specific job tasks
in a specific manner, the worker will most likely be classified as an employee.)
b) Financial Control--Includes various factors indicating whether an employer
has the right to control the business aspects of the worker's duties, including:
1. Reimbursement ofbusiness expenses;
2. Extent ofworker's investment;
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3. Extent to which worker makes services available to the relevant
market;
4. How the business pays the worker; and
5. Extent to which the worker can realize a profit or loss (generally an
independent contractor can make a profit/suffer a loss; an employee
cannot).
c) Type ofRelationship--a "catch-all" category (as provided by IRS Publication
15A). Includes factors that demonstrate the "type of relationship" between the parties,
including:
1. Written contracts describing the relationship the parties intend to
create;
2. Whether the employer provides the worker with employee-type
benefits, such as insurance, pension plan, vacation or sick pay;
3. The expectation ofpermanency of the relationship-is the worker
hired with the expectation that the relationship will continue indefinitely
rather than for the duration of a specific project oftime frame? (The IRS
now identifies "how long the person plans to work with your company" as
being "foremost" in its determination of independent contractor versus
employee status).
4. The extent to which services performed by the worker are considered to
be a key aspect ofthe employer's regular business. (The more impOliant
the worker's services are to the business, the more likely the employer will
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have the right to control and direct the worker's activities, and the more
likely that an employer-employee relationship will be found to exist.)
Under the new IRS criteria, a business that mistakenly treats a worker as an independent
contractor (by, for example, not paying employment taxes to the IRS) may be held liable
for past unpaid taxes (income, social security, welfare and others). More importantly,
and as evidenced by a number of recent court cases, misclassification of workers' status
can lead to substantial employer liability and worker recoveries, under a number of
different theories.
Misclassification Cases
The contingent workplace movement has recently been "educated" on the
potentially devastating consequences of worker misclassification in other areas, due to a
landmark case that began with the IRS' finding of a misclassification for tax purposes. In
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation, 120 F. 3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (en bane), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 899 (1998), the IRS first determined that Microsoft had misclassified a
group ofworkers as independent contractors, when in fact the workers met the common
law definition of employees. The workers in question had worked for Microsoft from
1987-1990 as freelance proofreaders, software testers, production editors, formatters and
indexers. They were told that, as independent contractors, they would be ineligible for
benefits (i.e., paid vacation, sick leave, holiday pay, short-term disability insurance,
group life and group health insurance, and participation in 401(k) and stock purchase
plans). All signed "Microsoft Corporation Independent Contractor Copyright
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Assignment and Non-Disclosure Agreements," in which they agreed that, as independent
contractors, they were individually responsible for payment oftheir own taxes.
Microsoft did not challenge the IRS determination ofcommon-law employee
status. Rather, it restructured that particular group ofworkers, hiring some as employees,
terminating others and requiring that they be placed through an agency. It then issued
corrected W-2 forms and paid the employer's share ofFICA taxes to the government.
Thereafter, the misclassified workers brought an ERISA action, taking the
position that, as employees and throughout their employment, they should have been
given the opportunity to participate in two (2) company-sponsored benefit plans.
Microsoft initially refused the request internally, and the workers appealed to a plan
committee set up to review coverage disputes. The plan committee agreed that the
workers were not allowed to participate in the plan, based primarily on the fact that, at
their time ofhire, these workers had agreed that they were independent contractors, and
had therefore waived any right they might otherwise have had to participate in the plans.
The District Court agreed with Microsoft's position, holding that the workers had
contractually waived their rights to any company benefits. The workers then appealed
that ruling, but only with respect to their claimed right to participate in the 401(k) plan
and the stock purchase plan.
A panel of the Ninth Circuit reviewed the terms ofthe plan documents in
question. For purposes ofthe appeal, Microsoft conceded that the workers were
common-law employees, but argued that they were nonetheless ineligible for the
contested benefits because they had been paid though accounts payable, and not through
the company's regular payroll. The panel found the language in the plan documents to be
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ambiguous with regard to eligibility under these circumstances, and therefore interpreted
the language against the drafter (Microsoft). Accordingly, the panel concluded that the
workers were employees who should have been allowed to participate in the 40l-k plan.
Applying state contract law principles, the panel reached the same conclusion with regard
to the stock purchase plan benefit.
After the panel's decision was announced to considerable controversy, the Ninth
Circuit reheard the case en banco With regard to the 401-k plan, the court remanded the
case to the plan administrator, but upheld the panel's decision with regard to the stock
purchase plan. Cert. was denied by the Supreme Court, and the case ultimately settled for
approximately $97 million in June, 2001.
Other high-profile worker misclassification cases have resulted in significant
liability to employers. (e.g. Herner v. Time-Warner settled for $5.5 million in
November, 2000; Clark v. King County settled for $18.6 million in June, 2000, and
Logan v. King County settled for $24 million in December, 1997). As a result of these
and other less well-publicized decisions, the proper classification ofworkers has now
become a very big deal, one that implicates a number of areas of the law.
In addition, and to further confuse an already complex area, the various statutes
where the classification ofworkers can be a critical issue contain different standards and
definitions.
Worker Classification Issues Under ERISA
ERISA, administered by the U. S. Department of Labor, identifies a number of
circumstances where workers may be permissibly excluded from employee benefits
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programs. For example, an employer may exclude any employee who works less than
1000 hours in a relevant 12-month period. As a result, "temporary" employees who work
40 hours per week for less than a full six month period are mathematically eliminated.
However, this is not an automatic exclusion, and employer's plans must contain
appropriate language implementing intended exclusions or risk having to provide the
benefits to temporary or part-time workers, as well as to independent contractors who are
later determined to be common law employees. [See, e.g., Bronk v. Mountain States
Tel. And Tel., Inc., 140 F. 3d 1335 (10th eire 1998), wherein the Court, in rejecting the
claim of leased employees that ERISA mandated their inclusion because they met the
common law definition of "employee," first noted that ERISA does not prohibit an
employer from providing benefits to some employees but not to others so long as the
exclusion is not based on age or length of service, and then held that, due to the specific
exclusion in the plan in question, the workers were not entitled to any relief.]
ERISA does not provide a statutory listing of factors to be considered in
determining "employee" versus "independent contractor" status. However, the U. S.
Supreme Court provided such a test in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,
503 u.S. 318 (1992), wherein the Court identified 12 significant factors to be considered
under ERISA as follows:
1. skill required;
2. source of tools and instrumentalities;
3. location where work performed;
4. duration of relationship ofparties;
5. hiring party's right (or lack thereof) to assign additional projects;
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6. hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;
7. method ofpaYment;
8. hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
9. whether the work is part ofhiring party's regular business;
10. whether the hired party is in business;
11. whether "employee benefits" are provided; and
12. the tax treatment of the hired party.
Under ERISA, the issue ofmisclassification can arise in a number of different
contexts, and may lead to very costly tax and benefit liabilities. A number of courts have
found independent contractor status, based on the agreement of the parties, and, therefore,
have concluded that any claim for benefits had been waived. [See, e.g.; Barnhart v. New
York Life Insurance, 141 F. 3d 1310 (9th Cir. 1998)-agreement between the parties
indicated intent to form independent contractor relationship, coupled with fact that agent
free to operate business and obtained income from other sources; Capital Cities/ABC v.
Ratcliff, 141 F. 3d 1405 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, (1998)-agreement
acknowledged workers' status as independent contractors and waived any benefits under
ERISA plans offered by employer. Even though IRS had found workers to be common
law employees, court held plans not required to cover all employees, and employees had
waived any rights they had to benefits.].
However, other courts have held that misclassified workers stated a cause of
action for ERISA violations. [See, e.g., Daughtery v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F. 3d 1488
(11 th Cir. 1993)-existence of an independent contractor agreement evidence of intent of
parties only, and not controlling. Remanded to district court for finding on degree of
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control and supervision.; Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F. 2d 543 (11 th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 308 (1993)-Section 510 ofERISA can be violated by
reclassifying an employee to eliminate health and defined contribution plan benefits.;
Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F. 2d 1532 (D. C. Cir. 1987)-employee misclassified as an
independent contractor.]
In addition to these private causes of action, the U. S. Department of Labor also
has standing to sue on behalfofcontingent workers whom it believes to have been denied
benefits due to misclassification. For example, in November, 2000, the DOL and Time-
Warner announced a $5.5 million settlement of charges that the company misclassified
hundreds of employees as independent contractors or temporary workers, thus denying
them benefits in violation ofERISA.
In order to avoid significant liability under ERISA, employers should:
1. . Identify the employment relationship with each of its workers, using the
12-point test and focusing on the control issue.
2. Examine its employee benefit plans to determine which classifications of
workers are and are not covered. [Many employers will discover that their
plan documents, summary plan descriptions, insurance plans and
agreements fail to adequately define the covered classes of employees,
and/or do not include language sufficient to exclude the intended groups.]
3. Recognize that plans subject to ERISA are not required to cover every
worker. Such plans must be maintained for the "exclusive benefit" of
employees and their beneficiaries; therefore, true independent contractors
and consultants cannot be offered coverage under such plans. In addition,
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an employer is not required to cover all employees under its benefit plans
(although the ability to limit coverage may be determined by application
of certain nondiscrimination and minimum coverage tests).
Absent appropriate language included in carefully constructed plan documents,
employers may face significant exposure. Employers do not want to discover problems
with their plans for the first time when enforcement actions are filed. An appropriate role
for legal counsel is to 1) educate clients as to these issues, and 2) review documents and
conduct benefits audits to help bring plans in to compliance.
Worker Classification Issues Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
American business is fashioning complex, new business relationships in response
to the development of a global economy, with its increased movement of capital and
labor across borders and cultures. Developments such as subcontracting, out-sourcing,
and the use of temporary and staffing firms are all responses to this phenomenon. The U.
S. Commission on the Future ofWorker-Management Relations (the Dunlop
Commission) concluded its final report by stating:
[C]ontingent [work] arrangements may be introduced simply to
reduce the amount of compensation paid by the firm for the same
amount and value ofwork, which raises serious social questions.
This is particularly true because contingent workers are drawn
disproportionately from the most vulnerable sectors of the
workforce. . .. The expansion ofcontingent work has contributed
to the increasing gap between high and low wage workers and to
the increasing sense of insecurity among workers. (U.S. DOL,
"Commission in the Future of Worker-Management Relative, Final
Report").
These issues often implicate compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29
U.S.C. § 201, et seq, which requires payment ofthe federal minimum wage and overtime
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pay of time-and-one-half the regular hourly rate for all hours worked by non-exempt
employees in any work week. Coverage by the FLSA requires a finding of an employer-
employee relationship, and thus can implicate a number of issues applicable to the
contingent workforce.
The relevant definitions contained in the FLSA are hardly "user-friendly", and
have long resulted in problems in applying the statute to contingent workers.
Specifically, an "employer" is defined under the FLSA as "any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203 (d).
An "employee" is "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.c. § 203 (e), and
the term "employ" includes "to suffer or permit to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203 (g). While
these definitions are not very helpful, Courts interpreting the FLSA have applied the
"economic reality" test for guidance in these areas. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Corp.,
366 U.S. 722 (1947); Danneskjod v. Hausrath, 87 F. 3d 37, 39 (2d eire 1996). The
"economic realities" test does not mirror the common-law test for employment status,
and, when assessing whether the worker is an employee, the courts look to see whether,
as a matter of economic reality, the worker is dependent on the employer. The FLSA
mandates that the question ofwho is an employer and employee under the FLSA requires
"a full inquiry into the true economic reality" of the relationship, based on "a
particularized inquiry into the facts of each case." Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,
331 U. S. 722 (1947)-employee status under the FLSA depends not on isolated factors
but on the circumstances ofthe whole activity. No one factor is dispositive and a totality
ofthe circumstances must be considered. This requirement of a case-by-case evaluation,
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based on the job content ofthe individual worker, can be onerous on any employer, and
especially on the small employer.
In addition, the FLSA and its regulations specifically contemplate "co-
emploYment" and "joint emploYment" status and relationships. DOL regulations provide
that a joint emploYment relationship may exist where: 1) there is an arrangement between
the employers to share the employee's services, 2) one employer is acting in the interest
of another employer in relation to the employee, and 3) the employers may be "deemed to
share control" of the employee. If such a relationship is found to exist, both employers
may be liable to that employee under the wage and hour laws. As an example, the DOL's
Wage and Hour Division specifically provides: "employees ofa temporary help agency
working on assignment in various business establishments are joint employees ofboth the
agency and the business establishment in which they are employed."
A number of courts have applied these definitions and tests to determine
"employee" versus "independent contractor" status under the FLSA, as well as to evaluate
the existence of "joint emploYment," the result of such finding would be to make both
firms liable for paYment ofwage and overtime liability. [See, e.g., Baystate Alternative
Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, No. 98-1084 (D.C. Mass. 1999), citing favorably the "six-
factor test commonly used to distinguish between independent contractors and employees
in the context of the FLSA," and referencing the test set out in Martin v. Selker Bros.,
Inc., 949 F. 2d 1293 (3rd Cir. 1991) i.e., - 1) the extent to which the services in question
are an integral part ofthe employer's business; 2) the permanency ofthe relationship; 3)
the amount ofthe alleged contractor's investment in the facilities and equipment; 4) the
nature and degree ofcontrol by the principal; 5) the alleged contractor's opportunities for
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profit and loss; and 6) the amount of initiative, judgment, or foresight in open market
competition with others required for the success of the claimed independent enterprise.
With regard to the "joint employment" issue under the FLSA, the Baystate court
identified "in particular" four (4) standards to be applied - i.e., whether the alleged
employer: 1) had the power to hire and fire the employee; 2) supervised and controlled
employee work schedules or conditions of employment; 3) determined the rate and
method ofpayment; and 4) maintained employment records. (citing Bonnette v.
California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F. 2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983)).
Issues implicating control of the worker, and not the form of the agreement or
what it is called by the parties, must be carefully examined in order to determine potential
FLSA liability. Once again, counsel should educate clients on these issues, including
conducting audits.
Worker Classification Issues Under Employment Discrimination Laws
Historically, issues specific to the contingent workforce have not played a major
role in compliance with the various federal and state EEO laws. That is all rapidly
changing, and many of these issues have now moved to the "front burner." For example,
relating specifically to its enforcement ofthe Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA),
the EEOC has recently declared that there is a "rampant" pattern of disability
discrimination by staffing agencies across the country. The agency has responded by
making temporary staffing firms a priority target for purposes of its ADA enforcement
activities.
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In addition, in 1997, the EEOC issued an Enforcement Guidance on the
Application ofEEO Laws to Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employment
Agencies and Other Staffing Finns, said guidance being applicable to the agency's
enforcement responsibilities under the ADA, ADEA, Title VII and the EPA. The
Guidance explores four (4) major areas where issues frequently arise when contingent
employees allege they have been discriminated against:
1. Worker Status/Classification: distinguishing employee and independent
contractor.
The EEOC came up with its own l5-factor test to determine employee status. However,
under the EEOC approach, the factors are not controlling; indeed, not all, or even a
majority, ofthe factors must be met. Rather, according to the EEOC, the fact-finder is
required to make the assessment based on all of the circumstances present in the
relationship between the parties. The 15 factors are:
-/ The finn or client has the right to control when, where and how the worker perfonns
the job;
-/ The work does not require a high level of skill or expertise
-/ The finn or client rather than the worker furnishes the tools, materials and equipment
-/ The work is performed on the premises of the firm or client
-/ There is a continuing relationship between the worker and the finn or client
-/ The firm/client sets the hours ofwork and duration of the job
-/ The worker is paid by the hour, week or month rather than for the agreed cost of
perfonning a particular job
-/ The worker has no role in hiring and paying assistants
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./ The work performed by the worker is part ofthe regular business of the firm or
client
./ The firm or the client is itself in business
./ The worker is not engaged in his or her own distinct occupation or business
./ The firm or client provides the worker with benefits such as insurance, leave or
worker's compensation
./ The worker is considered an employee ofthe firm or the client for tax purposes (i.e.,
the entity withholds federal, state and Social Security taxes)
./ The firm or client can discharge the worker
./ The worker and the firm or client believe that they are creating an employer-
employee relationship.
In addition, the EEOC takes the position that, ifboth entities (the staffing firm and the
client) both meet statutory minimum requirements, they are "joint-employers." Indeed,
this may be the most typical status of contingent workers for purposes ofEEOC
compliance. [But, See Stewart v. Univ. ofLouisville, 65 S.W. 3d 536 (Ky. App. 2001)
- grad student receiving fellowship from university not an "employee" for purposes of
anti-discrimination statute. Applied an "economic realities" test, and concluded that
nearly all student's duties in connection with academic work rather than providing service
to university.]
The EEOC's interpretation casts a very broad net, and greatly increases
employees' potential liability in these cases, particularly with regard to the long reach of
the "co-employer" rationale.
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Small Business Exemptions: "Counting Heads" for Coverage Purposes-
2. Who is the "employer"--once again, the EEOC considers the overall
nature of the relationship to be more important than the terms of any agreement between
the parties. Most often, the workplace location and control-related standards will result
in a finding of at least co-employment status. Given this fact, the client will most often
be jointly liable with the placement agency for a violation ofthe employment
discrimination laws.
3. What About Independent Contractors and Non-Employees? EEOC's
position is that, due to the broad remedial purposes of the EEO statutes, a company with
enough employees to qualify as an employer under a particular statute can be liable for
discriminating against an individual who is not its employee, or in some instances, for the
discriminatory acts ofnon-employees. "Enforcement Guidance: application of EEO
Laws to Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employment Agencies and Other
Staffing Firms," December 3, 1997; Lockard v. Pizza Hut, 74 EPD 45670 (10th Cir.
1998).
4.
Many state and federal EEO statutes exempt small businesses by limiting coverage to
employers with a minimum number ofemployees. [e.g., ADA, Title VII-15 or more;
ADEA-20 or more; FMLA-50 or more; KCRA-8 or more, etc.] When applying the
"counting" requirements, EEOC takes the position that an employer must count every
worker with whom it has an employment relationship. For example, a worker assigned to
a business by a staffing agency may be listed on the agency's payroll. However, both the
business client and the staffing agency must count the worker as an employee ifjoint-
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employer classification criteria have been met. This position promises to make a real
difference for many smaller employers that utilize contingent employees.
Once again, counsel should be assisting clients with audits of these issues, and,
specifically, with reviews of contracts with temporary and staffing agencies. Clients need
to understand that, in entering into these arrangements, they may be assuming substantial
liability for the acts oftheir "co-employer," over which they may have little or no control.
Worker Classification Issues Under Immigration Law
Worker classification issues can also present significant issues, and create
significant additional legal exposure, in the immigration area. For example, the federal
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) requires that all employers with 3 or more
employees verify that all employees are legally entitled to be employed in the United
States. This requirement applies to "employees," but not to "independent contractors."
In tum, INS regulations [8 CFR § 274a.l(j)] provide 8 factors to beconsidered by the
INS in determining independent contractor status. Such factors include, but are not
limited to whether the individual or entity:
,/ Supplies the tools or materials
,/ Makes services available to the general public
,/ Works for a number of clients at the same time
,/ Has an opportunity for profit or loss as a result of labor or services provided
,/ Invests in the facilities for work
,/ Directs the order or sequence in which the work is to be done
,/ Determines the hours during which the work is to be done.
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The INS applies these standards on a case-by-case basis, presenting the opportunity for
after-the-fact findings ofmisclassification. If, for example an employer wanted to avoid
providing fringe benefits by making the foreign national an independent contractor,
issuing a 1099, etc., the result could be the loss of immigration status, allegations of fraud
against the employer/contractor, etc.
In addition to IRCA, an evolving immigration issue involves the recent efforts by
business leaders to meet demands for certain highly skilled technical workers by lobbying
Congress to increase quota limits for temporary H-IB Visas. However, worker
classification issues may complicate this area as well. Specifically, H-IB visas raise
issues because they permit foreign workers to enter the U.S. temporarily, usually to
perform a particular assignment. Immigration law covers only workers who are
determined to be "employees" under INS criteria, but that leaves it to the courts to
determine coverage, on a case-by-case basis, which will typically involve a determination
of "employee" or "independent contractor" status.
Worker Classification Issues Under HIPAA
The new HIPAA health care privacy rules also pose some legal risks when
applied to the contingent workforce. HIPAA raises slightly different issues from the
coverage issues presented by the employee/independent contractor dichotomy. For
example, the HIPAA regulations replace the employee/independent contractor distinction
with the new categories of "workforce member" and "business associate."
As in the other areas of statutory compliance, correct worker classification is the
first step to effective HIPAA compliance. The second step is learning the process of
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managing the workers who fall within each of the relevant groups. Determining the
worker status question under HIPAA also depends on the degree of control the covered
entity exerts over the worker. For example, a computer professional who works on-site
as a contractor for an indefinite period of time is likely to be considered a "workforce
member." However, a computer professional who works on site as a contractor for a
week, on a single particular project, is likely to be considered a "business associate."
Unlike other laws applicable to the workplace, HIPAA covers all workers-both
employees as traditionally defined and contingent workers. Penalties for non-compliance
with HIPAA requirements range from $100 for a single violation to a $250,000 fine and
up to 10 years in prison for disclosing protected personal health information (PHI) for
personal gain or with the intent to cause malicious harm. In this environment, worker
misclassification can result in significant legal exposure.
Privacy Compliance under HIPAA. Employers and plan administrators are
required to control the use and disclosure ofPHI to and by both "workforce members"
and "business associates." For "workforce members," this obligation is satisfied by the
employer's developing and implementing new workplace policies and procedures and
training workforce members on HIPAA compliance. For "business associates," this
obligation is accomplished by incorporating necessary provisions into business contracts
to ensure compliance. In general, health sponsors and other "covered entities" will need
to:
1. Identify health plans that are subject to HIPAA requirements.
2. Protect all PHI by keeping it separate from employment-related functions.
This may mean a) designating an individual or department that does not make
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employment-related decisions as a "designated entity" to maintain all PHI on
a separate system, not accessible by others, and to use this alternative system
to receive all PHI on behalfof the plan, or b) out-sourcing all PHI to a third
party administrator.
3. Develop and implement compliance policies and procedures for workforce
training, complaints, risk-management, record-keeping, sanctions, individual
PHI notices and notice amendment procedures.
4. Amend the group health plan document and certify that it has been amended
and that the plan sponsor agrees to the required restrictions and conditions.
5. Develop and implement procedures for handling individual requests for PHI
use and disclosure restrictions, alternative methods and locations for PHI
communications, PHI access, amendments to an individual's PHI, and
accounting for PHI uses and disclosures.
6. Designate a privacy officer and contact person.
Training. "Workforce members" participate in training. "Business associates" do
not. Employees are typically workforce members. However, independent contractors
can be either "workforce members" or "business associates," depending on their duration
ofwork for the employer and other factors.
Business Associate Agreements and Confidentiality Agreements. Temporary
staffing agencies are typically business associates; as a result, staffing agencies and their
temporary workers need to have HIPAA-compliant Business Associate Agreements to
avoid potentially costly liability, which could arise if, for example, the staffing agency
disclosed PHI. In addition, vendors can become "business associates," if they provide a
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product or service that causes them to come into contact with PHI (e.g., certain soft-ware
vendors).
Although not required by HIPAA, because of the mandate to protect PHI,
employees and many business associates should also be required to sign confidentiality
agreements.
Worker Classification Issues - Unemployment Insurance
The Kentucky Supreme Court has recently clarified the tests for determining
"employee" versus "independent contractor" status for purposes ofthe Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance statute (KRS Chapter 341). In Kentucky Unemployment
Insurance Commission v. Landmark Community Newspapers ofKentucky, Inc., et al.,
2000-SC-0884-DG (Ky. 2003), the Court, in concluding that local newspaper carriers
were employees and not independent contractors, applied the factors identified at
Restatement (Second) ofAgency § 220(2).
In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent
contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent ofcontrol which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether in the locality, the work
is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
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the method ofpayment, whether by time or by the job;
whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation ofmaster
(d) the skills required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools
and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length oftime for which the person is employed;
(g)
(h)
(i)
and servant, and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
The Court further held that none of the factors is determinative, that each case
must be decided on its particular facts, and that, while important, the ability to control the
work was no more important to the classification determination than the other factors.
The Court then concluded that substantial record evidence supported the
conclusion ofthe Unemployment Insurance Commission that the newspaper carriers were
"employees" and not "independent contractors," (reversing the decision of the Court of
Appeals). See also, Litteral v. Comma ex rei Unemployment Compensation
Commission, 228 S.W. 2d 37 (Ky. 1950).
Advising Our Clients Today
While the legal and policy issues relating to the use of contingent workers are
difficult, and promise to create future challenges in all of the areas discussed above, our
clients are already being presented with a number of complex legal issues due to their
current use of contingent workers. Often, these issues are either not being recognized or
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are not being dealt with appropriately. Many first arise in the context ofbusiness clients
negotiating with providers of contingent workers, starting with the contract documents
establishing the relationship and defining the terms and conditions under which the
parties will operate.
It may not be possible for employers to avoid legal exposure resulting from the
various "contingent" staffing relationships, which may be complicated and, which may
present issues that have not been considered and/or clarified by the courts. However, it is
most important that employers carefully review all contracts creating relationships with
contingent workers and worker providers, and that the respective rights and obligations of
all parties be clearly set out. Form agreements, provided by the staffing agencies, should
be carefully reviewed, and should seldom be signed as originally presented. Many ofyou
have regular clients who utilize contingent workers, and who do not routinely have you
review their agreements with staffing and temp. agencies. Clients often assume that the
companies supplying contingent workers are knowledgeable and experienced, and/or that
there is no real opportunity to negotiate for terms different from those offered in the
provider's form agreements.
However, my experience has been that many businesses in the staffing industry
are not versed on many of these legal issues, even though they may tout their services by
proclaiming that our clients can insulate themselves from liability by allowing them to be
the "employer" in the relationship. Even the more knowledgeable providers often utilize
agreements that are heavily weighted in their favor, and against the interests of our
clients, sometimes to the point ofbeing unconscionable.
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In light of the various legal issues identified above, a good starting point for
employers and their counsel is to become much more pro-active in reviewing staffing and
contingent worker agreements, to make certain that they contain balanced provisions that
fairly allocate the legal risks between the parties, and that protect the interests of the
client. Many of our clients do not appreciate the need to utilize our services for this
purpose, and many of the agreements being used are seriously one-sided and/or legally
defective. In light of the legal issues described above, the following are examples of
issues that should be considered in reviewing contingent worker agreements:
1. Responsibility to recruit and hire
Consider the merits of including a provision making the staffing agency solely
responsible for recruiting, hiring and "screening" to do the work. The client should
supply job descriptions and other criteria, and otherwise provide a "framework" within
which the agency agrees to operate. The agreement should thereafter reflect that the
workers are hired by the agency, and not the company.
2. "Disclaimer" of employment status
Consider addressing the issue ofwhether the parties intend that workers will be the sole
employees of the staffing agency, or of the business utilizing its services. While such a
provision will not afford complete protection, in that the parties' designation will not be
dispositive, it is most important that the intent of the parties in this regard be clearly set
out in the agreement.
3. Responsibility for training
The agreement should indicate which party is to provide training. Of course, it is
reasonable to assume that, if the staffing agency is to provide meaningful training, this
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service will be factored into the cost of its services; however, such an allocation may well
pay significant dividends in the future.
4. Responsibility for compensation and benefits
The Agreement should reflect which party has responsibility for computing wages, hours,
and overtime hours, withholding and remitting taxes, and calculating and providing any
benefits or leave time required at law or otherwise offered by the agency. This provision
should be coordinated with the business' other contracts, insurance agreements, and
benefits plans.
5. Disciplinary actions and termination
The agreement should indicate the procedure by which disciplinary action will be taken,
and by which party. While the agreement may provide that any worker furnished by the
agency agrees to adhere to the policies and procedures of the company, the agreement
should also set out a procedure for the company to report worker violations to the staffing
agency, which should agree, in turn, to take appropriate action. The agreement should
provide that the company may request that a certain worker(s) not be returned; however,
the responsibility for determining continued employment with the staffing agency should
remain with that agency. Responsibility should also be allocated and procedures
established for investigation ofviolations ofpolicies such as allegations of sexual
harassment, so that the appropriate investigations can be made, while the staffing agency
can remain ultimately responsible for personnel actions regarding its employees.
6. On-site supervision
The parties should consider whether the staffing agency will provide an on-site
supervisor(s), to direct the work ofthe workers it places at the business. Procedures for
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the company to provide information and direction to the staffing agency supervisor can
be set out in the agreement; however, the right to "control the work" is almost always a
key issue for purposes of determining who is the employer, under any of the statutes
discussed above, and it will be difficult for the parties to argue that the staffing agency is
responsible for daily supervision of the worker if it has no presence on-site, and no real
involvement in, or even sense of, how the business operates on a daily basis.
7. Representation of compliance with all employment laws
The agreement should contain a certification by the staffing agency that it is and will
remain in complete compliance with all emploYment laws and regulations, and those
representations should be identified as being "material" for purposes of the agreement.
The provision should also recite that the agency will maintain an EED policy, including a
policy against harassment, and appropriate complaint and investigation procedures,
throughout the term of the agreement. The company should consider requiring that the
provider produce the policies at the time the agreement is entered into (for your review
on behalf of the client), and at other times, when requested or when changes are made.
(Example: policy on sexual harassment).
8. Indemnification
The agreement should address the issue of indemnification of each party for the acts of
the other party for its defense of any emploYment claims involving workers supplied by
the agency, and for any damages incurred as a result of any such claim(s).
9. Workers' compensation and unemployment insurance
The agreement should allocate which party has sole responsibility to make insurance
paYments for FICA, unemploYment and workers' compensation. Levels ofcoverage and
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carriers should be identified, along with provisions requiring consent of the business to
change coverages or providers, as well as requiring notice to the business of any actual or
threatened cancellation or other material change in circumstances.
10. Confidential and proprietary information
The agreement should protect confidential or trade secret information to which workers
may have access, and workers placed by staffing agencies should be covered to the same
extent as the company's own employees. This provision should address the issues of
access to confidential information, freedom to search belongings or work areas, and other
security procedures/precautions. The company should also consider the value ofusing
confidentiality agreements for the agency and all workers referred to the company.
*** *** ***
Issues involving the contingent workforce are complex, and often lead to
conflicting results. However, our clients should not allow this fact to become a
rationalization for doing nothing to evaluate and limit exposure. While our efforts are not
likely to eliminate all exposure in this complex and fast-changing area, an intentional
approach to evaluating risks and responding with appropriate policies aild practices, can
go a long way towards protecting clients' interests.
Samuel H. DeShazer
Hall, Render, Killian, Heath & Lyman, PSC
2501 Nelson Miller Parkway
Suite 102
Louisville, Kentucky 40223
(502) 253-1114
June 2004
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INTRODUCTION
It is not a news flash that employers today face an increasingly perilous landscape. In
addition to the significant challenges that flow from a confusing economic picture, employers are
faced with more frequent and dangerous claims by current and former employees. Among the
claims that give rise to the biggest financial risk are those involving a request for class relief.
For obvious reasons, employers want to do everything possible to avoid class exposure.
This outline will include a discussion of the fundamental requirements of a class action
and the principal issues faced by parties when litigating employment law class actions. It will
also include a brief discussion of emerging employment law issues in the class context.
BACKGROUND
A party may pursue a class action only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable (often abbreviated as "numerosity"); (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class (often abbreviated as "commonality"); (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class (often abbreviated as
"typicality"); and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class (often abbreviated as "fair and adequate representation"). 1 If all of these requirements
are satisfied, the court may certify a class if, in addition, the class representatives meet anyone
ofthe following requirements:2
(a) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of:
I FRCP 23(a). Because most class cases have been pursued in the federal courts, this outline principally focuses on
class reliefunder federal law.
2 These additional requirements are set forth in FRCP 23(b).
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(i) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(ii) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive ofthe interests ofthe
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(b) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory reliefwith respect to the class as a whole; or
(c) The court finds3 that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy.4
The party seeking class certification.bears the burden ofproof 5 and the
class mechanism is not available merely because a lawyer designates a group of
persons or entities as a "class" in the pleadings.6 Although a hearing prior to the
class determination is not required in every instance, " 'it may be necessary for
3 The matters pertinent to these [mdings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability ofconcentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
a class action. FRCP 23(b)(3).
4 The Supreme Court has held that district courts must conduct a "rigorous analysis" into whether the prerequisites
of Rule 23 are met before certifying a class. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
5 General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
6 Cash v. Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569,571 (6th Cir. 1970).
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the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification
question,,,7 As the Sixth Circuit has noted:
Mere repetition of the language ofRule 23(a) is not sufficient.
There must be an adequate statement of the basic facts to
indicate that each requirement of the rule is fulfilled.
Maintainability may be determined by the court on the basis of
the pleadings, if sufficient facts are set forth, but ordinarily the
determination should be predicated on more information than
the pleadings will provide ....The parties should be afforded
an opportunity to present evidence on the maintainability of the
class action. 8
I. Rule 23 (a) requirements.
A. Numerosity.
As noted above, to satisfy FRCP 23(a), a party seeking class reliefmust
demonstrate that the proposed class is so numerous that the joinder of all
members is impracticable.9 The test for numerosity is not precise and involves an
examination ofthe specific facts of each case. 10 In determining whether joinder is
impracticable, courts often will consider not only the size of the proposed class,
but also "the class's geographical dispersion, the ability of claimants to bring
individual suits, and whether the members' names are easily ascertainable."l1
Even so, when the class size is extremely large, the impracticability requirement
7 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. at
160 (1982».
8 Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 1200 (6th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted).
9 FRCP 23(a)(I).
10 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996).
11 O'Neil v. Appeal, 165 F.R.D. 479, 489 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
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is nonnally satisfied. I2 At least one court has concluded that fewer "than twenty-
one [members] is inadequate, more than forty [is] adequate, with numbers
between varying according to other factors. 13
It is important to note that mere conclusory allegations that joinder is
impracticable are not sufficient to satisfy the numerosity requirement.14 Indeed, it
is proper for a court to rule against class certification when the contentions
concerning the size ofthe class are purely speculative. IS
As with all of the requirements of class status, a claimant typically must
establish the numerosity requirement by a preponderance ofthe evidence. I6
B. Commonality.
A party seeking class status must prove that there are questions of law or
fact common to the class. I7 Although a claimant can satisfy this requirement even
if the claims are not identical, when the resolution of a common legal issue is
dependent upon factual detenninations that will be different for each purported
class member, the courts have consistently refused to find that the commonality
12 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996). See also Ilhardt v. AO. Smith Corp., 168
F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D. Ohio 1996) ("Numerosity may be satisfied by numbers alone").
13 Thomas County Branch of the N.AA.C.P. v. City ofThomasville Sch. Dist., 187 F.R.D. 690, 696 (M.D. Ga.
1999) (quotirIg Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11 th Cir. 1986)).
14 See Liberty Lincoln Mercury v. Ford Mktg. Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65, 74 (D. N.J. 1993).
15 Vigue v. Ives, 138 F.R.D. 6, 8, (D. Me. 1991).
16 Ilhardt v. AO. Smith Corp., 168 F.R.D. 613, 618 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
17 FRCP 23(a)(2).
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requirement was satisfied. IS Thus, where there is a finding that common issues do
not predominate, certification is improper. 19
The Sixth Circuit has noted that the "commonality requirement is
interdependent with the impracticability ofjoinder requirement, and the 'tests
together form the underlying conceptual basis supporting class actions' ".20
C. Typicality.
To meet the typicality requirement, the party seeking class status must
establish that the claims or defenses of the representative party are typical ofthe
claims or defenses of the class.21 Stated otherwise, the class representative's
interests must be aligned with those ofthe represented group so that "in pursuing
his own claims, the named plaintiffwill be advancing the interests of the class
members.,,22 This test is normally met as long as there is "a nexus between the
class representatives' claims" and the common questions of fact or law
concerning the class.23 If there is a defense that is peculiar to the named plaintiff,
class certification may be denied.24
18 See, e.g., Liberty Lincoln Mercury v. Ford Mktg. Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65, 76 (D.N.I. 1993). See also McCauley v.
International Business Machines, 165 F.3d 1038, 1046-47 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that to meet the commonality
requirement, the allegations of misrepresentations upon which the class claims are based must "be uniform among
class members ....")
19 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he products are different, each plaintiff has
a unique complaint, and each received different information and assurances from his treating physician").
20 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1080 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting 1 Newberg on Class Action, § 3.10, at
3-47).
21 FRCP 23(a)(3).
22 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1082 (6th Cir. 1996).
23 Cook v. Rockwell Infl Corp., 151 F.R.D. 378,385 (D. Colo. 1993).
24 BalIan v. Upjohn Co., 473 F.R.D. 473,480 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
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D. Adequacy ofRepresentation.
In recognition of the importance of the selection of class counsel to the
successful handling of a class action, the drafters of the recent amendments to
Rule 23 prepared a new section concerning the appointment of class counsel.
Rule 23 now explicitly says that "[u]nless a statute provides otherwise, a court
that certifies a class must appoint class counsel.,,25 That attorney must, ofcourse,
"fairly and adequately represent the interests ofthe c1ass.,,26 To that end, the
court is required to consider in its appointment decision "the work counsel has
done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action", "counsel's
experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and claims of the
type asserted in the action", "counsel's knowledge of the applicable law" and "the
resources counsel will commit to representing the class,,27 and may consider any
other "pertinent" matter.28 Moreover, the court may direct potential class counsel
to provide information on any subject pertinent to the appointment and to propose
terms for attorney fees and nontaxable costS.,,29
Amended Rule 23 also provides greater guidance concerning the
procedure for appointment of class counsel. Specifically, the Rule says that the
court may designate interim counsel to act on behalf ofthe putative class before
25 FRCP 23(g)(1)(A).
26 FRCP 23(g)(1)(B).
27 FRCP 23(g)(1)(C)(i).
28 FRCP 23(g)(1)(C)(ii).
29 FRCP 23(g)(1)(C)(iii).
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detennining whether to certify the action as a class action.3o Further, when there
is one applicant for appointment as class counsel, the court may appoint that
applicant only ifthe applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1)(B) and (C).31
Predictably, the Rule says that ifmore than one adequate applicant seeks
appointment as class counsel, the court must appoint the applicant best able to
represent the interests of the class. 32 The Rule also expressly authorizes the court
to include provisions about the award ofattorney fees or nontaxable costs in the
order appointing class counsel. 33
Whether representation is adequate is generally considered a question of
fact based upon the circumstances of each case.34 Before the amendment ofRule
23, courts generally found that for a representative to be deemed adequate he or
she must have common interests with the unnamed members of the class and it
must appear that the representative would vigorously prosecute the interests of the
class through qualified counsel.35 Applying these factors, courts before the
amendment typically reviewed whether there was any antagonism between the
interests of the named plaintiff and the other members of the class and also
reviewed the experience and the ability of the attorneys for the class.36 In
30 FRCP 23(g)(2)(A).
31 FRCP 23(g)(2)(B).
32 Id.
33 FRCP 23 (g)(2)(C).
34 BaHan v. Upjohn Co., 159 F.R.D. 473, 480 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
35 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1083 (6th Cir 1996).
36 BaHan v. Upjohn Co., 159 F.R.D. 473, 482 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
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addition, courts considered whether the class representative" 'posses[ed] the
same interest and suffer[ed] the same injury' as the class members.,,3? With
respect to that point, it is generally recognized that a person will not be deemed an
adequate class representative ifhe or she fails to establish the existence of a case
or controversy.38 Moreover, standing must exist both at the time the complaint is
filed and at the time the class is certified.39
On a similar point, special mootness rules exist for class actions. Once a
class is certified, "the mooting ofthe named plaintiffs claim does not moot the
action" and "the court continues to have jurisdiction to hear the merits of the
action if a controversy between any class member and the defendant exists. ,,40 On
the other hand, where the named plaintiffs claim becomes moot before
certification, dismissal of the action is required.41
II. Rule 23(b) Requirements.
As discussed above, a party seeking class reliefmay pursue a class action if he or
she meets the Rule 23(a) "prerequisites" and, in addition, demonstrates the applicability
of one of the three subparts ofRule 23(b).
A. Risks From Prosecution of Separate Actions.
Rule 23(b){l) recognizes the propriety of a class action if the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites are met and the prosecution of separate actions by or against
37 General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982); James v. Jones, 148 F.R.D. 196,201 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
38 Coleman v. Cannon Oil Co., 141 F.R.D. 516, 523 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
39 Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390,399 (6th Cir. 1993).
40 Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 399 (6th Cir. 1993).
41 Id.
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individual members ofthe class would create a risk of: (a) inconsistent or varying
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
establish incompatible standards for the party opposing the class; or (b)
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests. A judgment in a Rule 23(b)( I) case "shall" include and describe those
whom the court finds to be members ofthe class.42
B. Conduct Giving Rise to Injunctive or Declaratory Relief.
Under Rule 23(b)(2), class relief will be deemed proper ifthe Rule 23(a)
prerequisites are satisfied and the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory reliefwith respect to the class as a
whole.
C. Predominance of Common Questions.
Class relief is appropriate under the last subpart ofRule 23(b) if the Rule
23(a) prerequisites are satisfied and the court finds that the questions oflaw or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.43 The
Rule specifically identifies the following list of factors that are "pertinent to the
42 FRCP 23(c)(3). This same requirement applies to a judgment entered in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action.
43 FRCP 23(b)(3).
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findings": (a) the interest ofmembers of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (b) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (c) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum; and (d) the difficulties likely to be encountered
'h f I ,44In t e management 0 a c ass actIOn.
With respect to a FRep 23(b)(3) class action, the court is required to
direct to the members of the class the "best notice practicable under the
circumstances", including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort.45 Such notice "shall" advise each member that: (a) the
court will exclude the member from the class if the member so requests by a
specified date; (b) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (c) any member who does not request
exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through counse1.46
Due process concerns mandate the opt-out mechanism.47
A judgment entered in a Rule 23(b)(3) case "shall" include and specify or
describe those to whom the notice provided in the preceding paragraph was
directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be
members ofthe class.48
44 Id.
45 FRCP 23(c)(2).
46 Id.
47 Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 193 F.3d 415,425 (6th Cir. 1999).
48 FRCP 23(c)(3).
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Issues of damages in a Rule 23(b)(3) action may, where appropriate, be
reserved for individual treatment, with the question of liability tried as a class
action.49 In complex cases where no single set of operative facts establishes
liability, where no single proximate cause applies to each potential class members
and to each defendant, and where individual issues outnumber common issues,
however, the district court should question the appropriateness of a class action
for resolving the controversy.50
III. Other Procedures.
A. Class Certification.
Rule 23 specifically provides that "[w]hen a person sues or is sued as a
representative of a class, the court must - at an early practicable time - determine
by order whether to certify the action as a class action.,,51 Providing the court a
measure of flexibility, the Rule also provides that "[a]n order under Rule 23 (c)(l)
may be altered or amended before final judgment.,,52 In the Sixth Circuit, there is
an abuse ofdiscretion standard for the review of a trial court's class action
certification.53 In addition, if the parties agree to class certification or if the
opposing party does not contest the assertions of the party seeking class
certification as to the existence of a prerequisite, the district court may conclude
49 Ilhardt v. A.a. Smith Corp., 168 F.R.D. 613, 619 (S.D.Ohio 1996).
50 Id.
51 FRCP 23(c)(1)(A).
52 FRCP 23(c)(1)(C).
53 McCauley v. International Business Machines Corp., 165 F.3d 1038, 1046 (6th Cir. 1999).
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that certification is proper or that the prerequisites are properly established
without making a specific finding. 54
B. Discrete Issues and Subclasses.
Rule 23 explicitly recognizes that an action may be brought or maintained
as a class action with respect to particular issues.55 Similarly, a class may be
divided into subclasses and each,subclass treated as a class.56
C. Orders in Conduct of Actions.
Rule 23 provides that a court in a class action may make appropriate
orders: (1) determining the course ofproceedings or prescribing measures to
prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or
argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as
the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of
the proposed extent of the judgment, or ofthe opportunity ofthe members to
signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene
and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing
conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the
pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of
absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar
procedural matters. 57
54 In re American Medical Sys., 75 F.3d 1069,1079-80 (6th Cir, 1996).
55 FRCP 23(c)(4).
56 Id.
57 FRCP 23(d).
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D. Dismissal or Compromise.
Federal Rule 23(e) has been amended recently to set forth more
specifically the process a court will follow when approving a proposed settlement,
voluntary dismissal or compromise. The Rule specifically begins with the
principle that "[t]he court must approve any settlement, voluntary dismissal, or
compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class.58 When
presented with a proposed voluntary resolution, a court is required to direct notice
"in a reasonable manner" to all class members who would be barred by the
proposed resolution.59 In addition, the court may approve a proposed voluntary
resolution that would bind class members only after a hearing and on finding that
the proposed resolution is "fair, reasonable, and adequate.,,6o Similarly, if the
action previously was certified as a class action unqer FRCP 23(b)(3), the Court
may refuse to approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request
exclusion to individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to request
exclusion but did not do SO.61
The parties seeking a voluntary resolution ofclass claims must file a
statement identifying any agreement made in connection with the proposed
resolution.62 Further, any class member may object to a proposed settlement,
58 FRCP 23(e)(1)(A).
59 FRCP 23(e)(1)(B).
60 FRCP 23(e)(1)(C).
61 FRCP 23(e)(3).
62 FRCP 23(e)(2).
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voluntary dismissal or compromise that requires court approval under FRCP
23(e)(1)(A) and an objection made under Rule 23(e)(4)(A) may be withdrawn
only with the court's approva1.63
E. Appeals.
A court of appeals may, in its discretion, permit an appeal from an order of
a district court granting or denying class action certification under the Rule if
application is made to it within ten days after entry ofthe order.64 An appeal does
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of
appeals so orders.65
F. Award ofAttorney Fees.
In an action certified as a class action, the court may award reasonable
attorney fees and nontaxable costs authorized by law or by agreement ofthe
parties. As a matter ofprocedure, a claim for an award of attorney fees and
nontaxable costs must be made by motion, subject to the provisions ofRule 23(h),
at a time set by the COurt.66 Notice of the motion must be served on all parties
and, for motions by class counsel, directed to class members in a reasonable
manner.
67 A class member, or a party from whom payment is sought, may object
63 FRCP 23(e)(4).
64 FRCP 23(f). It is noteworthy that there is no corresponding provision under Rule 23 of the Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure.
65 Id.
66 FRCP 23(h)(1).
67 Id.
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to the motion68 and the court may hold a hearing and must find the facts and state
its conclusions oflaw on the motion.69 The court is authorized to refer issues
related to the amount of the award to a special master or to a magistrate judge as
provided in Rule 54(d)(2)(D).7o
IV. Emerging Class Issues in Employment Law.
A. Claims Regarding Employee Benefits.
Among the most prevalent class action claims in the employment law area
are those regarding employee benefits. Such claims typically are pursued under
the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").71 Class
claims under ERISA may involve such issues as "nondisclosure, breach ofduty,
or nonforfeiture provisions.',n
B. Discrimination Claims.
Employers today face an increasing risk of defending discrimination
claims by groups of former, or even current, employees. In earlier cases under
Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, many courts tended to be more lenient
in finding compliance with Rule 23 than in other types ofcases.73 That tendency
68 FRCP 23(h)(2).
69 FRCP 23(h)(3).
70 FRCP 23(h)(4).
71 29 U.S.c. § 1001, et. seq.
72 5 James Wm. Moore, et al. Moore's Federal Practice § 23.23 [5][i] (3d ed. 2000).
73 Lindema1ll1 & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law, Vol. II at 1582 (3d ed. 1996).
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ended after the United States Supreme Court emphasized that a Title VII class
plaintiffmust satisfy all ofthe requirements ofRule 23,74 noting:
We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or ethnic
discrimination are often by their very nature class suits,
involving classwide wrongs. Common questions of law or
facts are typically present. But careful attention to the
requirements ofFed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 remains nonetheless
indispensable. The mere fact that a complaint alleges racial or
ethnic discrimination does not in itself ensure that the party
who has brought the lawsuit will be an adequate representative
ofthose who may have been the real victims of that
discrimination.75
As a general proposition, disparate treatment discrimination claims are
often not appropriate for class treatment because allegations of intentional
discrimination often raise individual issues.76 Stated another way, "[i]t is more
difficult to find commonality and typicality in disparate treatment claims as
opposed to disparate impact claims.'m Among the problems with the pursuit of
disparate treatment class claims is that the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages in Title VII cases "requires individualized and independent proof of
injury to, and the means by which discrimination was inflicted upon, each class
member.',78 As the United States Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit has noted:
The plaintiffs' claims for compensatory and punitive damages
must therefore focus almost entirely on facts and issues specific
74 East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodrigues, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
75 Id. at 405-06.
76 Lindemann & Grossman, n. 55, supra, at 1593.
77 Carter v. West Publishing Co., 79 FEP 1494, 1498 (D. Fla. 1999). See also Zachery v. Texaco Exploration &
Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 239 (W.D. Tex. 1999) ("Because disparate treatment claims are by their nature
individual, the class treatment of these claims requires close scrutiny of the proposed class and claims.").
78 Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,419 (5th Cir. 1998).
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to individuals rather than the class as a whole: what kind of
discrimination was each plaintiff subjected to; how did it affect
each plaintiff emotionally and physically, at work and at home;
what medical treatment did each plaintiff receive and at what
expense; and so on and so on. Under such circumstances, an
action conducted nominally as a class action would 'degenerate
in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.' 79
A Title VII plaintiffbringing a disparate impact claim must identify a
specific practice or specific practices as the cause ofthe alleged impact, unless the
elements of the decision making process are not capable of separation for
analysis. 80 Courts generally find the Rule 23(a) requirements met in disparate
impact cases when the plaintiffs identify a particular test or other objective
selection devise that created the disparate impact.8!
C. Harassment Claims.
Although harassment claims more often than not involve allegations of
individual harassment, there is precedent for class actions that arise from an
alleged pervasive course of harassing conduct affecting a large number of
persons.82
D. Wage and Hour Claims.
Wage and hour claims, like those asserted under ERISA, can give rise to
significant exposure for relatively minor missteps. Under Federal Law,83 there
79 Id.
80 Lindemann & Grossman, n. 55, supra, at 1591.
81 Id., 2000 cum. supp. at 881.
82 See, e.g., Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405 (9th Cir. 1998).
83 The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. section 201, et seq. requires payment of minimum wages and overtime
to employees covered by the Act.
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are special rules concerning collective claims that, in contrast to those in Rule 23,
require claimants to opt in to a potential class.84 Oddly, the Kentucky Wage and
Hour chapter, though based in significant part on the Fair Labor Standards Act,
does not contain a similar "opt in" provision.85
84 29 U.S.C. § 216 ("No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing
to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.").
85 See KRS 337.385 ("Such action may be maintained in any court ofcompetent jurisdiction by anyone (1) or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves.").
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SECTION I

An Overview of the Employment At-Will Doctrine in Kentucky
Life is largely made up of relationships. One can argue that the employee/employer
relationship is just as important in our every day lives as the relationship between parent and
child and husband and wife. Many employees would join in the chorus of Johnny Paycheck's
famous song "Take this job and shove it." Many employers have recently enjoyed" The
Apprentice" which shows a person leaving each week after Donald Trump famously fires them.
Anyway you look at it, the question of at-will employment is very important to employers and
employees.
The number one question an attorney has to ask him or herself when presented with facts
of a particular matter is "Do I have a cause of action?" In the employment law field this question
inevitably turns on whether the employee is considered an "at-will employee." If so, the attorney
must determine whether there is a valid exception to the at-will employment doctrine that can be
utilized on his or her client's behalf.
Another question a practitioner may ask is whether there are enough employment law
cases to sustain a practice. I submit that employment law is recession proof. During good
economic times there are still human resource blunders that lead to wonderful cases. During bad
economic times (as is largely the case at the present time) employees who get fired are much
more emotional about losing their job because it is hard to find another one. They call an
attorney to see if there is anything they can do about being fired for no apparent reason.
I hope to provide a brief sketch of the basics of the employment at-will doctrine in
Kentucky. In no way is this presentation or material meant to be an exhaustive analysis of the
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topic. Rather, it provides the relevant and current materials on particular topics dealing with at-
will employment that an attorney then can extrapolate from there.
1. Employment At-Will: What is it?
An employment at-will contract is a contact of employment with no defined period for
that employment. It is therefore terminable at any time by either the employer or the employee.
Kentucky has generally recognized that an employer may discharge his at-will employee for
good cause, for no cause or for a cause that some might view as morally indefensible.
Production Oil Co. v. Johnson, Ky., 313 S.W.2d 411 (1958).
So can there ever be a time that an employee can sue an employer for his or her
termination? Yes. There are two situations that exist where grounds for discharging an
employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable absent explicit legislative
statements prohibiting the discharge. First, if the alleged reason for the discharge of the
employee was the failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment. Second, when
the reason for discharge is the employee's exercise of a right conferred by well established
legislative enactment. Dauley v. Hops ofBowling Green Limited, 2003 WL 1340013 (Ky.App.)
citing Suchodolaski v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d 710 (1981). Accordingly
there have been common law as well as statutory exceptions made to the employment at-will
doctrine. Each ofthese will be discussed below with correlating case examples.
2. Statutory Exceptions to the Employment At-Will Doctrine
There are three primary statutory provisions in the employment law field that give rise to
causes of action for an employee against an employer. The first is a statutory prohibition against
the employer from retaliating against the employee for applying for workers' compensation
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benefits. KRS 342.197(1). The second is the Kentucky Whistle-Blower statute. KRS 61.102(1).
Finally there is the prohibition against discrimination found in the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.
KRS 344.010 et. seq. Each ofthese statutory basis will be explored further below.
a. Workers' Compensation Retaliation - KRS 342.197(1)
KRS 342.197(1) states that "no employee should be harassed or discharged or
discriminated against in any manner what so ever for filing or pursuing any lawful claim
under this chapter." The statute is actually written to codify the holding of Firestone
Textile Company Division v. Meadows, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 730 (1983). There are two
important aspects of the Firestone case. The first is the Court's acknowledgement that an
employee can sue an employer for retaliating against him. The Court noted "the only
effective way to prevent an employer from interfering with his employee's right to seek
compensation is to recognize that the latter has a cause of action for retaliatory discharge
when the discharge is motivated by the desire to punish the employee for seeking the
benefits to which he is entitled to by law." Id. at 734. The second important
development from the Firestone case is that it is a question of law for the Court to decide
whether the reason for discnarge is unlawful. Id. at 733.
In First Property Management Corp. v. Zarebidaki, Ky. , 867 S.W.2d 185 (1993),
the Court determined whether the termination of the employee had to be solely because
he filed for workers compensation benefits or whether the fact that the employee filed for
workers compensation benefits was a substainual motivating factor in terminating the
employee to sustain a cause of action. The Court held "that the employer is not free from
liability simply because he offers proof he would have discharged the employee anyway,
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even absent the lawful and pennissible reason, so long that the jury believes the
impennissible reason did in fact contribute to the discharge as one of the substantial
motivating factors." Id. at 188.
Another important case for plaintiffs is Pike County Coal Corp. v. Ratliff,
Ky.App., 37 S.W.3d 781 (2000). This case expanded the scope of KRS 342.197(3) to
protect those who protect co-workers from retaliation. The plaintiff sued the employer on
the theory that he was fired for his failure to persuade a co-worker from dropping a
workers compensation claim. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim but agreed with
the trial court that KRS 342.197(3) extended 342.197(1) protection beyond an injured
employee. The court stated "clearly to insure the integrity of the underlying policies of
the statute we would not hesitate to construe the "any individual" language to encompass
any person who sought to protect his own rights to pursue a workers compensation claim
as well any person who acted in support of another's pursuit or those rights and who
suffered reprisals from the employer of the injured employee." Id. at 784.
b. The Kentucky Whistle-Blower Statute - KRS 61.102(1)
KRS 61.102(1) states that
"no employer shall subject to reprisal or directly or
indirectly use or threaten to use any official authority or influence
in any matter what so ever which tends to discourage, restrain,
depress, dissuade, detour, prevent, interfere with, coheres or
discriminate against any employee who in good faith reports,
discloses, divulges, or otherwise brings to the attention of the
Kentucky Legislative Ethics Commission, the Attorney General,
the Auditor of Public Accounts, the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky or any of its members or employees,
a legislative research commission or any of its committees,
members or employees, the judiciary or any member or employee
of the judiciary, any law enforcement agency or its employees, or
any other appropriate body or authority, any facts or infonnation
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relative to an actual or suspected violation of any law, statute,
executive order, administrative regulation, mandate, rule or
orderanance of the United States, the Commonwealth of Kentucky
or any of its political subdivisions, or any facts or information
relative to actual or suspected mismanagement, waste, fraud, abuse
of authority, or substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety. No employer shall require any employee to give notice
prior to making such a report, disclosure, divulgence."
KRS 61.102(2) states that "no employer shall subject to reprisal or discriminate
against or use any official authority or influence to cause reprisal or discrimination by
others against any person who supports, aids or substantiates any employee who makes
public any wrong doing set forth in subsection (1) ofthis section."
The most recent case dealing with the Kentucky Whistle-Blower Statute is
Commonwealth ofKentucky Department ofAgriculture v. Vinson, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 162
(2000). This case decided whether the statute was unconstitutionally vague, whether the
plaintiffs were entitled to punitive damages, whether the plaintiff was entitled to a jury
trial and when amendments to the statute took effect in regard to this particular matter.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague,
that the plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages, that the plaintiff was entitled to a trial
by jury, and that the 1993 amendments to the statute (which were favorable to
employees) would not be applied retroactively. As a result, the judgment was reversed
and the case remanded for a new trial under the original version of the statute. However,
this case shows that the statute has far reaching application.
C. The Kentucky Civil Rights Act - KRS 344.040
KRS 344.040(1) states "it is unlawful practice for an employer to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against an individual with
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respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of
the individual's race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age forty (40) and over, because
a person is a qualified individual with a disability, or because an individual is a smoker or
nonsmoker, as long as the person complies with any workplace policy concerning
smoking."
A case that is cited by nearly every defendant in nearly every employment law
case is Grzyb v. Evans, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 399 (1985). The Court held "the claim of sex
discrimination would not qualify as providing the necessary underpinning for a wrongful
discharge suit because the same statute that enunciates the public policy prohibiting
employment discrimination because of "sex" also provides a structure for pursuing a
claim for discriminatory acts and contradiction of its terms." Id. at 401. The Court went
on to state "the same statute which would provide the necessary underpinning for a
wrongful discharge suit where there is sufficient evidence to prove sex discrimination in
employment practices also structures the remedy. The statute not only creates a public
policy but preempts the field of its application." Id. Thus the defendant usually argues
that the plaintiff is not entitled to bring a cause of action and instead is limited to
administrative remedies.
However two cases have since clarified whether plaintiff can bring a wrongful
discharge claim as indicated in the statute. The first is Grego v. Meijer Inc., 187 F.Supp.
2d 689 (W.n.Ky. 2001). ill that case the Court held that "absent the final determination
by the administrative agency, therefore, the election of remedies provision of the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act does not bar [plaintiffs] claim so long as it is no longer
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pending with the KCHR." Id. at 693. The second case is Young v. Hammond, 2004 WL
867795 (Ky.). In this case, decided April 22, 2004, the court held that the when the
plaintiff is notified by the EEOC that their file is being closed and infonns her of her
right to sue, the plaintiff is still entitled to bring a lawsuit in circuit court. Id. at *7.
3. Common law claims or case law claims.
There are a plethora of common law claims that are available to a plaintiff that may be
considered exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine, like intentional infliction of emotional
distress and negligent hiring and supervision of employees. I will only address several of the
most litigated topics below.
a. Public Policy Exception
The Firestone case, referenced earlier, is a perfect example of a public policy
exception to the employment at-will doctrine. The public policy exception was clearly
defined by the Grzyb case also mentioned earlier. Of course the Grzyb decision was also
further clarified by the Dauley decision mentioned at the very beginning of this paper.
There are four cases that show how narrow the Court construes public policy
exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine. First, is Boykins v. Housing Authority of
Louisville, Ky., 842 S.W.2d 527 (1992). In this case the plaintiff was employed as an
executive secretary with the Housing Authority of Louisville and filed a lawsuit against
the Housing Authority of Louisville as next fiend of her infant son alleging negligence.
Approximately four months later she was fired from the Housing Authority. The plaintiff
claimed that she was fired in retaliation for filing the suit as next fiend of her infant son.
Although she was fired for a matter not related to her employment, she claimed that the
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tennination was in violation of the "open courts" provision of Section 14 of the Kentucky
Constitution. The Court held that there was no "fundamental and well-defined public
policy evidenced by existing law as required by Firestone. Nor does either exception
outlined in Grzyb apply." Id. at 530.
The next case is Nelson Steel Corp. v. McDaniel, Ky., 898 S.W.2d 66 (1995). In
this case the plaintiff filed two workers compensation claims with his prior employer
before he began employment with the defendant, Nelson Steel Corp. When he was
discharged he alleged that he was fired due to filing of prior workers compensation
claims. The Court concluded "KRS 342.197(1) does not expand the cause of action for
wrongful discharge for exercise of workers compensation rights beyond the retaliatory
discharge situation." Id. at 69.
One of the more recent decisions regarding the public policy exception is Barlow
v. Martin-Brower Co., 202 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. Ky. 2000). The plaintiff alleged that he
was wrongfully discharged because he refused to violate federal and state time and safety
regulations. The federal district court dismissed plaintiff's claims finding that the
administrative remedy available to plaintiff under the Surface Transportation Assistance
Act ("STAA") was exclusive. The plaintiff contended that while the STAA may have
precluded his claim for one count of his complaint it did not preclude his claim for
wrongful tennination and violation of well defined statutory provisions. However the
Court held that "the public policy asserted was not defined as required by Grzyb by
constitutional statutory provision. It is modified only by administrative regulation." Id.
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at **2. Thus an administrative regulation is not considered a public policy exception to
the employment at-will doctrine.
The most recent case concerning the public policy exception to the employment
at-will doctrine is Byrd v. Packaging Unlimited, Inc., 2004 WL 539125 (Ky.App.). In
this case the plaintiff brought his lawsuit for wrongful discharge based upon the
allegation that he was discharged by the defendant for refusing to violate a law in the
course of his employment. Specifically the plaintiff alleged that he was dismissed based
upon his refusal to violate the law against falsifying business records. The Court held
that KRS 517.050, the statute with codifies the defense of falsifying business records,
"falls squarely within the first exception to at-will employment identified Grzyb." Id. at
*8. Thus a criminal statute can be the basis for an exception to the employment at-will
doctrine.
Finally, the plaintiff in Zumot v. Data Management Co., 2004 WL 405888
(Ky.App.) reported illegal business activities to others in his company. The Court held
that plaintiff was a at-will employee and that "[plaintiff's] report of illegal activity to
those other than public authorities is not protected activity under the public policy
exception." Id. a *1.
b. Contract Claims
It is well established that contract provisions and other representations can form
an exception to the employment at-will doctrine. In Putnam v. Producers' Livestock
Marketing Ass 'n, Ky.App., 75 S.W.2d 1075 (1934), the Court held that a letter from the
employer to the employee providing for an annual salary was held to sufficiently disclose
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the intention to employ the plaintiff for a definite period of time. Thus the resulting
contract was not considered terminable at-will.
In Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., Ky., 655 S.W.2d 489 (1993), the
plaintiff alleged that the parties had agreed that after a ninety day probationary period he
could only be fired for just cause. The Court made two important holdings. First, the
Court stated "the parties may enter into a contract of employment terminable only
pursuant to expressed terms-as "for cause"- by clearly stating their intention to do so,
even though no other considerations than services to be preformed or promised, is
expected by the employer, or preformed or promised by the employee." Id. at 492.
Second, and maybe more importantly for plaintiffs, the Court stated ''whether [plaintiffs]
employment contract contained a "termination for cause only" covenant or whether he
was fired in accordance with company policies and procedures for one or more of the
many causes alleged by [defendant] cannot be resolved against him on [defendant's]
Motion for Summary Judgment." Id. Thus under similar circumstances, whether the
contract is considered a termination for cause or an at-will contract is a question for the
jury to decide.
It should be noted that the holding in Shah has been refined on two occasions.
First, in Baker v. Kentucky State University, 2002 WL 1792178 (6th Cir. Ky.) the plaintiff
was hired as a police officer at Kentucky State University under a succession of one year
contracts. When he was terminated the plaintiff filed suit and relied on the language in
Shah to support his claim that a case such as his raising the issue of denial of
predeprivation due process in the employment context is not appropriate for summary
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judgment. The Court rejected this argument due to the fact that the plaintiff presented no
evidence of an implied contract. Id. at **3. In the second case, Bailey v. Floyd County
Board of Education, 106 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. Ky. 1996), plaintiff was fired from her
position with the Head Start Program in Floyd County. She claimed the personnel
manual for the high school that was modified after her employment began created a "for
cause" exception to her at-will contract. The Court noted that the plaintiff actually
drafted the policy and asserted in an introductory statement that the manual was not a
change in employment status but a "guide and reference" and a collection of "ideas and
principles". Id. at 143. The Court also noted that the manual indicated it did not apply to
Bailey as a director of the head start program. Id. Thus the court held that the plaintiff
was still an employee at-will.
In Hunter v. Wehr Constructors, Inc., Ky.App., 875 S.W.2d 899 (1993) the
plaintiff received a letter from the defendant which stated that "this project position will
last a minimum of thirteen months". The plaintiff asserted that this created a contract for
a thirteen month period. The defendant denied this and fired the plaintiff asserting that he
was an at-will employee. Importantly the Court held "if there is more than one
reasonable inference to be drawn from the May 18, 1990 letter the question should be
submitted to the jury. In other words if the writing is ambiguous, the factual question of
what the parties intended by it is for the jury." Id. at 901.
Another case involving a letter and an employee manual as the basis ofplaintiffs
claim that he is no longer an at-will employee is Williams v. Webster Co. Coal, 2003 WL
1240474 (Ky.App. 2003). The Court held that there was no clear expression in the letter
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or the employee manual to change plaintiffs position as an at-will employee. Thus the
mere existence of an employee manual or a letter from employer to employee regarding
job conditions will not suffice to take the plaintiff out of the at-will category.
The most recent expression about contractual modifications to the employment at-
will status can be found in Landrum v. Lindsey Wilson College, 2004 WL 362317
(Ky.App.). In this case the plaintiff was hired as a professor in the business department
at Lindsey Wilson College. From 1992 to 1997, plaintiff was employed by the college
under a series of one year contracts. In February, 1997 the college offered plaintiff a
three year "rolling" employment contract. While the contract set forth a three year term it
was renewable annually and the contract provided that it was subject to the terms and
conditions set in the faculty handbook. The college fired Landrum and Landrum filed the
lawsuit claiming wrongful termination. The Court held ''where an employment contract
sets forth a specific period of employment, an employer may not unilaterally alter the
terms and conditions of the employment during that period." Id. at *3. The Court
ultimately found for the defendant in this case because the contract in which the plaintiff
signed containing a thirty day notification process had expired by the time the
termination that gave rise to the lawsuit had taken place.
c. Written Modifications
The question of whether employee handbooks and policy manuals could provide
an exception to the employment at-will doctrine was dealt with in Nork v. Fetter Printing
Company, Ky.App., 738 S.W.2d 824 (1987). The plaintiff filed a claim for wrongful
discharge against the defendants stating that the employee handbook issued by the
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defendant for it's employees created a contract implied in fact and portions of the
handbook prevented the defendant from discharging the plaintiff. The Court noted the
following language appeared immediately above the plaintiffs signature on the
application form: "it is further agreed that this contract may be terminated at-will by
either the employee or the employer." Id. at 826. The Court denied plaintiffs claim
stating that the handbook "contains policy compliancy statements which [defendant]
management admittedly strove to follow, but this does not amount to an expression of an
contractual agreement where the language is not contractual." Id.
An employee handbook without the language mentioned in the Nark case as
mentioned above can serve as a basis to modify the employment at-will relationship. In
Norris v. Wilson Care Home Limited, 1990 WL 393903 (Ky.App.) the Court noted "we
cannot accept the position that an employer can draft a detailed handbook setting forth a
probationary period, warning system, and different categories of offenses without some
impact upon the employment relationship." Id. at *4. The Court went on to note "the
inference above is that employment, after the ninety day probationary period, was not
"at-will" but was permanent subject to discharge for cause." Id.
In Hines v. ElfAtochem North America, Inc., 813 F.Supp. 550 (W.D.Ky., 1993)
the Court found the plaintiffs at-will employment had been altered due to posted rules of
conduct. The rules stated "our labor agreements have always explicitly recognized the
company's right to discharge, suspend, or otherwise discipline for just cause." Id. at 552.
The Court held "the posted rules of conduct could be construed as creating an implied
contract between [plaintiff] and [defendant]. The intention to create a just cause
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relationship is clear. The policy was posted and [plaintiff] read and relied on the
language. There is no disclaimer or limiting language. There is some evidence that there
was a modification to the employment at-will status. For this reason the Motion to
Dismiss a claim for breach of an implied contract would be denied." Id. This case stands
for the interesting proposition that as long as there is "some evidence" that there was a
modification to the employment at-will status that a summary judgment motion would be
precluded.
d. Oral Modifications
In Audiovox Corp. v. Moody, Ky.App., 737 S.W.2d 468 (1987) the plaintiff was
told that if she came forward with information about her immediate supervisor she would
not be discharged. After being unable to verify plaintiff's statements defendant fired
plaintiff. The Court held that defendant's representations to plaintiff that they would not
fire her created an oral modification to her at-will employment. The Court noted that
"rather than perform what we assume to be an oral contract as it could have done by
intervening to Appellee's rescue [defendant's] breached the contract." Id. at 470. This
case stands for an important proposition for plaintiffs in that the existence of a contract is
a question of fact for the jury to answer.
In a relatively famous case, Hammond v. Heritage Communications, Inc.,
Ky.App., 756 S.W.2d 152 (1988) the plaintiff worked at a radio station and was
encouraged by her supervisor to appear in Playboy magazine. After the pictures came
out she was terminated. The Court of Appeals held that there was an issue of fact as to
whether the parties had entered into an oral contract which modified the plaintiff's status
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as an at-will employee. Id. at 154. The Court noted that "the records are undisputed that
the appellants immediate supervisor .. , told her that she would not lose her job if her
photograph were to appear in Playboy. This admission, together with the allegations set
forth in the complaint, create an issue of fact as to whether an oral contract modifying
appellants status as an at-will employee was entered into between the parties.
Consequently if a jury finds that an oral contract did exist modifying her at-will status the
appellate is entitled to introduce evidence proving that such a contract was breached and
that she was damaged." Id.
It is important to note that the Hammond case turned on the assurances from
plaintiffs immediate supervisor as to whether an oral employment contract was entered
into. In Wells v. Huish Detergents, Inc., 19 Fed.Appx. 168(6th Cir.Ky. 2001) the
defendant actually placed language in the company handbook that stated that the
defendant would not be bound by any unauthorized statements by employees. Further the
defendant included language in it's handbook that modification to the employment
relationship had to be facilitated by a written statement by the company president. In
denying plaintiffs claim the Court held that the plaintiff ''was fully aware that only the
president of [defendant] not Anglin or any other manager had the authority to bind the
company or modify his at-will employment status with the company." Id. at 176.
However, even if there is an oral agreement modifying an at-will status, should a
plaintiff go beyond the scope of any oral agreement then he will be considered an at-will
employee. This is the holding in Buckholtz v. Dugan, Ky.App. 977 S.W.2d 24 (1998).
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In Mayo v. Owen Healthcare Inc., 229 F.3d 1152 (6th Cir.Ky. 2000) plaintiff
claimed that the defendant breached an oral contract of employment. The plaintiff
claimed that his testimony alone created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
there was an oral employment contract. The Court affirmed the district court and noted
"there was no evidence that the "benefits" discussed included a termination of for cause
restriction and further there is no evidence that a termination for cause restriction was
ever a benefit enjoyed with [defendant] and subject to continuation." Id. at **2.
The most recent case dealing with this issue is Russell v. Jewish Hasp., 2004 WL
405973 (Ky.App., 2004). The plaintiff claimed she was wrongfully discharged because
the defendant allegedly would have required her to perform procedures for which she was
neither licensed or qualified. Plaintiff did not have an employment contract with the
defendant. The Court pointed out that there was no specific training or license required
to do the work the plaintiffwas being asked to do. The Court further noted that there was
no evidence in the record that anyone on behalf of the defendant ever asked the plaintiff
to perform procedures requiring invasive procedures that was the basis of her objection.
The Court held "in absence of any evidence that [plaintiff] was requested or instructed to
violate the law she can not maintain a cause an action for wrongful discharge under the
public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine." Id. at *2.
e. Fraud, Misrepresentation & Estoppel
In United Parcel Service Co. v. Rickert, Ky. 996 S.W.2d 464 (1999) the plaintiff
alleged that he was promised a job with UPS if he stayed on with the contract carrier
Orion through a transition period. When UPS did not end up hiring the plaintiff he
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brought suit alleging breach of contract, fraud and promissory estoppel. The Court held
"sufficient evidence was produced to established a jury question regarding the alleged
untrue statements of UPS causing the inaction and the resulting damages. There was
evidence produced at trial that indicated the only reason UPS promised [plaintiff] a job
was to induce him to fly its planes during the transition period." Id. at 469. Thus the oral
promise of a further contract was held to be enough to sustain plaintiff's claim for fraud
and promissory estoppel.
f. Obligation of Good Faith & Fair Dealing
Although an at-will employment contract carries with it an implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing just as any other contract, the Courts in Kentucky have nonetheless
held that an at-will employee could still be fired with or without cause. In Wyant v. SCM
Corp., Ky.App., 692 S.W.2d 814 (1985) the appellant argued that his seventeen year
employment implied a duty of good faith and fair dealing upon the appellate. The Court
stated, "the problem with the appellant's position is that terminable at-will employment
in Kentucky may mean that at any time with or without cause." Id. at 816. However the
Court did leave open the possibility that with the right facts the implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing could apply. The Court stated "at any rate we do not think appellant
demonstrated Appellee's bad faith to even a scintilla of reliable probable evidence." Id.
Thus plaintiff could argue that if they demonstrate the defendant's bad faith that a viable
claim could be brought and summary judgment precluded. Query how this claim may be
brought in correlation with an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim similar to
that in Kroger v. Wellberger, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 61 (1992).
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g. Tortious Interference with Contract
The plaintiff in Stanek v. Greco, 323 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. MICH 2003) alleged that
even though she was an at-will employee the defendant still tortuously interfered with her
employment agreement. The Court held "virtuously all states, even those states that do
not recognize certain exceptions to employment at-will, have permitted tort lawsuits in
the employment termination context particularly the torts of fraud, deformation, and
mental and emotional distress, invasion ofprivacy, and of course intentional interference
with contract. Unlike the employment at-will exceptions these cases merely represent an
application of existing and long standing tort law to the employment setting rather than a
creation or further development of newer and unevenly accepted at-will exceptions." Id.
at 479. Thus if an employer tortiously interferes with an employee's contract they could
be held responsible.
4. Conclusion
In nearly every employment law case there will anse a question concerning at-will
employment. It is the employment at-will doctrine that arguably screens an overwhelming
majority of employment law cases that plaintiff's attorneys must consider and gives defendants a
powerful argument during litigation. This presentation and corresponding material are meant to
provide practitioners with current and relevant information to begin further research into the
employment at-will doctrine as it applies to their particular case. A basic understanding of this
doctrine is essential to the successful litigation of a case one way or the other~
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I. DISCOVERY: THE NECESSARY EVIL.
A. In employment cases, Plaintiffs and Defendants attorneys approach discovery
from totally different perspectives to meet their respective goals.
B. Discovery is usually the least liked task ofboth parties' attorneys in the entire
litigation process.
II. PRELIMINARY AND INFORMAL DISCOVERY BY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL
WITH HIS OWN CLIENT.
A. Initial screening.
1. "Screening without screaming".
• Eliminate a client who has bad facts. Ensure that the potential client
understands that any bad facts will be disclosed in the process of
pursuing his case, and what the consequences of such disclosure may
be.
• Clearly establish your client's goals in the initial consultation. The
expressed goals can sometimes be quite amazing and unpredictable.
Some persons just want their job back, and others want dignity, a sense
ofworth, and/or their good name back. lfthe client's goals can be met
without litigation, the Plaintiffs attorney does the client a disservice to
jump into litigation without pursuing other reasonable options.
• Stay clear ofthe disgruntled employee seeking only "revenge".
2. Obtain as much corroboration as possible prior to notifying the employer.
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• Talk to fonner employees to corroborate, and with any other friends,
neighbors, relatives, or other important potential witnesses.
• Consider the use of a private investigator
III. STRATEGIC USE OF FORMAL DISCOVERY TOOLS.
A. The scope of discovery is unique to every case, and a discovery plan should be
designed up front.
B. Plaintiff's plan for the timing and the order of discovery is often directly contrary
to Defendant's plan.
C. Plaintiff's general discovery interests:
1. Basic infonnation on the Defendant Company, the Company players, and
the environs.
• To even the playing field regarding the context and scope ofclient's
(fonner) employment environment. This includes taking 30.02(b)
depositions and sending requests for production.
• Discovery on the individual players in the case - finding out comments
by the harasser and any admissions-against-interest by other prominent
Company players (key managers, HR personnel).
2. Who made the job decisions about your client?
• Primary decision maker. .
• Others who participated/provided infonnation.
• Meeting or committee
who, what, when, where, why, how?
notes, minutes, materials involved.
context and purpose ofmeeting.
3. Pretext.
• Comparators.
4. Basis for Defendant's denials and affinnative defenses.
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5. Identifications ofkey documents and location.
D. Defendants Interests:
1. What is your client going to say about his claim, and who/what will
corroborate it?
• Plaintiff should answer Defendant's discovery completely.
E. The Discovery Plan: Plaintiff's most important role in discovery is "keeping your
eye on the ball": your client's claim.
1. Formulate an aggressive plan. Generally, discovery may be obtained
regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to a claim or defense
of any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things
and the identity and location ofpersons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter.
2. Implement your plan as soon as permitted by procedural and court rules.
Reflect early and often on how the case will best be presented on motions,
such as summary judgment, and at trial.
3. Work your plan, but don't let it work you. Trial attorneys are trained
to love the fight for the fight. This is the red herring that defense
attorneys throw in our path to keep us away from the true task at
hand, finding the correct information and moving toward trial.
Rather, busy yourselfwith putting together the appropriate materials,
checklists, and interrogating letters, placate yourselfby sending
threatening letters to compel and obtaining your share of return letters, but
remember only some ofthem will culminate in an all-out war in the
courtroom. When the fight become so ugly and progressively takes up an
inappropriate amount ofyour time, take a step back and breathe so that
you can refocus on the goals in your case.
4. Have a protective order drafted and be prepared to negotiate its terms
with defense counsel so that the issue of confidentiality ofdocuments
does not delay discovery.
5. Develop methods to efficiently organize the volume of information
produced, such as a document depository, coding and/or imaging
documents, a system for retrieving "hot" documents, and a witness
tracking system. Computerized databases are essential.
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6. Summarize key points of each deposition immediately after. This is
key in follow-up discovery and in conducting witness interviews, and
preparing and defending pre-trial memorandums.
7. Stay civil. (See "duty to adversary" under our Rules ofProfessional
Conduct).
IV. OTHER SPECIAL CONCERNS IN DISCOVERY.
A. Mental Exams.
1. First of all, for defense attorneys' purposes, it is not an "independent"
medical exam, it is a Defendant's exam and Plaintiffs attorneys will
continue to remind you of this.
2. Plaintiffs attorney is entitled to know what tests are to be given by the
Defendant's expert before your client goes into the exam.
3. Sexual history/sexual orientation ofPlaintiff.
B. Allegations of stolen "company documents".
1. Documents in possession ofPlaintiffafter termination should be returned
to Employer/Defendant only if they are employer's property. Whether
they are or are not alleged to be "company property", and whether your
client does or does not return them on such basis, it is certainly acceptable
for the Plaintiff to be permitted to retain a copy of the documents or, at the
very least, a log of such documents.
C. "Electronic data" and "electronic media".
1. Keep current with new forms ofdiscovery and, especially, with the
various electronic systems and data keeping procedures that companies
are utilizing.
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DISCOVERY TIPS AND TECHNIQUES:
A DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE
1. INTRODUCTION
Defense counsel's principal goal in representing a client in an employment case
should be achieving a favorable outcome as early as possible, preferably on motion for
summaryjudgment, ifnot before. One ofthe best ways to achieve that goal is with well-
focused, "smart" discovery.
Not all of the following suggestions can be used in every case, and this is
certainly not an exhaustive list. It is the author's hope, however, that you will discover
a few useful ideas which you can use to your clients' benefit in future cases.
II. INFORMAL FACT GATHERING
Discovery as described in the Kentucky and Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure is
a set ofprocedures designed to facilitate an exchange ofinformation and documentation
between the parties, and to make possible the taking of testimony from knowledgeable
non-partywitnesses. While this formal type ofdiscovery is essential to almost any case,
there are many other sources of useful information. Here are a few:
A. Documentation from your client:
Documents which will almost always be relevant to the defense of any
employment case are the following:
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1. The plaintiffs personnel file
2. The personnel file of any accused harasser or other alleged
wrongdoer
3. Relevant investigative notes
4. Employee manuals and policies
5. Plaintiffs medical file
6. E-mails relating to the subject matter of the complaint
These and other relevant documents should be requested and reviewed at
the commencement of the case.
B. Your Client's Employees
While documents will provide important background information, much
more detail can be learned from discussions with decision-makers and others who were
directly involved in the events giving rise to the Complaint. These people should be
identified early on, and interviewed. It is a good idea to either take detailed notes of
these interviews, or audio-tape them. In either case, the notes or tapes should be typed
or transcribed soon thereafter, and, ifpossible converted into statements for signature by
the employees.
C. Administrative Agencies.
If you have had no prior involvement in the matter which is the subject
of the complaint, find out if there was a charge involving the same matter before the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Kentucky Commission on Human
Rights or the Lexington or Louisville Human Rights Commission. Ifso, make a Freedom
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of fuformation Act or Kentucky Open Records Act request to obtain the entire
administrative file.
If there was a claim for Unemployment fusurance benefits made by the
plaintiff, request the entire file from the Unemployment fusurance Commission. Even if
the employer believes it has all the papers that were filed in the proceeding, it may not.
Often a claimant will send an unsolicited letter to the Commission containing what may
turn out to be an important admission, and there are often notes of telephone
conversations between the claimant/employee and the investigator. (You also want to
know what oral and/or written representations your client may have made in the
Unemployment forum). Depending on the type of case, State Workers Compensation
files may exist, and may turn up relevant information.
D. Census Data.
Statistical information can be found, broken down by county, at
www.census.gov. Such information may be useful, particularly in cases alleging race or
national origin discrimination.
E. Consulting Experts.
FRCP 26(b)(4) and CR 26.02(4) protect from the normal rules of
discovery experts employed in anticipation oflitigation but not intended to be called as
witnesses at trial.
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F. The Internet.
Check your client's website. You can be sure Plaintiffs counsel will be
scouring it for any potentially advantageous admissions. ("Weare proud ofour youthful
and energetic workforce.")
Ofcourse, turnabout is fair play: check to see ifany relevant infonnation
involving the plaintiff or his witnesses can be found.
G. Criminal and/or Civil Background Checks.
For obvious reasons, you should know whether any party or essential
witness to the case has a criminal record. Check not only the plaintiffand the plaintiffs
witnesses, but yours as well.
III. FORMAL DISCOVERY
A. First Steps
In almost all cases, you will want to learn the plaintiff's "story" and
commit him to it as early as possible. Exactly how you do this may vary from case to
case. Here are some alternatives:
1. Take the plaintiff's deposition as soon as possible.
You should take the plaintiff's deposition before allowing any
discovery to be taken ofyour client. There is nothing in the Kentucky or Federal Rules
or Civil Procedure which establishes the defendant's "right" to take the plaintiffs
deposition before being required to submit to its own. However, according to 6 Philipps,
KENTUCKY PRACTICE § 26.04 (5th ed. p. 531), "[t]he custom and practice in most
cases is to depose the plaintiff(s) followed by the depositions of the defendant(s)." It is
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only logical that the plaintiff should be required to explain the background for her case
before the defendant must give its version of the facts relating thereto.
The best way to avoid a dispute over this issue is to send a letter
to the plaintiffs counsel along with the Answer to the Complaint asking for dates for the
plaintiffs deposition. (If the Complaint is filed in federal court, or you are removing to
federal court, the request must take into account the moratorium on discovery until the
parties have conferred as required by FRCP 26(f). The letter may nevertheless reference
the defendant's desire to take the plaintiffs deposition as soon as possible after the
discovery period commences).
2. Send an Initial Set of Interrogatories and/or Request for
Production of Documents (to be followed by the Plaintiff's
Deposition).
Depending on the nature of the case and/or the clarity of the
Complaint, some initial written discovery may be desirable. Since it is safe to assume
that the plaintiffs counsel will be involved to a great extent in preparing Interrogatory
Answers, it is usually better to seek information about the plaintiffs version ofthe facts
(which may be quite different from the version set forth in the Complaint) by way of
deposition. The same is true for the plaintiffs version ofher injuries. Interrogatories can
be very useful at the start of a case, however, for the following purposes:
• To determine the cause of action if it is not clear. The
plaintiff herself will probably not be able to articulate a
legal basis for her claim at deposition. Such information
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is better sought through an Interrogatory (which will
probably be answered by counsel).
• To find out details about the plaintiffs attempts to find
work and places where he has actually worked since
leaving your client's employ (where applicable). In
framing this Interrogatory, ask where the plaintiffapplied
for work during the period ofa year or more before he left
your client's employ. You may find, to your and your
client's surprise, that the plaintiff (who is claiming to
have been damaged because of his tennination) was
actually trying to leave before he was tenninated.
• To learn the identity and addresses ofthe plaintiffs health
care providers over the last several years, and of any
health care providers who have treated the plaintiff in
connection with her claimed injuries.
• To obtain a HIPAA-compliant release for
medicaVpsychological records.
• To find out who has knowledge ofdiscoverable matters,
and their location.
• To learn whether the Plaintiff intends to call any expert
witnesses, and ifso, discoverable infonnation with regard
thereto.
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• To obtain infonnation about the types and amounts of
damages sought.
• To obtain diaries, journals and calendars for the relevant
period.
• To obtain recent tax returns.
• To obtain copies of any documents Plaintiff has in her
possession which arguably belong to the employer.
• To obtain any other documents which may be relevant to
the Complaint.
Chances are good that your initial written discovery request may
yield a lot of answers such as "Plaintiff cannot answer this Interrogatory at this time
because discovery has not yet been completed." No problem. FRCP 26(e) and CR 26.05
require the supplementation of certain Interrogatories, even if supplementation is not
specifically requested. Further, a plaintiffs failure to ever provide a timely answer to an
Interrogatory asking for the amount of unliquidated damages can have a seriously
negative effect on his case at trial: under Fratzke v. Murphy, 12 S.W. 3d 269 (Ky. 1999,
reh. denied 2000) he may be prohibited from recovering any monetary relief at all.
3. What ifyou receive a set ofInterrogatories with the Complaint?
Sometimes the plaintiffs counsel will send a set of contention
Interrogatories (that is, Interrogatories essentially asking for the defendant's side of the
story) with the Complaint, which would seem to upset the defendant's interest in learning
the plaintiffs side of the story first. Remember, however, that CR 33.01(2) pennits the
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defendant a period of 45 days after service of summons within which to answer
Interrogatories served with the Complaint, whereas the normal response time is 30 days.
Therefore, if you serve your client's own contention Interrogatories within 14 days of
receipt ofthe summons, the plaintiffs answers will be due before you client's. (Normally
contention Interrogatories are not advisable since they are likely to be answered by
counsel, but they may be called for in this particular instance). You may also be able to
agree with the plaintiff's counsel that her client's deposition will be taken before your
answers are expected.
B. Plaintiffs D<mosition.
This is, in almost every case, the most important part of the discovery
process. While one of the goals of taking the plaintiff's deposition is to learn the facts
which support her claims, this should not be the primary focus of the deposition. Your
primary goal should be that of laying the groundwork for your eventual motion for
summary judgment. Toward this end, thorough planning and preparation are essential.
Here are some steps you should take in preparing for the plaintiff's deposition:
1. Thoroughly review the facts as stated in the Complaint and
compare these with any documents you have been provided and
any information you have obtained from your client or other
sources. Note discrepancies for investigation during the
deposition.
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2. Be sure that you are thoroughly familiar with the elements ofthe
plaintiffs causes(s) of action and your client's affinnative
defense(s). Some lawyers go so far as to prepare jury instructions
at the start ofthe case, in order to focus the legal issues from the
beginning. You should at least outline the elements of the
plaintiffs prima facie case, and then consider, with respect to
each element, what facts she must prove. Do the same with the
elements of your client's defenses, and then explore the facts
relating to these elements with the plaintiffduring her deposition.
3. Outline the most convincing arguments for your eventual motion
for summary judgment. What facts do you have already? What
facts do you need to complete it?
4. Decide whether or not to videotape the deposition. This is
particularly effective if you have reason to believe the plaintiff
may not be entirely truthful.
5. Outline the deposition, making sure to include all relevant areas
of inquiry. While there is no right or wrong way to organize a
deposition, here are some thoughts:
• Think in tenns of topical "modules," with the goal of
exhausting one module before going on to the next. This
does not mean that, for strategic reasons, you will not
come back to a topic which was theoretically exhausted.
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It does help to insure. however. that important
information will not be omitted. At the close of each
module. commit the plaintiff to her testimony by asking.
for example: "Is that everything that took place during the
meeting with your supervisor on that date?"
• Plan to lead the plaintiffthough a particular topic without
relevant documents. listening carefullyto her answers and
making mental notes of any discrepancies between her
testimony and the content ofany written documentation.
You may then decide to show her the documents during
the deposition and ask for an explanation of the
discrepancy. or may decide to save it for later.
• Plan to seek admissions directly related to the arguments
you intend to make in your motion for summary
judgment.
• Begin your outline with boilerplate instructions. (Obtain
the plaintiff's agreement that she will let you know ifshe
does not understand a question. that she understands that
she may ask for a break at any time. that she will allow
you to complete your questions before answering. that she
will make oral responses. and that she is not on
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plaintiffs deposition:
medication which would affect her ability to understand
or answer your questions.)
Here are some techniques to keep in mind as you take the
• Start slowly and build the plaintiff's comfort level.
• Ask open-ended questions to obtain information.
• Ask leading questions to obtain admissions.
• Have the plaintiff identifY and verifY any documentary
evidence you intend to use on motion for summary
judgment or at trial.
• Probe and explore the plaintiffs motivations and reasons
for doing what she did and for feeling the way she does.
• Probe the basis for the plaintiffs statements of "fact."
How does she know that John Smith harassed Jane Doe?
Pin her down until it is clear that she has no source of
knowledge other than inadmissible hearsay.
• Always ask: "Is that all?" when the plaintiff is listing
events, people, etc., until you get an affirmative answer.
• Do not try to avoid the objection: "calls for a legal
conclusion." If the objection is made as to an arguably
factual issue, it may be just the ammunition you need
when the plaintiff tries to set the issue up as a genuine
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issue of "fact" to defeat to your motion for summary
judgment.
• Do not hesitate to ask a question twice, particularly at
entirely different points in the deposition, in order to see
if the plaintiff's story is consistent. The plaintiff's
attorney's "asked and answered" objection can be
disregarded.
• At the end, ask the plaintiff if there is anything about her
testimony that she wants to change.
C. Defending your Client's Representative's Deposition
As with everything else, preparation is key. Here are some suggestions:
1. Show the representative a video designed for witnesses who are
unfamiliar with the deposition process.
2. Review with the witness common deposition traps: testifying to
what the witness believes is probably true, as opposed to what he
knows to be true; failing to listen carefully to the question;
inadvertentlydivulging attorney/clientprivileged information, etc.
3. Carefully explain the plaintiffs case from a legal and factual
standpoint.
4. Carefully explore any potential problem areas: does the witness
have a criminal background? Are there anypersonal and arguably
non-discoverable "secrets" the witness is hoping will not come up
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during the deposition? These items should be explored before the
deposition in order to research any legal issues, and determine
whether any valid objections or privileges can be asserted.
D. Further DiscoverY.
1. Additional Interrogatories/Requests for Admission
These can be useful for following up on issues that were not sufficiently
explored in deposition, or that need to be tied up for summary judgment or trial.
2. Requests for Supplementation.
You may request that the plaintiff supplement any previous discovery
responses, including deposition testimony.
3. Rule 35 Physical/Mental examination
When the plaintiff puts his medical or psychological condition in
controversy, you maymove the court to orderhim to undergo a physical orpsychological
examination. In employment cases, plaintiffs often claim to have suffered severe
psychological distress as a result of the events underlying their complaint. A
psychological expert may be asked to determine the existence of any psychological
disorder, the extent thereof, and whether other events in the plaintiffs past may have
contributed to or caused any existing psychological disorder.
Remember that any correspondence, notes, etc. between you and
the expert will probably be discoverable.
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IV. OTHER ISSUES
A. Protective Orders.
FRCP 26(c) and CR 26.03 provide for the court to enterprotective orders
under certain circumstances. It is not unusual in employment cases for the defendant to
be asked to produce certain documents which it has a legitimate interest in protecting
from further disclosure: e.g., the personnel files ofemployees other than the plaintiff, and
trade secret or other proprietary information.
In most cases, opposing counsel will enter into an Agreed Protective Order, in
exchange for production of the requested information. Such orders typically (1) permit
the documents to be used by the parties, their counsel and assistants solely for the
purpose ofthe litigation, (2) provide for the sealing ofsuch documents when filed with
the court, and (3) require that all produced copies be destroyed or returned to the
defendant's counsel at the end ofthe case. A sample Agreed Protective Order is attached
hereto.
B. Electronic Discovery.
Rule 34 permits a party to request and copy (among other things) "data
compilations from which information can be obtained." The Advisory Committee Note
to the 1970 amendment to the rule provides that the term "document" was intended to
include electronic data compilations. Courts have made clear that all information
available on electronic storage media is discoverable whether "active," or "deleted but
recoverable." See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co., v. Bando ChemicalIndustries Ltd., 167 F.R.D.
90, 112 (D. Colo. 1996).
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In employment cases, the type of electronic media most often sought is
e-mail. E-mails are replacing handwritten memos and notes as the "smoking guns" of
harassment and other employment cases. However, the scope ofa request for electronic
data does not begin and end with e-mail.
The potential breadth of a request for electronic data is extremely
extensive. Consider, for example, a request for "all documents (inclUding those in
electronic fonn) constituting communication in any fonn between the plaintiff and any
supervisor or manager ofXYZ corporation." Such a request would necessarily require
a search through each supervisor's and manager's paper files, and should arguably
include as well a search of each such person's desktop computer hard drive, notebook
computer hard drive, all floppy disks to which he or she might have transferred data, his
or her PDA, pager, voice mail archives, etc.
As "e-discovery" increases, issues such as the following will undoubtedly
continue to engender controversy in the future:
1. Who mustpayfor the cost ofretrieving andprocessing electronic
files, particularly when costly restoration of backup media is
involved?
On July24,2003, the United States District Court for the Southern
District ofNew York issued a significant decision regarding the issue ofwho must pay
for the sometimes enonnous cost of producing electronic data. In Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III), a case in which a fonner
female employee oflJBS Warburg alleged gender discrimination and retaliation under
federal, state and city law, the defendant argued that the estimated cost ofapproximately
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$300,000 to restore and produce e-mails from backup tapes should be borne by the
plaintiff. Holding that the plaintiffwould be required to share in the costs ofrestoration,
the court nevertheless determined that the employer would be required to bear the bulk
of the expense.
The court listed seven factors which should be considered in
determining whether cost-shifting to the plaintiff is appropriate in a given case:
• The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to
discover relevant information
• The availability of such information from other sources
• The total cost ofproduction, compared to the amount in
controversy
• The relative ability of each party to control costs and its
incentive to do so
• The importance ofthe issues at stake in the litigation, and
• The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the
information.
Zubulake at 284. Note that the Court observed that cost-shifting is potentiallyappropriate
only when inaccessible data (such as backup tapes intended solely for disaster recovery)
is sought; when "active on-line or near-line data" is sought, cost-shifting should not be
considered. ld.
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2. What is a party's duty to preserve electronic data?
Four months after Zubulake III, supra, the Southern District of
New York tackled the issue of a party's duty to preserve electronic data. Zubulake IV
(Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)), grew out of the
defendant's realization, during the process ofrestoring the tapes referenced in Zubulake
III, that certain backup tapes were missing. Zubulake sought sanctions against UBS for
its failure to preserve the missing data, including an "adverse inference" instruction (that
is, an instruction to the jury that it could infer that the missing tapes contained
information damaging to UBS' case).
The first question which the court sought to answer was when the
obligation to preserve evidence arises. In this case, the first official notice the employer
had ofZubulake's intention to commence litigation was her filing ofan EEOC charge on
August 16, 2001. According to the court, the duty to preserve evidence arose, at the
latest, on that date. But, the court went on to determine that the obligation actually arose
earlier, at the time that UBS "should have known that the evidence was relevant to future
litigation." In this case, the evidence showed that almost everyone associated with
Zubulake recognized the possibility that she might sue four months before she filed her
EEOC charge. This earlier date, then, was the trigger date for preserving evidence.
The court next dealt with the issue of what the defendant must
preserve, and held that anyone who anticipates being a party to a lawsuit "must not
destroy unique, relevant evidence that might be useful to an adversary." Included would
be relevant e-mails from and to key players. As to the form ofelectronic data to retain,
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litigants may choose the medium to preserve, as long as all relevant documentation is
retained in one form or another. Thus, all then-existing backup tapes for relevant
personnel could be retained, and later-created documents preserved in a separate
electronic file. That, combined with a mirror-image of the computer system, according
to the court, creates a complete set ofrelevant documents. The court opined that there are
a multitude of other ways to achieve the same result.
In any event, the court observed that once a party reasonably
anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention/destruction policy
and preserve all relevant documentation. As a general rule that hold does not apply to
inaccessible backup tapes (those for disaster reliefonly), but does apply to tapes actively
used for information retrieval.
In a case full ofonerous implications for employers, there was one
silver lining to the case. The court refused to grant the plaintiff's request for an adverse
inference instruction, stating that such an instruction is an "extreme sanction" and
"should not be given lightly." According to the court, a party seeking an adverse
inference instruction based on spoliation of evidence must establish: (1) that the party
having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was
destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed with a "culpable state ofmind" and (3) that
the destroyed evidence was "relevant" to the party's claim or defense such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.
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The message of Zubulake IV is clear: Counsel should alert his
client at the start of litigation (and before, if he is involved in the events leading to
litigation) to be take immediate steps to preserve all relevant documentation, including
electronic data which might one day be relevant to the plaintiffs claim. These steps
should include a halt on the routine recycling and overwriting ofbackup tapes and on any
routine purging ofdocuments.
J(b) • 19
J(b) - 20
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
____ CIRCUIT COURT
DIVISION _
CIVIL ACTION NO. _
PLAINTIFF
v.
DEFENDANT
AGREED PROTECTIVE ORDER
WHEREAS, the proceedings in this action will involve the disclosure of confidential and
proprietary documents and information by Defendant ("Defendant"), and
whereas Defendant, and Plaintiff,, ("Plaintiff') have agreed pursuant to CR 26
for a protective order relating to certain confidential documents and information which may be
utilized in the litigation of the above-styled action,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. As used herein "Confidential Material" means documents and any information
contained within Defendant's personnel and other records relating to any former, current or future
employee ofDefendant other than Plaintiff. The term also applies to any such information which is
revealed through the deposition or trial testimony ofany party or witness to this civil action.
2. Confidential Material furnished by Defendant may be used by any person other than
Defendant solely for the purpose ofprosecuting or defending this action and not for any business,
commercial or other purpose whatever.
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3. All Confidential Material which is filed with the Court shall be filed in sealed
envelopes or other appropriate sealed containers on which shall be endorsed the title of this action,
an indication of the nature of the document, the word "CONFIDENTIAL" and a statement
substantially in the following form:
This envelope is sealed pursuant to Court Order and contains
information designated confidential in this case by Defendant
_______ and is not to be opened or the contents thereof to
be displayed or revealed except by Order ofthe Court or pursuant to
written consent by Defendant '
Said envelope or container shall not be openedwithout further orderofthe Court exceptby Qualified
Persons who shall return the document to the Clerk in a sealed envelope or container. The Clerk of
the Court is hereby directed to maintain such Confidential Documents in a separate portion of the
Court files not available to the public.
5. Except with the prior written consent of Defendant, or pursuant to further order of
the Court, Confidential Material may not be shown, disclosed, divulged, revealed, transmitted,
described or otherwise communicated by the non-furnishing parties or attorneys for the non-
furnishing parties to any person other than the following (hereinafter designated as "Qualified
Persons"):
(a) Full-timeemployees ofthe attorneys representing suchnon-furnishing parties;
(b) Experts, consultants, accountants and other third parties expressly retained
by counsel for the non-producing parties to assist in the preparation of this litigation for trial who
are identified in advance in writing by counsel for the non-producing parties, with disclosure only
to the extent necessary to assist in such preparation.
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(c) Any person from whom testimony is taken in this action, except that such
person may only be shown copies ofConfidential Material during his testimony and in preparation
therefor and may not be permitted to retain any Confidential Material following the conclusion of
his testimony; and
(d) The Court, the jury and court reporters in this action.
Except upon Defendant's prior written consent, or pursuant to further order of the
Court, Confidential Material may not be shown, disclosed, divulged, revealed, transmitted,
described or otherwise communicated by the non-furnishing parties or attorneys for the non-
furnishing parties to any person other than Qualified Persons.
6. The attorneys for any non-furnishing party may testify on, submit, refer to, quote
from, paraphrase or otherwise utilize any Confidential Material in any testimony, transcript, brief
or other document submitted or filed with the Court or any appellate court, provided that any such
document is marked "CONFIDENTIAL" and treated in accordance with the provisions ofthis Order
and filed under seal as set forth in paragraph 4 hereof. In the event that any Confidential Material
is used in any court proceeding herein it shall not lose its confidential status through such use, and
the parties shall take all steps reasonably required to protect its confidentiality during such use.
Material shall be maintained anywhere except at the offices ofcounsel ofrecord or their experts.
7. Nothing herein shall be construed or applied to affect the rights of any party to
discovery under the Kentucky Rules ofCivil Procedure or to assert any privilege or objection, or to
prohibit any party from seeking such further provisions or reliefas it deems necessary or desirable
regarding this Order or the matter ofconfidentiality.
8. After the termination ofthis litigation, including all appeals, all ConfidentialMaterial
shall be delivered or returned to Defendant.
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ENTERED: ,,2004.
JUDGE, CIRCillT COURT
AGREED TO:
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
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I. INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. CHOICE OF LAW
1. Choice of Law is Critical in Enforcing Non-competition Covenants.
a. State laws vary dramatically on the enforceability of covenants not
to compete. Some states, not including Kentucky, have statutes severely restricting enforcement.
See, ~, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, §217 (1980) (void unless made in connection with sale of
business or dissolution of partnership); Colo. Rev. Stat. §8-2-13 (1973) (valid only in four
limited circumstances). In other states, court decisions have the same effect. See Olliver/Pilcher
Insurance v. Daniels, 715 P.2d 1218 (Ariz. 1986).
2. Kentucky Choice of Law Rules.
If you are litigating a noncompetition case in Kentucky, a Kentucky court most likely will apply
Kentucky law. As a general rule in Kentucky, as long as it has personal jurisdiction, a Kentucky
court will apply its own law. Kentucky's choice oflaw rules require the application ofKentucky
law "unless there are overwhelming interests to the contrary." Blount v. Bartholomew, 714 F.
Supp. 252, 255 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (quoting Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc., 712 F.2d 1069, 1071 (6th
Cir. 1983)), affd wlo op., 869 F.2d 1488 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Foster v. Leggett, Ky., 484
S.W.2d 827, 829 (1972) (Kentucky law "should not be displaced without valid reasons").
Kentucky "strongly favors the application of its own law whenever it can be justified." Grant v.
Bill Walker Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 523 F.2d 1301 (6th Cir. 1975).
3. Choice of Law Clauses
Do not assume a choice of law clause governs. The Kentucky Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals have held that they are free to ignore a contractual choice of law clause which provides
that another state's law should govern. See Breeding v. Massachusetts Indemnity & Life Ins.
Co., Ky., 633 S.W.2d 717, 719 (1982); Paine v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., Ky. App., 736
S.W.2d 355, 357 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Oliver v. Schultz, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 699,
702 (1994). The Paine Court said: Kentucky courts are "egocentric" about choice of law. Id.
The reverse is also true. When enforcing a Kentucky noncompete in another state, do not
assume a foreign court will abide by a choice of law provision that calls for the use ofKentucky
law.
B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION.
K·l
To increase the chances that a covenant not to compete will be interpreted with
reference to Kentucky law, even if a choice of law provision selects another
state's law, sue in Kentucky. But before initiating a lawsuit against a non-
resident, an attorney should carefully review Kentucky's long-arm statute, KRS
§454.210, to be sure the non-resident has enough contacts in Kentucky. In
questionable cases, it may be best to sue out of state, since a dispute as to personal
jurisdiction will almost certainly delay the granting of immediate injunctive relief
and bog the litigation down in the minutae of personal jurisdiction. This can be a
critical disadvantage since time is commonly of the essence in enforcing
restrictive covenants.
II. ENFORCEABILITY OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN KENTUCKY
A.
1.
2.
MAJORITY RULE.
Covenants Not to Compete Are Enforceable if Ancillary to a
Valid Contract.
Most states, including Kentucky, will enforce reasonable covenants not to
compete if they are ancillary to a valid and enforceable contract, such as a
contract for the sale of a business, a lease, or a contract of employment.
Restrictive covenants made independently of such transactions are void as
against public policy. Johnson v. Stumbo, 277 Ky. 301, 126 S.W.2d 165
(1939).
Employment Agreements.
Courts are reluctant to enforce noncompete covenants made in connection
with employment contracts, because it is difficult to distinguish between
the employer's confidential information and the normal skills of the trade
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B.
1.
learned by an employee, and preventing use of one may well inhibit or
prevent use of the other. Courts have generally been more willing to
uphold covenants to refrain from competition made in connection with
sales of good will than those made in connection with contracts of
employment. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §188 comment b (1981).
That said, there is ample case law supporting the enforcement of
reasonable restrictive covenants against former employees. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals has even written that "the policy of this state is to
enforce [reasonable covenants not to compete] unless very serious
inequities would result." Lareau v. O'Nan, Ky., 355 S.W.2d 679, 681
(1962). Likewise, in the context of an insurance adjuster's one-year, 200-
mile noncompete, the Court opined that such covenants are "a valuable
business tool." Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv., Inc., Ky. App., 567
S.W.2d 313,315 (1978).
WHEN IS A COVENANT REASONABLE?
Balancing Test.
In determining whether a covenant not to compete is "reasonable," courts
balance several factors: the interest of the party seeking to enforce the
covenant, the extent of the restrictions, the hardship imposed on the
covenantor and any interest of the public.
It has been held in Kentucky that an
agreement in restraining of trade is
reasonable if, on consideration of the subject
matter, the nature of the business, the
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situation ofthe parties and the circumstances
of the particular case, the restriction is such
only as to afford fair protection to the
interests of the covenantee and is not so
large as to interfere with the public interests
or impose undue hardship on the party
restricted.
Ceresia v. Mitchell, Ky., 242 S.W.2d 359,364 (1951).
LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF THE PARTY ENFORCING THE
COVENANT.
A restrictive covenant is only enforceable if it protects a legitimate interest of the
party seeking to enforce it. Crowell v. Woodruff, Ky., 245 S.W.2d 447 (1951). A
restrictive covenant that is "more comprehensive than necessary to afford fair
protection to the legitimate interest of the employer" may not be enforced. Id.
Legitimate interests include:
1.
2.
Protecting confidential information and trade secrets.
As early as 1926, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that an employer
"has the right by contract to protect himself against the giving out of
information concerning his business methods and trade secrets...." Thomas
W. Briggs Co. v. Mason, 217 Ky. 269, 289 S.W. 295,297 (1926).
Protecting the party's relationship with its clients.
Where the covenantor is in a position which includes client contact,
covenants not to compete will usually be enforced. Bradford v. Billington,
Ky., 299 S.W.2d 601, 604 (1957). On the other hand, covenants by
employees with no access to clients or other confidential information are
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suspect. See Crowell v. Woodruff, Ky., 245 S.W.2d 447, 450 (1951)
(court refused to enforce one-year covenant where employee was not in
contact with clients and "did not acquire knowledge of any trade secrets
which might be made available to a competitor").
Money and time spent in training employees.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has recognized that an employer has an
interest in recouping its investment in training its employees. For
example, the Court in Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram
Associates, Inc., Ky. App., 622 S.W.2d 681, 686 (1981), had this to say
about a nationwide collection agency when holding that its
noncompetition covenant was enforceable:
CAB's business is highly specialized and competitive, and since
clients sign no written contract they are free to change collectors
almost overnight. Thus, covenants not to compete are about the
only protection available to CAB to prevent employees from
resigning and attempting to pirate away their clients after CAB has
expended considerable time, effort, and money in training those
employees in the collection business. Absent the training afforded
by CAB, its employees would hardly be in a position to compete.
Therefore, we are satisfied that CAB's covenants not to compete
are a reasonable restriction affording CAB fair protection for its
legitimate business interests.
Id. This sort ofpro-employer language could easily be applied to any type
of sales business where covenants not to compete are "about the only
protection" for a company's relationship with its clients.
SCOPE AND DURATION OF RESTRICTIONS.
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In determining the enforceability of a covenant not to compete, the scope of the
geographic restriction and the time the restriction is in effect are crucial. The
touchstone is "reasonableness."
1. Unlimited covenants fail.
A covenant unlimited as to area or time is unenforceable. Calhoun v.
Everman, Ky., 242 S.W.2d 100 (1951).
2. Geographical scope of restrictions.
Area restrictions which include the area in which the covenantor worked
are generally permissible. ~ Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Service,
Inc., Ky. App., 567 S.W.2d 313 (1978) (200-mile covenant upheld);
Davex Tree Expert Co. v. Ackelbein, 233 Ky. 115, 25 S.W.2d 62 (1930)
(100 miles).
Nationwide covenant upheld. In Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v.
Ingram Associates, Inc., Ky. App., 622 S.W.2d 681 (1981), the Kentucky
Court of Appeals enforced a nationwide covenant against the former
employee of a collection agency because the employer's business was
nationwide.
3. Time duration of restriction.
The restriction should be no longer than necessary to protect the
covenantee's legitimate interest, i.e., the length of time the covenantor
could compete unfairly. Kentucky courts have upheld restrictions on
employment as long as six years, Bradford v. Billington, Ky., 299 S.W.2d
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601 (1957), though shorter limitations periods will generally be safer. See
Lareau v. O'Nan, Ky., 355 S.W.2d 679 (1962) (five years); Stiles v. Reda,
312 Ky. 562,228 S.W.2d 455 (1950) (two years); Hammons v. Big Sandy
Claims Service, Inc., Ky. App. 567 S.W.2d 313 (1978) (one year).
Covenants in Contexts Other Than Employment. Much longer
restrictions are often upheld in the context of restrictive covenants in
leases, see, e.g., Porter v. Hospital Corporation of America, Ky. App., 696
S.W.2d 793 (1985) (ten years); Vaughan v. General Outdoor Advertising
Co., 352 S.W.2d 562 (1961) (ten years), or ancillary to the sale of a
business, see Ceresia v. Mitchell, Ky., 242 S.W.2d 359 (1951) (ten years);
F.T. Gunther Grocery Co. v. Koll, 153 Ky. 446, 155 S.W. 1145 (1913)
(covenant restricting seller from competing in city "so long as purchaser
remains in business" upheld). The Kentucky Court of Appeals has even
upheld a covenant restricting the purchaser of property from operating a
theater there for twenty-one years. Ladd v. Pittsburgh Consolidation
Coal Co., 309 Ky. 405, 217 S.W.2d 807 (1949).
MUST NOT IMPOSE UNDUE HARDSHIP ON THE EMPLOYEE.
When enforcement of a covenant would require an employee to change his or her
occupation, courts may be reluctant to enforce it. Crowell v. Woodruff, 245
S.W.2d 447 (refusing enforcement where to do so ''would deprive a man of
middle age with a family of the right to pursue his lifetime trade..."). The Crowell
case provides fodder for those defending employees, offering quotable language
such as:
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A man's right to labor in any occupation in which he is fit to
engage is a valuable right, which should not be taken from him, or
limited, by injunction, except in a clear case showing the justice
and necessity therefor.
Id. at 450.
F. PUBLIC INTEREST.
Although the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §188(1) (1981) and most courts
profess a reluctance to enforce covenants not to compete which adversely impact
the public, Kentucky courts have apparently never recognized such a case. See
Johnson v. Stumbo 126 S.W.2d 165 (1938) (rejecting argument that enforcing
covenant restricting a doctor who sold hospital to plaintiffs from opening a
competing hospital was contrary to the public interest).
JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF COVENANTS.
A. COVENANTS CAN BE ENFORCED TO THE EXTENT
REASONABLE.
A court ordinarily will "blue pencil" an agreement, enforcing restrictive
covenants to the extent it finds them to be reasonable. Hammons v. Big Sandy
Claims Service, Inc., Ky. App., 567 S.W.2d 313 (1978); Ceresia v. Mitchell, Ky.,
242 S.W.2d 359 (1951) (court confined scope of covenant to definite period of
time, although agreement itselfwas silent on the matter).
However, there is at least one case that suggests that the absence of a
geographic restriction, as opposed to a time restriction, cannot be cured by court
modification. In Calhoun v. Everman, the Court observed, in dicta:
The general rule is that contracts in restraint of trade are not
enforceable where they are unlimited as to both time and space, or
K- 8
B.
as to where they are unlimited as to space but limited as to time,
but where such contracts are unlimited as to time but are confined
to a reasonable territory they are enforceable.
242 S.W.2d at 102.
In defending the employee, an attorney may want to invoke the rule that
contracts missing an essential term cannot be specifically enforced. Cases from
several other states have refused to enforce or modify a restrictive covenant if it is
missing an essential term, such as either a time or geographic restriction. See~,
Cohen Realty, Inc. v. Marinick, 817 P.2d 747 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) Gudicial
modification of an unenforceable covenant not possible if court must supply
essential term); Lee O'Keefe Ins. Agency v. Ferega, 516 N.E.2d 1313, 1313 (Ill.
App. 1987) (denying modification would "have been tantamount to drafting a new
contract.").
A severability clause should be included in agreements to increase the
likelihood ofpartial enforcement.
OVERLY BROAD COVENANTS MAY NOT BE ENFORCED AT
ALL.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts §184(b) (1981) states that unreasonable
covenants will not be enforced unless the employer obtained the covenant "in
good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing." Under
this rule, a court will not enforce part of a covenant when the covenantee "has
taken advantage of his dominant bargaining power to extract from the other party
a promise that is clearly so broad as to offend public policy...." Id., comment b.
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SELECTED KENTUCKY CASES ON COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE.
Eigelbach v. Boone Loan & Investment Co., 216 Ky. 69, 287 S.W. 225
(1926) - Contract by general manager ofloan and investment company not
to engage in same line of business in same city for one year was
enforceable. Contract applied to both voluntary and involuntary
tenninations.
Davey Tree Expert Co. v. Ackelbein, 233 Ky. 115,25 S.W.2d 62 (1930)
- Court enforces restrictive covenant restraining tree surgeon from
working within 100 miles of office where he worked for one year.
Contracts restricting freedom of employment are enforceable when
reasonable, taking into account the interest of the employer, the employee
and the public. Covenants not to compete can be modified and enforced to
the extent reasonable.
Johnson v. Stumbo, 277 Ky. 301, 126 S.W.2d 165 (1939) - Sellers of
hospital agreed not to own or operate a hospital in Floyd County for 10
years. Restraints of trade are judged by the rule of reason. Id. at 169.
Upheld when they are necessary to afford fair protection to the legitimate
interests of the covenantee and not so extensive as to interfere with the
interests of the public. Id. Must be ancillary to a lawful contract. Id. The
Court upheld enforcement of the agreement, concluding that it was not
contrary to public policy. Court enjoined the operation of the new hospital
even though it was just outside the county line.
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Stiles v. Reda, 312 Ky. 562, 228 S.W.2d 455 (1950) - Court enforces
covenant that required employee to pay employer $50 per week if he
engaged in jewelry repair business for himself within two years after the
termination of his contract. Court finds that this was a reasonable
restraint. Since requiring employee not to engage in the business at all
would have been enforceable, the instant covenant requiring the employee
to pay for the privilege was valid. Fifty dollars a week was not a
prohibited "penalty." A good case to use in enforcing a liquidated
damages clause.
Calhoun v. Everman, Ky., 242 S.W.2d 100 (1951) - Alleged oral
agreement not to enter into competition with employer's dry cleaning
business was unenforceable. The alleged agreement contained no time or
territory restriction. There was no consideration for the covenant, as the
employer had the right to terminate employee at any time. "Contracts in
restraint of employment ... are not favorites of the law." "The modem
philosophy ofthe law is that a man may sell his services but not himself."
Crowell v. Woodruff, Ky., 245 S.W.2d 447 (1951) - Another dry
cleaning case. Employer terminated employee four months after
employee signed employment agreement containing covenant not to
compete. Court concludes the contract lacked mutuality, as the employer
"did not bind himself to continue Crowell in his employment longer than
thirty days, yet the employee bound himself to surrender his life trade in
his home community for a period of one year." Id. at 449. "A man's right
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to labor in any occupation in which he is fit to engage is a valuable right,
which should not be taken from him, or limited, by injunction, except in a
clear case showing the justice and necessity therefor." Id. at 450.
Webb v. Welcome Wagon, Inc., Ky., 255 S.W.2d 459 (1953) - Court
enforces non-compete against hostess for Welcome Wagon for five years.
Court states that if the company breached a material provision of the
contract, it would not be entitled to injunction. Id. at 461. Because of the
procedural posture of the case, the court does not decide the issue of first
breach.
Martin v. Ratliff Furniture Co., Ky., 264 S.W.2d 273 (1954) -
Injunction against former business owner and general manager requiring
him not to operate furniture business for five years in the county, upheld
by Court. Covenants in the sales of business are uniformly upheld. Id. at
275. Although such agreements are strictly construed, they will not be
interpreted at variance with the plain purpose ofthe parties. Id. at 276.
Bradford v. Billington, Ky., 299 S.W.2d 601 (1957) - Court enforces
non-compete against physician barring practice ofmedicine for six months
in the same county. Covenant in partnership agreement did not lack
consideration simply because it was terminable without cause upon notice.
Lareau v. O'Nan, Ky., 355 S.W.2d 679 (1962) - Agreement prohibiting
physician from engaging in practice of medicine in Henry County is
enforced. Court distinguishes Crowell and Calhoun because the
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employees in those cases had a "limited capacity to compete in the labor
market." Id. at 680. "There is no basic public policy against such
covenants, particularly when they involve professional services. In fact,
the policy of this state is to enforce them unless very serious inequities
would result." Id. at 681
Hall v. Willard & Woolsey, P.S.C., Ky., 471 S.W.2d 316 (1971) -
Enforcing noncompete against physician for one year within fifty miles of
city where she formerly practiced. Physician quit within three weeks after
her employment to set up competing practice. Follows Lareau. "While it
certainly is arguable that competition is the life of trade, nevertheless,
courts have upheld restrictive covenants where they are reasonable in
scope and in purpose." Id. at 317.
Louisville Cycle & Supply Co. v. Baach, Ky., 535 S.W.2d 230 (1976) -
Reversing trial court's refusal to enter injunction against competing
former employee of cycle shop. The court skirts, but does not directly
address, the issue of whether a noncompete lacks consideration because
employment is at will.
Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv., Inc., Ky. App., 567 S.W.2d 313
(1978) - Court upholds injunction that barred insurance adjuster, for one
year, from operating claim business within 200 miles of office where
adjuster worked. Court refuses to enforce contract as written because it
would have prohibited employee from competing within 200 miles of any
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of employer's offices. When covenant is too broad, court may enforce it
as modified to be reasonable. Employer had legitimate interest to protect
- its good will with clients. Covenants not to compete are "a valuable
business tool." Id. at 315.
Orion Broadcasting, Inc. v. Forsythe, 477 F. Supp. 198 (W.D. Ky.
1979) - Court declines to enforce one-year noncompete covenant against
Melissa Forsythe. Television channel had terminated Forsythe allegedly
because "female news anchors lose credibility with age." Court follows
Calhoun, finds Forsythe "is not in a seller's market," and notes that to
deprive her of her livelihood would be "an example of industrial peonage
which has no place in today's society." Id. at 201.
Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram Associates, Inc., Ky. App.,
622 S.W.2d 681 (1981) - Enforcing contract prohibiting competition with
collection agency for two years within the entire U.S.. Covenant signed
after beginning of employment is enforceable ''provided the employer
continues to employ the employee for an appreciable length of time after
he signs the covenant, and the employee severs his relationship with his
employer by voluntarily resigning." Id. at 685. Employer has interest
because business is highly specialized and competitive and employer
pours considerable time and money into training employees.
Higdon Food Serv., Inc. v. Walker, Ky., 641 S.W.2d 750 (1982) - Trial
court enforced non-compete against former salesman and competing
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company which he had joined. Court ofAppeals reversed, concluding that
because the covenant had been signed after the beginning of the
employee's employment, there was no consideration. The Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the "rehiring" of the employee
was sufficient consideration for the agreement. "The point is that [the
employer] did not have to hire him - or keep him on - at all." Id. at
751.
White v. Sullivan, Ky. App., 667 S.W.2d 385 (1983) - Enforces
substantial monetary contempt judgment against a man who had assisted a
former employee in violating his covenant not to compete with accounting
firm. A good case to cite in pursuing those who "aid and abet" an
employee in breaching a covenant not to compete.
Daniel Boone Clinic, P.S.C. v. Dahhan, Ky. App., 734 S.W.2d 488
(1987) - Court enforces provision of employment agreement against
physician, which barred practice of medicine within fifty miles of clinic
for eighteen months. Patients were not third party beneficiaries of
physician's employment agreement. Court reverses trial court's refusal to
award clinic $75,000 in liquidated damages.
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v. STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION
In addition to the Unifonn Trade Secrets Act, attorneys counseling clients about
restricting competition by their employees should be aware of the restriction on the use of
noncompetition covenants for particular classes of professionals, such as attorneys and
physicians.
A. LAWYERS - MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 5.6.
Adopted in Kentucky as SCR 3.130-5.6, Rule 5.6 essentially rules out the use of
noncompetition covenants to restrict the right to practice law. It provides:
RULE 5.6 RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO PRACTICE
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a
lawyer to practice after tennination of the relationship, except an
agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is
part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.
Comment
(1) An agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to
practice after leaving a finn not only limits their professional autonomy
but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a)
prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions
concerning retirement benefits for service with the finn.
(2) Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent
other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalfof a client.
B. Health Care Providers - HB 250, KRS 311 [NOW REPEALED].
Prior to 1994, Kentucky courts apparently had no scruple about enforcing
covenants not to compete against medical professionals. See Hall v. Willard &
Woolsey, PSC, Ky., 471 S.W.2d 316 (1971) (restrictive covenant in which
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physician agreed not to practice medicine within 50 miles for one year was
enforceable). According to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, "There is no basic
public policy against such covenants, particularly when they invoke professional
services." Lareau v. O'Nan, Ky., 355 S.W.2d 679,681 (1962).
HB 250 radically changed the law in Kentucky. This statute was
adopted in 1994 in response to several well-publicized cases of towns who lost
their only physician or specialist, when the doctor had to move his practice
because he had signed a covenant not to compete. The statute provided:
(1) It is the finding of the General Assembly that the
American Medical Association and Kentucky Medical
Association have determined that agreements between
health care providers that allow or encourage the
enforcement of contractual provisions by which one (1)
health care provider agrees not to compete against another
health care provider or group of health care providers for a
period of time upon the severance of any relationship
between the health care providers is unethical. It is further
the finding of the General Assembly that these agreements
serve to increase health care costs by creating a barrier in
the physician and patient relationship which forces the
patient to seek alternate care from another health care
provider, even if the original treating provider remains in
the community. It is therefore the finding of the General
Assembly that these agreements are contrary to the public
policy of the Commonwealth.
(2) An agreement between health care providers that allows
or encourages the enforcement of contractual provisions by
which one (1) health care provider agrees not to compete
against another health care provider or group of health care
providers for a period of time upon the severance of any
relationship between the health care providers shall be void
as against public policy and not enforceable if the
period of time is for one (1) year or longer.
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The statute was short-lived. HB 250 went into effect in 1994 and was repealed in
1996. Still, agreements by health care providers not to compete for more than one
year that were entered into from 1994 to 1996 arguably are void. Even if a
physician signed a noncompete after the repeal of HB 250, the fact that the AMA
and KMA have declared such agreements "unethical" may provide a strong public
policy argument that such an agreement is against public policy and therefore
unenforceable.
C. ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996.
1. Effective Date.
In October 1996, President Clinton signed the Economic Espionage Act,
Pub. Law. 104-294, 18 U.S.C. §§1831-1839, into law. It became effective
January 1, 1997.
2. Prohibited Activities.
Under the law, it is a federal crime to steal, remove, obtain by fraud or
copy a trade secret for the economic benefit of someone other than its
owners. It is also a crime to receive a trade secret if the recipient knows
that the information has been obtained in a prohibited way.
3. Coverage.
The act covers trade secrets that are related to or included in a product that
is produced or placed in interstate or foreign commerce.
4. Penalties.
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Those convicted of trade secret misappropriation face fines of up to
$250,000 for individuals or $5 million for corporations, jail terms of up to
10 years and possible forfeiture ofproperty.
VI. DEFENDING THE EMPLOYEE'S INTERESTS
A. DEFENSES TO ACTIONS TO ENFORCE NON-COMPETES
In defending an employee against an action to enforce a restrictive covenant, an
attorney should keep in mind that the most common form of relief - injunction - in
these cases is equitable. Therefore, all those defenses to an equitable action apply. E.:.&...
Daniel Boone Clinic, PSC v. Dahhan, Ky. App., 734 S.W.2d 488,490 (1987). Similarly,
lawsuits to enforce noncompetition clauses are based on contract and often tum on
contract principles. Contract defenses, such as lack ofconsideration, also apply.
1. UNCLEAN HANDS.
The defense of unclean hands is widely used in restrictive covenant cases. Where
an employer has breached its agreement with an employee, for example, the
courts will not enforce a restrictive covenant against the employee. Webb v.
Welcome Wagon, Inc., Ky., 255 S.W.2d 459 (1953); Crowell v. Woodruff, Ky.,
245 S.W.2d 447, 450 (1951) (employer guilty of unclean hands where it
discharged employee in 4-1/2 months).
2. FIRST BREACH.
Likewise, the contract doctrine of "first breach" applies. "The breach by an
employer of a material provision of the contract of employment, such as failure to
give notice of termination ... deprives him of the right to enjoin the employee's
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breach of such a restrictive covenant." Crowell, 245 S.W.2d at 450. See also
Webb v. Welcome Wagon, Ky., 255 S.W.2d 459 (1953).
3. LACK OF CONSIDERATION.
The covenantor may also claim that there was no consideration for the restrictive
covenant.
(1) Covenant Entered into after Employment May Be Enforceable
in Kentucky.
In Kentucky, a restrictive covenant entered into after an
employment relationship begins is enforceable. Higdon Food Serv., Inc.
v. Walker, Ky., 641 S.W.2d 750, 751 (1982) (''whatever may have been
the employment arrangement before, it was succeeded and superseded by
the contract.... The hiring itself (or rehiring, if one prefers that word) was
sufficient consideration for the conditions agreed to by [the employee]").
See also Louisville Cycle & Supply Co. v. Baach, Ky., 535 S.W.2d 230
(1976) (covenant entered after employment was supported by
consideration because new contract set a definite term of employment);
Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram Associates, Inc., Ky. App., 622
S.W.2d 681, 685 (1981) (holding that restrictive covenant entered into
during employment relationship is enforceable, provided the employee
severs his relationship with his employer by voluntarily resigning).
(2) Covenant Entered Into After Employment is Unenforceable in
Some Jurisdictions.
Some states find no consideration for covenants entered into after
employment begins and refuse to enforce them. See,~, Records Center,
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Inc. v. Comprehensive Management, Inc., 525 A.2d 433 (Pa. Super.
1987).
(3) Terminated Employees.
One federal district court in Kentucky has opined in dicta that applying a
non-compete covenant against an involuntarily tenninated employee is an
"example of industrial peonage which has no place in today's society."
Orion Broadcasting, Inc. v. Forsythe, 477 F. Supp. 198, 201 (W.D. Ky.
1979). No published Kentucky opinion directly addresses the issue of
whether a noncompete fails for lack of consideration because it is being
enforced against a tenninated employee. The court in Central Adjustment
Bureau specifically declined to express an opinion on whether a restrictive
covenant would be enforceable if the employer unilaterally and
involuntarily tenninated the employment. 622 S.W.2d at 681.
However, at least three reported Kentucky cases have enforced
restrictive covenants against tenninated employees without addressing the
issue. Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv., Inc., Ky. App., 567 S.W.2d
313, 315 (1978) (tenninated claims adjuster); Lareau v. O'Nan, Ky., 355
S.W.2d 679 (1962); Stiles v. Reda, 312 Ky. 562, 228 S.W.2d 455 (1950).
Other cases support the notion that an employer need not show it
tenninated an employee in "good faith" before the employer can enforce
its non-compete. See Louisyille Cycle & Supply Co. v. Baach, Ky., 535
S.W.2d 230 (1976) (although trial court refused to enforce non-compete
covenant because employment was at will, court of appeals decided case
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on different ground); Daniel Boone Clinic P.S.c. v. Dahhan, Ky. App.,
734 S.W.2d 488 (1987) (tennination includes non-renewal of contract);
Bradford v. Billington, Ky., 299 S.W.2d 601 (1957) (non-compete in
partnership agreement was not unenforceable simply because partnership
agreement was tenninable without cause); Eigelbach v. Boone Loan &
Investment Co., 216 Ky. 69, 287 S.W. 225 (1926) (restrictive covenant
applied to both tenninations and voluntary quits).
One Indiana case directly holds that an employer should not be
required to prove that it tenninated an employee for "good cause" before it
can enforce a valid restrictive covenant. Gomez v. Chua Medical Corp.,
510 N.E.2d 191, 195 (Ind. App. 1987) ("Neither equity not the law will
deny enforcement upon the basis that the employer must establish that a
discharge was made in good faith, or for good cause.").
There are several cases in other jurisdictions holding to the
contrary. See Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc. v. Douglas, 727 S.W.2d
426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (no enforcement where employer tenninates
employee without good cause); Wauswau Medical Center, S.C. v.
Asplund, 514 N.W.2d 34 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (noncompete
unenforceable where employee worked for only 45 days for employer);
Ma & Pa, Inc. v. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d 500 (Iowa 1984) (noncompete that
applied after tennination "for any reason." was unenforceable). This is a
fertile area for litigation.
K- 22
4. LACHES.
When a party neglects to assert its rights, that party's neglect can bar its right to
seek equitable relief if the delay has caused injury or prejudice to the other party
or the other party has changed its position. Gammill v. Bradley T, 879 F. Supp.
737 (W.D. Ky. 1995); Plaza Condominium Ass'n v. Wellington Corp., Ky., 920
S.W.2d 51 (1996); Crady v. Hubrich, 299 Ky. 461, 185 S.W.2d 949 (1949);
Wisdom's Adm'r v. Sims, 284 Ky. 258, 144 S.W.2d 232 (1940).
5. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
In Maupin v. Stansbury, Ky. App., 575 S.W. 2d 695, 699 (1978), the Court described
temporary injunctive relief as follows:
applications for temporary injunctive relief should be viewed on three levels.
First, the trial court should determine whether plaintiff has complied with CR
65.04 by showing irreparable injury. This is a mandatory prerequisite to the
issuance of any injunction. Secondly, the trial court should weigh the various
equities involved. Although not an exclusive list, the court should consider such
things as possible detriment to the public interest, harm to the defendant, and
whether the injunction will merely preserve the status quo. Finally, the complaint
should be evaluated to see whether a substantial question has been presented. If
the party requesting relief has shown a probability of irreparable injury, presented
a substantial question as to the merits, and the equities are in favor of issuance,
the temporary injunction should be awarded. However, the actual overall merits
of the case are not to be addressed in CR 65.04 motions. Unless a trial court has
abused its discretion in applying the above standards, we will not set aside its
decision on a CR 65.07 review.
An attorney counseling employees should not overlook defenses to the
availability of injunctive relief.
Injunction is "an extraordinary remedy and the sufficiency of evidence presented
to the circuit court must be evaluated in the light ofboth substantive and equitable
principles." Commonwealth v. Wilkinson, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 610, 612 (1992).
The propriety of injunctive relief is "basically addressed to the sound discretion of
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the trial court." Id. "A doubtful case should await trial on the merits because the
temporary injunction often has the effect of enforcing a mere claim ofright." Id.
1. Immediate Injury.
A party seeking injunctive relief must make a clear showing that this right
is about to be immediately impaired. The movant "must demonstrate an
urgent necessity for the injunction." Id. "To support an extraordinary
remedy of injunction there must be shown a practically certain injury." Id.
at 613.
2. Irreparable Injury.
The injury must be "irreparable". Maupin v. Stansbury, Ky. App., 575
S.W.2d 695, 698 (1978). The injury, by definition, should be one that
cannot be compensated in damages. This is a fertile area for defending
injunctive actions on restrictive covenants. If there is damage in the form
of lost sales, argue that the action can and must proceed to the
determination of the monetary value of those sales. The plaintiff then can
be compensated by the legal remedy of damages.
6. ENFORCEMENT OF COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE WOULD
VIOLATE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS.
While this argument is sometimes made, reasonable covenants not to compete which have little
or no impact upon interstate commerce or competition do not violate antitrust laws. See
Frackowiak v. Farmers Insurance Co., 411 F. Supp. 1309 (D. Kan. 1976); Mendell v. Golden-
Farley of Hopkinsville, Inc., Ky. App., 573 S.W.2d 346 (1978). However, there are a few cases
indicating that it may be possible to state an antitrust claim in the context of covenants not to
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compete. Compare American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir.
1975) (agreement precluding franchisees of motels from operating motels of competitor may
present antitrust violation); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978) (employee agreements not to compete are proper subjects for
scrutiny under Sherman Act); with Bradford v. New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1974)
(where employee's agreement not to compete met rule of reason, it was not per se violation of
Sherman Act); R.W. International, Inc. v. Borden Interamerica, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 654 (D.P.R.
1987) (complaint alleging antitrust violation in covenant not to compete failed to state a claim);
Optivision, Inc. v. Syracuse Shopping Center Assoc., 472 F. Supp. 665 (N.D.N.Y. 1979)
(agreement in shopping center lease prohibiting landlord from leasing to a business in
competition with tenant did not have significant competitive impact); Genovese Drug Stores, Inc.
v. Bercrose Assoc., 563 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Conn. 1983) (restrictive covenant in lease for drug
store was not so plainly anticompetitive as to warrant application of per se rule of illegality),
vacated, Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. Connecticut Packing Co., 732 F.2d 286 (2nd Cir. 1984)
VII. CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS, TRADE SECRETS AND INEVITABLE
DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Depending on the level of an employee's position, he or she may be
subject to a common law duty of loyalty against breaches of confidence under Kentucky law.
Confidentiality agreement have not been litigated in cases reported in Kentucky, but have similar
contractual attributes to covenants not to compete. Confidentiality agreements eliminate any
ambiguity as to which employees are subject to a duty of loyalty, a question which has not been
squarely addressed by Kentucky courts. They can also serve to define protected information, and
as evidence that an employer is attempting to protect trade secrets.
2. Application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine by a court has the effect
of imposing a covenant not to compete on an employer/former employee relationship, even when
such agreements do not exists. The doctrine applies to post-employment activities where it is
found that employee will "inevitably disclose" confidential information because of the
similarities between his or her current and former positions. While a majority of states have
adopted this doctrine, it has not been addressed by Kentucky's courts.
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B. Duty of Loyalty to Employer
1. Roge v. Kentucky River Coal Co., Ky., 287 S.W. 2d 226 (1926) contains a
broad statement of the duty of loyalty for agents, trustees and/or servants, or any similar
employee who represents an employer's interests to the public. See also Stewart v. Kentucky
Paving Co, Ky. App. 557 S.W. 2d (1977) (relying on Roge to hold that company agent could not
solicit paving business for own company while still employed by paving company).
2. No Contract?
a. Even in the absence of contractual requirements, where a secret is
disclosed to defendant in confidence, a disclosure in breach of that confidence will result in
liability to the person making the disclosure. Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition §41
(1995)
b. Thus, an employee who gains intimate knowledge of his
employer's business is liable for disclosures of trade secrets even absent a contractual provision
prohibiting disclosure. Zoecon Industries, Division of Zoecon Corp. v. American Stockman Tag
Co., 713 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1983); Restatement §42.
c. A corporate director or officer is also liable for disclosures of trade
secrets acquired through his or her relationship with the corporation. Aero Drapery ofKentucky,
Inc. v. Engdahl, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 166 (1974).
d. Negotiations can also create a confidential relationship, leading to
liability for disclosing trade secrets learned during the negotiations. Digital Development Corp.
v. International Memory Systems, 185 U.S.P.Q. 136 (S.D. Cal. 1973).Aero Drapery
3. Upper Echelon Employees
a. Steelvest v. Scansteel, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W. 2d 476 (1991) found
that rules of honesty and fair dealing demand unselfish and undivided loyalty of president and
general manager who incorporated competitor while still employed by Steelvest--"a direct
corollary of this general principle of loyalty is that a corporation officer or higher-echelon
employee is barred" from actively competition while still employed.
4. Low Level Employees
a. There is no Kentucky case law considering the duties owed by
employees other than agents, officers or mid to upper-level managers. The level of an
employee's position or degree of duties and/or management sufficient to trigger duty ofloyalty is
unclear under Kentucky law.
C. Confidentiality Agreements--
1. Definition and Purpose
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a. A promise to hold employer's information in confidence; define
protectable information; and promise to return such information
2. Basic Considerations
a. The same considerations regarding choice of law, jurisdiction and
essential elements discussed above with regard to covenants not to compete control.
b. Kentucky lacks any meaningful authority with regard to the policy
or enforcement of confidentiality agreements.
3. Limitations
a. Commonly available information, i.e., information that is
"apparently available to many persons" and "relatively well-known principles in the ... field,"
cannot be transformed into a trade secret by a confidentiality agreement. Mid-States Enterprises,
Inc. v. House, 403 S.W.2d at 50; Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E. 2d 685,
710 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1952). For that reason, such information should only be
communicated to employees involved in its use, i.e., handled on a "need-to-know" basis.
D. Trade Secrets
1. Policy.
"The maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of
invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law." Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
2. Governing Law.
The law of trade secrets changed in Kentucky on July 15, 1990, when the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (hereinafter "Uniform Act"), as enacted in Senate Bill
180 (1990), took effect. The Uniform Act is codified at KRS §365.880, et seq.
3. Replaces Pre-existing Law if in Conflict with the Uniform Act.
The Uniform Act replaced all conflicting tort, restitutionary or other law
of Kentucky providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade
secret, but did not affect contractual or criminal remedies. KRS
§365.892(1) and KRS §365.892(2).
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4. Effective Date.
a. The Uniform Act, as adopted in Kentucky, does not apply to
misappropnatlOn occurring prior to July 15, 1990, or, in the case of a continuing
misappropriation that began prior to July 15, 1990, to the continuing misappropriation that
occurs after July 15, 1990. KRS §365.900.
5. States Enacting the Uniform Act.
a. The Uniform Act was approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1979 and amended in 1985. It has been adopted in at
least 42 jurisdictions: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana [I.e. 24-2-3-1
to 24-2-3-8], Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
6. While there are no reported Kentucky decisions under the Uniform Act,
case law from other jurisdictions is persuasive authority.
7. Definition.
a. The Uniform Act defines "trade secret" as follows:
i. "'Trade secret' means information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, data, device, method, technique, or process, that:
[a] Derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and
[b] Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy."
KRS §365.880(4).
8. Statute Of Limitations.
a. The Uniform Act establishes a three-year statute of limitations
requiring that "[a]n action for misappropriation must be brought within three (3) years after the
misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been
discovered." KRS §365.890. The Uniform Act rejects a "continuing wrong" approach to the
statute of limitations, providing that "a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim."
KRS §365.890.
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9. Proving The Existence Of A Trade Secret.
a. A trade secret plaintiff must first prove the existence of a trade
secret. Mid-States Enterprises, Inc. v. House, Ky., 403 S.W.2d 48 (1966). The new Restatement
(Third) Unfair Competition §39 (1995) lists the following as some relevant factors in
determining the existence of a trade secret.
b. Requirement ofValue.
i. According to the Uniform Act, a trade secret "[d]erives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use." KRS §365.880(4)(a). The trade secret need not actually be in use by
the plaintiff, under either the Uniform Act or the new Restatement.
c. Requirement of Secrecy.
i. The Uniform Act states that "readily ascertainable"
information may not be protected and the comment to the Uniform Act says that that
"[i]nformation is readily ascertainable if it is available in trade journals, reference books or
published materials." Uniform Act §1 [KRS 365.880(4)(a)], comment. Cf., Amoco Production
Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E. 2d 912, 919 (Ind. 1993) (where the duplication or acquisition of alleged
trade secret information requires a substantial investment of time, expense or effort, such
information may be found not "readily ascertainable"); Thermofil, Inc. v. Fenelon, 13 U.S.P.Q.
2d 1404 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (where compositions of products could be readily ascertained
through public literature or nomenclature ofplaintiff, the compositions are not trade secrets).
d. Precautions to Maintain Secrecy.
i. "Reasonable" security precautions are required. E.!.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1024 (1971), reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 967 (1971) ("Reasonable precautions against
predatory eyes we may require, but an impenetrable fortress is an unreasonable requirement.. ..")
The Uniform Act requires "efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy." KRS§365.880(4)(b).
ii. Entering into confidentiality agreement provides employee
with notice of employer's interest in protecting trade secrets and provides proof of a measure of
security.
10. Improper Discovery & Liability
a. Liability exists only when discovery of trade secret is unauthorized
and where the discovery or use is improper. Restatement § 43, comment a ("a person who
obtains a trade secret by proper means is free to use or disclose the information without
liability").
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b. Breach of Confidence (Duty of Loyalty) can fonn a basis of
liability--see above.
c. Third Party Liability
i. Party who learns secret with notice (knows or has reason to
know) ofbreach ofconfidence can be liable. KRS § 365.880(2)(a)
11. Remedies
a. Equitable--see above
b. Damages
i. Actual losses and unjust benefit or Defendant's gam
recoverable, as long as not duplicative KRS § 365.884(1)
ii. Double Damages where willful and malicious
misappropriation. KRS § 365.884(2).
111. Attorneys fees recoverable where willful and malicious
misappropriation. KRS § 365.886. Fees can be recovered from plaintiffs who make bad faith
claims. Id.
E. Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
1. Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th eire 1995) is the leading
case on the inevitable disclosure doctrine.
a. Pepsico held that the inevitable disclosure doctrine can be used to
enjoin for a reasonable period a fonner employee from working for a competitor, if the fonner
employer shows that the employee cannot help but rely on the trade secrets of the fonner
employer to perfonn his new duties. See id. at 1267. The court reasoned that unless the
employee has "an uncanny ability to compartmentalize infonnation" he would necessarily be
relying on his knowledge of the trade secrets. See id. at 1269. But this showing requires more
than the fact that an ex-employee has assumed a similar position at a competitor. See id. at 1269.
In other words, the fact that a skilled employee is taking his skills elsewhere is insufficient to
show inevitable disclosure. See id. at 1270.
b. A majority of U.S. states which have considered the issue have
adopted some fonn of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure. Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125
Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (Cal. App. 4th 2002).
c. Other jurisdictions have refused to do so. Compare Lumex, Inc. v.
Highsmith, 919 F.Supp. 624 (B.D. N.Y. 1996) (recognizing theory), with Whyte v. Schlage, 101
Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1458 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) and Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food
Co., Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (rejecting theory).
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2. Mere Possibility of Misuse is Not Sufficient to Invoke the Doctrine
a. Pepsico distinguished its facts from an earlier decision of a federal
court in Illinois which had dismissed an inevitable disclosure claim. Id. at 1268-70. In
Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Comm. Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1989), the court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to allege any facts showing that the
defendants had threatened to use the plaintiffs trade secrets or to disavow their confidentiality
agreements. See Teradyne, 707 F. Supp. at 356. An allegation that defendants could misuse
plaintiffs trade secrets and that the plaintiff feared that this could happen was insufficient to
plead a valid inevitable disclosure claim. Id. at 357. The district court observed that the law not
only permits, but encourages employees to take the knowledge acquired in their previous
employment to their new place ofbusiness. Id. at 356. Pepsico cited Teradyne favorably, stating
that the decision and the Illinois Trade Secrets Act lead to the conclusion that a "plaintiff can
prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that defendant's new
employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiffs trade secrets." See Pepsico, 54
F.3d at 1269 (emphasis supplied).
b. In Strata Marketing, Inc. v. Murphy, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 1069
(1 st Dist. 2000), the Illinois appellate court read Pepsico narrowly by holding that a plaintiff was
required to plead in the complaint facts stating that the defendant could not operate or function in
his new position without relying on the former employer's trade secrets (Id. at 1071) and held
that the plaintiffs complaint met this rigid standard. Id. But the court cautioned that a plaintiffs
fear that a defendant would misuse confidential information is insufficient to support a claim
based on inevitable disclosure. Id. at 1070.
3. Presence of a restrictive covenant (not to compete; confidentiality
agreement) is not required to invoke the doctrine
a. The doctrine also has the effect of creating an after-the-fact
covenant not to compete. But this is a protection about which the employer had never bargained
with the employee nor paid consideration. This alters the employment relationship without the
employee's consent. See Whyte, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 1462. And it runs counter to the public
policy favoring employee mobility. See Bayer v. Roche, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Ca.
1999). As stated by the California Supreme Court:
every individual possess as a form of property, the right to pursue
any calling, business or profession he may choose. A former
employee has the right to engage in a competitive business for
himself and to enter into competition with his former employer ...
provided such competition is fairly and legally conducted.
See Bayer, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 (quoting Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal.
2d 104 (1944)).
4. Evidence of Bad Faith Probative
a. Bad faith or predatory intent regarding former employer IS a
probative factor in the doctrine's application. PepsiCo, Inc.. 54 F.3d at 1270-71.
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5. Injunctive Relief
a. Some courts which have considered the issue have held that an
employee may be enjoined from continuing employment with the new employer upon a showing
that (1) the current and former employers are competitors, (2) the employee's responsibilities in
the new position overlap with those in the prior position such that disclosure of confidential
information is inevitable, and (3) the current employer has not taken sufficient, demonstrable
steps to prevent misappropriation from occurring. Merck & Co., Inc., v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp.
1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996)(citing PepsiCo, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1267).
6. Absence of Kentucky Authority
a. There is no case law in Kentucky adopting the inevitable
disclosure doctrine.
b. However, KRS §365.882(1) of KUTSA, provides "Actual or
threatened misappropriation may be enjoined." (Emphasis added).
c. The Seventh Circuit has specifically recognized that Kentucky law,
even when an employee has signed a post-employment non-compete, does not sanction an
injunction against an employee working for a competitor. In Vencor, Incorporated v. Webb, 33
F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 1994) affing 829 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ill. 1993), the Court upheld the district
court's denial of a preliminary injunction which would have prevented Webb from working for a
competitor. The post-employment restrictive covenant was governed by Kentucky law. 33 F.3d
at 844-45. The district court relied on the following factors in deciding that enforcement of the
covenant was not reasonable: (i) Webb took no confidential documents when he left Vencor, (ii)
Webb denied using confidential information in his position with his new employer, and (iii) his
new position involved different duties. 829 F. Supp. at 249.
d. Both the district court and the court of appeals held that the written
covenant would not be enforced under Kentucky law against Webb because it would not be
reasonable to do so. This was so even though Webb joined Vencor's competitor in contravention
to the language of his agreement not to engage in a competitive business. If these limits apply
when a court is asked to enforce a bargained-for non-compete, they certainly should apply to a
former employer's attempt to enjoin the former employee from taking a new position with a
competitor when there is no non-compete agreement.
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I. The EthicslLegal Problems Associated with Prospective Client's Removal of
Materials and/or Recording Conversations in Preparation for an
Employment Claim
A. Often a prospective client presents in your office who has been
experiencing a course of conduct he/she deems discriminatory or which
he/she believes is leading to termination. They may have already begun
building their case or may be seeking your legal advice regarding any or all
of the following:
1. Taking copies (or sometimes originals) of written materials from
their employee personnel file or the files of co-employees;
2. Downloading information from company computers used by the
employee, managers, or even officers;
3. Surreptitiously using tape recorders at disciplinary meetings where
alleged discriminatory statements are made or in encounters where
sexually provocative statements take place;
4. Recording telephone conversations.
B. Ethical considerations of the plaintiff attorney:
1. Under Rule 1.2(d) of the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct, a
lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage nor shall he/she assist a
client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but
a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course
of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a
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good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or
application of the law.
2. Similarly, a lawyer under Rule l.l6(a)(1) may decline to represent a
client if the representation will result in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Once employed, withdrawal is also permitted
under Rule l.l6(b)(1) or (3) if the client engages in conduct the
lawyer believes to be criminal or fraudulent as well as if the client
pursues an objective the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent.
C. To avoid ethicaVlegal problems, the plaintiffs lawyer better know
applicable Kentucky and federal law or perform the requisite legal research
before advising what if anything the employee may lawfully take from the
employer or do in preparation for a possible civil action.
D. Important questions for the plaintiff lawyer to ask:
1. Does the employee have an Employment Agreement or is there a
handbook in force which sets forth the company policy as to
ownership and/or retention of company documents?
2. Does the employee have a separate Confidentiality Agreement which
addresses company policy on the retention or use of
information/documents?
3. Does the taking of company data, information/documents have
implications that may get the plaintiff sued under the Kentucky
Trade Secret Act, KRS 365.880-900?
4. On the issue of an employee accessing or taking computer
information from the employer without consent, have you considered
the potential criminal implications ofKRS 434.853 which states:
434.853. Unlawful access in the fourth degree.
(1) A person is guilty ofunlawful access in the fourth
degree when he or she, without the effective consent
ofthe owner, knowingly and willfully, directly or
indirectly accesses, causes to be accessed, or
attempts to access any computer software, computer
program, data, computer, computer system, computer
network, or any part thereof, which does not result in
loss or damage.
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(2) Unlawful access to a computer in the fourth degree is
a Class B misdemeanor. (Effective July 15,2002.)
5. You must also consider the potential for any civil or even criminal
violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 and the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. See 18 U.S.C §2707.
6. Are there any invasion ofprivacy tort claim risks or other criminal
considerations with use of tape recordings for meetings/encounters or
is such activity permitted under KRS 526.010 pursuant to the
definition of "eavesdrop?"
7. As to employee recording of telephone calls, have you considered
the application ofKRS Chapter 526 and 18 U.S.C. §2511 including
any exceptions under those statutes which may allow the conduct to
be deemed lawful because the person acting is a party to the
communication. However, see Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601 (6th
Cir. 1998), where two Louisville lawyers became defendants
concerning their knowledge and roles in a case involving their client,
a divorced mother, secretly taping telephone calls between her
former husband and their 14-year-old minor daughter she had
custody of (on whose behalf the mother claimed she consented to the
taping without telling the girl out of concern for her welfare). Also,
see Sparshott v. Feld Entertainment Inc., 311 F.3d 425 (C.A.DC
2002); Smoot v. United Transp. Union, 246 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2001).
E. Other strategic alternatives for the plaintiff lawyer to consider to minimize
ethical/legal problems when advising the employee:
If the employee prospective client has not already engaged in taking
documents and/or computer information, and knows the materials exist
which may be crucial to achieving a successful outcome in litigation, the
following course of action may be helpful and less risky from both an
ethical and legal standpoint:
1. Consider writing the employer's President, General Counsel, outside
counsel, ifknown, (or all of them) identifying the computers which
contain the required documentary evidence used by the specific
individuals who were the decision makers for any discriminatory
actions or unlawful termination. Instruct them to respond
immediately in writing that they will agree to preserve all of those
computers and all of their contents because of the materiality of the
information to the employee's claim. You may also want to cite
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Rule 3.4(a) to the lawyers concerning the consequences of alteration
or destruction of the information or computers.
2. If there is no immediate response to such a letter, or if you know the
employer plays "hard ball" and the request will be futile, you may
consider instituting a civil action (using a Verified Complaint), to
seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief
from the Court to preserve the material and computers. If you wrote
a letter first and received no response or a refusal to our request,
attach a copy of the letter so the judge will get the immediate
impression that the employer is wasting the Court's time by
stonewalling a legitimate request.
3. Do not forget to seek a jury instruction on spoliation of evidence
should any of the documents or computers critical to your client's
case be deemed "missing" during discovery, especially if early
written notice has been given of the importance ofpreserving those
documents. Monsanto Co. v. Reed, Ky., 950 S.W.2d 811, 815
(1997).
4. If the case has the value to justify it, consider hiring a computer
expert with the ability to retrieve allegedly deleted information from
computers;
5. If the prospective client shows up in your office and has already
taken written documents, downloaded computer information, or
taped meetings and/or telephone calls, consider all of the legal
ramifications very carefully before using the information in
litigation. Also, consider whether it may be ofpotential benefit for
settlement purposes to voluntarily disclose possession of any or all
such information to the employer or its counsel.
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II. Ethical Problems in Settlements Involving the Plaintiff Employee or
Employees and Counsel
A. Many prospective clients who are employees seeking counsel in a wrongful
termination or discrimination case will tell you when presenting their
claims, "It's a matter ofprinciple, and it's not about money." This is the
rare employment client based upon my experience. Regardless, it should
reinforce the need for plaintiffs counsel to make sure the attorney fee
arrangement is both specifically documented by contract and fully
understood by the client(s).
B. Normally the likelihood of an ethical conflict between attorney and client
will arise less often in a wrongful termination case because it is unlikely
that the employer will be paying your attorney fee as plaintiffs attorney.
This is due to the fact there may be no statutory or common law basis for
asserting an attorney fee claim against the employer as an element of
plaintiffs damage.
C. In discrimination cases under Kentucky (KRS 344) and Title VII cases
under federal law, as well as a myriad of other employment-related statutes
under both Kentucky and federal law, there are provisions allowing
plaintiffs attorney fees and costs to be recovered from the other side, which
increases the likelihood of a potential ethical conflict.
D. Ethical considerations are often presented in settlement situations where the
defendant employer's counsel seeks to involve simultaneous negotiation of
plaintiff counsel's attorney fees and the amount payable to the plaintiff
employee(s). Great care must be taken in these cases to avoid violating
1.7(b) and/or 1.8(g) of the Rules ofthe Kentucky Supreme Court.
Rule 1. 7. Conflict ofinterest: general rule.
* * *
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation ofthat client may be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a thirdperson,
or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will
not be adversely affected; and
(2) The client consents after consultation. When
representation ofmultiple clients in a single matter is
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undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation ofthe
implications ofthe common representation and the advantages
and risks involved.
Rule 1.8. Conflict ofinterest: prohibited transactions.
* * *
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not
participate in making an aggregate settlement ofthe claims of
or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated
agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each
client consents after consultation, including disclosure ofthe
existence and nature ofall the claims or pleas involved and of
the participation ofeach person in the settlement.
1. For example, employer may seek to generously settle the claim(s) of
employee(s) conditioned upon a waiver or large reduction of the
claim for attorney fees; (such an approach does not appear to violate
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,42 U.S.C.
§1988. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 737-738 (1986).
2. Counsel for the employer may offer to pay all of the attorney fees
without question as to the reasonableness of amount in return for
concessions by employee(s) as to the amount of recoverable
damages, benefits, or withdrawal of a request for permanent
injunctive relief to change an unlawful employment practice, etc.
3. The potential conflict between plaintiff employee(s) and their
attorney can be exacerbated when the documented attorney fee
incurred for which payment is sought may be higher than the
settlement amount offered or the damages awarded the employee at
trial. There can also be a problem when there is a threatened appeal
by the losing employer presented with a combined offer of settlement
for less than the verdict plus attorney fee the Court would be
requested to award. See for example, Meyers v. Chapman Printing
Co., Inc., Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814 (1992), where the attorney fee was
$150,662.85 and the verdict was $100,000; Abrams v. Lightolier,
Inc., 50 F.3d 1204 (3rd Cir. 1995), where the attorney fee request was
$546,000 and damages awarded were $474,000.
4. Where plaintiffs counsel evaluates or accepts a Rule 68 Offer of
Judgment, make sure there is no ambiguity as to how much is
damages for the employee(s) versus how much is cost
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reimbursement and attorney's fees. This is essential to avoid a
serious potential ethical conflict. Another option is to require the
Rule 68 offer to state only how much is damages for the employee(s)
and reference in it that the cost and attorney fee amount will in
addition be determined by the Court. Failing to use precise language
in the Rule 68 Offer of Judgment may have disastrous ethical and
legal consequences for the plaintiffs side (or the defense side).
There are multiple reported cases which allow attorney fees to
subsequently be awarded after plaintiff has become the prevailing
party by accepting the Rule 68 offer. Defendant's counsel may have
contemplated that the amount offered included attorney fees, but did
not specify this in clear language. See Lyte v. Sara Lee Corp., 950
F.2d 101, 104-105 (2nd Cir. 1991). Numerous cases also exist where
the Court has voided the Rule 68 offer because of its ambiguous
language concerning whether attorney fees were included in the
amount. Radecki v. Amoco Oil Co., 858 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir.
1988). If the settlement breaks down due to problems with a Rule 68
offer and plaintiff ultimately does not prevail at trial, there could be
adverse ethical and legal consequences for plaintiffs attorney.
L - 7
E. Considerations for the plaintiff attorney to reduce the ethical and legal risks
1. Create a special civil contract (as opposed to using the boilerplate
type) for employment cases where you as the plaintiffs attorney
realize from the beginning that a potential conflict may exist because
attorney fees are a recoverable element of damage in the client's
case. Use very clear (i.e., non-legalese) language. Include, ifneed
be, a written example of how an ethical conflict could arise in
settlement or even after a successful verdict if an appeal is threatened
combined with a reduced settlement offer meant to include damages,
costs, and attorney fees. Fully explain these risks, if need be in a
letter addendum to the contract, and have the client acknowledge
receiving and understanding the explanation.
2. If you are not sure if the proposed settlement by the defendant
employer poses an ethical conflict, seek an informal opinion from
other impartial plaintiffs counsel with experience in evaluating
ethical issues associated with employment cases. Consider selecting
an attorney that may have gained experience in ethical issues from
service as a member of the Professional Responsibility Committee.
In rare circumstances, a formal Ethics Opinion can even be sought.
3. If you think your client does not understand the settlement proposal
after thorough explanation related to the allocation of fees versus
damages, urge the client to obtain a second opinion from another
attorney they select to discuss the fairness and reasonableness of the
proposed basis for settlement.
4. Detail all of the actions in writing every step of the way as soon as
there is the first hint of a potential ethical dispute between the client
and attorney.
5. If all of the above fail, do not hesitate to seek early assistance from
the Court on deciding allocation of damages to the employee versus
attorney fees should a potential ethical conflict arise.
F. Special ethical considerations for the attorney where the representation
involves two or more employees:
1. All of the above points under Section E apply where there are
multiple employee plaintiffs, however, in addition, group
representation of employees requires a need for extra attention to
avoid ethical conflicts. As Rule 1.7(b)(2) indicates, "... When
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the
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consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the
common representation and the advantages and risks involved."
Further, under Rule 1.8(g) it states, "A lawyer who represents two or
more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement
of the claims of the clients unless each client consents after
consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of the
claims involved and of the participation of each person in the
settlement.
2. For example, with a group of female employees that seek to retain
you as counsel in a sexual harassment claim where a manager has
taken different improper actions toward each potential plaintiff, the
attorney must explain from the outset that the claims may have
different values for settlement purposes. Make sure this is
acknowledged in writing by all of the clients along with a procedure
to be followed in the event a global settlement is offered by the
employer (i.e., split the proceeds equally "all for one and one for all,"
which some term "The Three Musketeers Approach," agree to let the
judge decide the value of each claim, allow the group to decide the
value of each claim if it can be done unanimously without counsel
playing a decision-making role and without hostility). This conflict
should be less problematic where economic damages that can be
quantified such as back pay is the major element of damage. When
unliquidated damages that are difficult to quantify for elements such
as humiliation or embarrassment come in to play, fair valuation
becomes much more difficult and it increases the need for the Court
to set the amounts.
3. Planning how to try and prevent the potential conflict before an
attorney agrees to represent multiple plaintiff employees is critical.
This is because a combined settlement offer by the employer may be
advanced to purposely divide the plaintiff group from each other
and/or from their counsel which could adversely affect achieving a
favorable result. Even worse, if there is a failed settlement it may
undermine presentation of the group's claims at trial because an
individual client's goal could then override the group's mission. I
term a reverse Three Musketeers approach which can be summed up
as "All for one and that one is me.". (Although it was not an
employment case, the recently settled sexual abuse case against the
Louisville Archdiocese presented many of the divisive ethical and
legal issues discussed here. Many members in the class ofplaintiffs
disagreed concerning how much their individual claims were worth.
Some of the plaintiffs and their individual attorneys also disagreed
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concerning the amount of attorney fees the lead attorney for the class
should be awarded out of the $25,000,000 global settlement which
was offered. The issues were ultimately resolved by the trial judge
as to the lead attorney fee and by appointment of an experienced
outside attorney to recommend to the Court how members of the
plaintiff class should be compensated for their respective claims.)
L - 10
LEGAL ETIDCS IN HARA~SMENT INVESTIGATIONS
1. The unique role ofan employment defeqse attorney
A. Unlike most litigation or corpor~te counsel, employment lawyers seldom practice
law exclusively inside or outside! the courtroom.
B. The practice of employment law fis often split
1. A process of counseling (prospectively advising clients on compliance
with the law) ,
2. A process of advocacyj (retrospective argument that one's client has
previously complied with the law).
C. This creates a problem in the context of all discrimination claims, particularly
sexual and other forms ofharassment.
ll. A typical harassment case for an emplo)jIDent defense lawyer
A. The role of counselor usually co*es first.
1. Burlington Indus., Inc. VI Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v.
City ofBoca Raton, 524 V.S. 775 (1998), advised employers to implement
comprehensive anti-harw:isment policies and enforce them effectively.
2. The first duty as counselor is to draft employment policies designed to
prevent and correct sexual and other forms ofharassment.
B. Eventually, most clients will receive complaints under their anti-harassment
policies.
1. Often followed by a telephone call to the attorney, in which the client
seeks advice on how to proceed.
2. Still in the role of counselor, advising the client on how best to comply
with the law and minimize the client's liability.
3. In the case of hostile environment claims, the employer is advised to
conduct a thorough investigation of the allegations contained in the
complaint.
C. The investigation
1. Client often asks employment counsel, the people who are most familiar
with the requirements ofan effective investigation, to perform it.
2. Counsel has expertise in the law, and expertise in the operation of the
employers' specific anti-harassment policy.
3. The process
a. Investigator decicles whom to interview, and what questions to ask.
b. Reach a conclusiQn on the veracity of the allegations
c. Recommend a coirrse ofconduct for the employer
D. The litigation
1. The role as advocate begins
a. Receipt ofan EE4>C charge or KCHR complaint
b. Receipt ofa com,laint
2. Lawyer's role changes I
a. Arguing the empIPyer's position
b. Focus is retrospe~tive- no longer prospective.
I
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3. Substance ofthe argument
a Client possessed ~dequate procedures for preventing harassment.
(1) Did the e¢ployer have a policy?
(2) The lawyer probably wrote it.
b. Employer took sufficient steps to remedy the harassment once it
occurred.
(1) The essential element of this proof is often a demonstration
that the en).ployer undertook a thorough investigation.
(2) The emplqyer conducted the investigation that now fonns
an element ofthe client's defense.
B.
C.
m. Creation ofthe Problem
A. Attorney must demonstrate the ~equacy of the client's anti-harassment policy,
which was drafted by that attorn~y.
Attorney must demonstrate th:;t' e client thoroughly investigated the employee's
allegations of harassment, thou the attorney was the very one conduoting the
investigation on behalfof the loyer.
Attorney becomes both advocate! and witness on behalfofthe client.
2.
The Three Ethical Problems.
A. Client has an interest in preseztving the attorney/client privilege protecting the
communications made during th~ counseling stage.
1. However, the adequacy hf the employer's anti-harassment policies are a
substantive issue in the li~gation.
a. Can the privilege ~e maintained?
b. Should it be?
The employer's imp1eme~tationof the policies is also an issue
a. Can the privilege ~e maintained?
b. Should it be?
Potential conflict of interest.
1. Can attorney serve as a ~itness for client?
2. Ifpossible, is it even advtsable?
Malpractice.
1. Dual role ofcounselor aqd advocate creates a problem.
2. If the client loses the ~e because of the inadequacy of the investigation
or policy, what liability ~oes that create for the attorney?
B.
C.
N.
v. Attorney/client privilege.
A. We must first decide wheth the allegedly privileged infonnation is even
relevant, since irrelevant infonn tion is not discoverable under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26.
1. At least one employer h tried to argue that the investigation is actually
irrelevant to a Faraghe 'Ellerth defense.
2. Payton v. N.J. Turnpike uthority, 73 PEP Cases 1149 (N.J. 1997).
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(2)
(2)
b.
a.
c.
d.
c.
e.
d.
3.
The employer ar ed that the process ofinvestigation is irrelevant,
and only the 0 tcome of the investigation matters to the
employer's affirm tive defense.
Where the haras ment stops because the harasser is effectively
disciplined, the eans by which the discipline came about (the
attorney's inVesti~atiOn) is arguably irrelevant.
The lawyer's tes imony about the investigation would th.erefore
also be irrelevant and the privilege and ethical issues wpuld be
moot. i
The New Jersey ;preme Court rejected this argument. Reasoning
that '~ustice del ed is justice denied," the court held that an
investigation that reaches the correct result but which also allows
the harassment to~ ontinue during a prolonged period is ineffective
under Faragher· d Ellerth.
The employment lawye 's participation in the process is likely. to be
relevant to the case, e ,en if the investigation resulted in the. correct
outcome. [
Since the process of the inVeStig~iOn is relevant, the next issue is Whether.. or not
the plaintiff/employee can overc me the attorney/client privilege.
1. Assume, for purposes of alysis, that the privilege actually attaches to the
investigation.· i
a. This is not a forefne conclusion
b. Unless the inv stigation was undertaken in anticipation of
litigation or can b classified as the provision of "legal advice," the
attorney/client pri 'lege is inapplicable.
Scott v. Avondale Industries, et al., 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6696, 91
FEP Cases 1442 .D. La. 2003).
(1) Court hel that documents created by a company's human
resources nvestigator (who was not an attorney) Were not
protected y the work product privilege
They wer created in the ordinary course of business, and
not in anti ipation oflitigation.
Simple enforcem t of company policy or a desire to comply with
a legal duty is al 0 insufficient motive to trigger the protection of
the privilege. Se~ Payton, supra.
Cle~ly, the Coutts will limit the circumstances under which an
investigation is ~eemed to be undertaken "in anticipation of
litigation." !
(1) The existqnce of an allegation of harassment is not enough
by itself. i
An empl yment attorney cannot preserve the privilege
simply b instructing the employer's human resources
departm t to prevent litigation by following the
harassme t policy and investigating every allegation.
B.
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(2)
(3)
f.
b.
2.
3.
i
There may still b~a work-product privilege which the attorney can
assert when the ttorney instructs the employer to conduct an
investigation.
If the privilege attaches, mployers must decide whether they can assert it
and still adequately defen their case.
a. Few courts have dressed this issue, but those that have issued
opinions force ployers to choose between the privilege and
defending the dis rimination charges.
(1) McIntyre. Main Street, 84 FEP Cases 1032 (N.D. Cal.
2000) ( employer may not rely on an outside
investigati n as an affirmative defense where the employer
asserted t the investigation was privileged)
Harding ~ Dana Transport, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1084, 69
FEP Case 1603 (D. N.J. 1996) (holding that defendant's
use of its attorney's investigation of sexual harassment
allegatio~ as a defense waived 'the attorney/client
privilege) I
Brownell t. Roadway Package System, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 19,
24-25 (S.~. N.Y. 1999) (if the employer had raised the
defense ~f adequate investigation and response to a
complaint' of discrimination, it would waive the attorney-
client pri 'lege with respect to communications between
counsel d client pertaining to that investigation)
Even if the attorney's tions during the investigation of the harassment
allegation are privileged, he privilege may be meaningless.
a. If the only effi 've defense to the employee's claim involves
proof of an efIec 've investigation of the harassment allegations, a
waiver ofthe pri 'lege is in the client's best interest.
Maintenance of e privilege is squarely at odds with the obligation
to serve as an effi ctive advocate for the client.
If the client is truly not l'able for the harassment because the investigation
was adequate, the only, ay to prove the client's innocence may be to
waive the attorney/clien~rivilege.
Beware: simply by rais' g the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense, the
employer may have uni tentionally already waived the privilege. See
Payton, supra. ,
Implications to a waiver of the p 'vilege
1. The next time an employe accuses the client ofharassment, the client will
no doubt remember the p evious experience.
At the counseling stage f the second harassment allegation, the client is
likely to be far more gu ded in what is said, knowing that future litigation
may require waiver ofth attorney/client privilege.
This reluctance defeats e very purpose of the privilege: to foster open
and honest communicati n between attorney and client.
By waiving the privile e in one harassment case, the attorney may
irreparably damage the a ility to represent the client in future cases.
2.
4.
4.
3.
5.
C.
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c.
c.
2.
c.
Conflict of Interest.
A. Attorney as witness., .
1. The defense ofthe harasstnent allegations requires proofof two el~ents
a. The employer had adequate anti-harassment policies with ~equate
training on those ~licies, and .
b. Those policies w' effectively enforced.
Strangely, the attorney y be the best witness that the employer [has met
each of these elements 0 the Faragher/Ellerth defense.
a. The employer oft wrote the policies that are now under file
b. Attorney is likel to be the most qualified person to testify to the
scope and intende effect ofthe policies.
Having conduct the inquiry into the harassment allegations, the
attorney is alSOiquelY qualified to testify as to the effectiveness
ofthe investigati .
Is the dual role ofwitness and ocate acceptable?
1. Model Rule 3.7 ofthe A Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct ,
(a) A lawyer shall not apt as advocate at a trial in which the lqwyer is
likely to be a nec~sary witness unless:
(1) the testimony,., lates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony elates to the nature and value of legal ~ervices
rendered i the case; or
(3) disqualificatio of the lawyer would work substantial ~ardship
on the eli t. ;
(b) A lawyer may act as dvocate in a trial in which another laWYfr in the
lawyer's firm is 'kely to be called as a witness unless p ecluded
from doing so by ule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.
2. Rule strictly limi the circumlrtances under which an atto ey can
be both an advocate and witness for a client.
The practice is prohibit , unless
a. the issue is unco ested,
b. the testimony re ates to the nature and value of legal [services
rendered in the c e, or :
disqualification ould be a substantial hardship for the cli+t.
B.
VI.
VII. Malpractice.
A. Increased risk of malpractice c aims where attorney is the one cond
investigations into discriminatio charges.
B. If the attorney conducts the inv stigation, and the employer loses the su sequent
discrimination claim because e jury detennined that the investiga on was
inadequate, what liability exists
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OFFICERS, THE COMPANY, ~D EMPLOYEES: SHOULD ,ACH
HAVE SEPARATE COUNSE~?
I. Can defense attorneys undertake joint r resentation of the company and an emp~oyeeof
the company?
A. ABA Model Rules ofProfession Conduct
1. Rule 1.7- Conflict oflnte est: Current Clients
(a) Except as provid in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not,., resent
a client if the r resentation involves a concurrent co iflict of
interest. A concu 'ent conflict ofinterest exists if:
(1) the repres ntation ofone client will be directly a erse to
another cl ent; or
(2) there is a ignificant risk that the representation 0 one or
more clie ts will be materially limited by the awyer~
responsibi ities to another client, a former client 0 a third
person or ~ a personal interest ofthe lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding he existence of a concurrent conflict 0 interest
underparagraph a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawye reasonably believes that the lawyer wi! be able
to provi competent and diligent representation to each
affected c 'ent;
(2) the repres ntation is notprohibited by law;
(3) the repres ntation does not involve the assertion 0 a claim
by one c 'ent against another client represente by the
lawyer in he same litigation or other proceeding fore a
tribunal; nd
(4) each affe ted client gives informed consent, con ed in
writing.
2. What is informed consen ?
a. Attorneys should ommunicate the following:
(1) The co . ts that may arise between the two partie;
(2) The ethic standards that may prohibit a la r from
represen . g a client when there is a conflict.
(3) The possi ility of restricting their claims if they
to take co icting positions.
(4) The costs d disruption involved if they should ha e to get
separate c unsel down the line.
(5) In the ev t of a conflict between the parties, co
withdraw from representing one party and co
represent e other.
(6) That the attorney/client privilege does not appl to the
parties jo tly represented and the attorney may disclose
informati n given by one party to the other party.
b. Communication hould be in writing with client's signatur
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e.
f.
b.
c.
d.
3.
a.
2.
c. Infonned consen often takes the fonn of a joint efense
agreement. They ypically include:
(1) An ackno ledgement of common interests,
(2) An agre ent to share infonnation (even privileged ,
(3) Recogniti n ofpossible conflicts, and
(4) Condition for withdrawal.
Minimizes attorn y fees by preventing duplicative prepara~on
Provides for legal strategies that may not be otherwise avai able
Lawyer is able to Ian a joint defense
Presents a united ont to a jury
Easy access to all the needed facts
Facilitates better mmunication between the defendant e
and defendant em loyer.
Business
a. Emphasizes the c rporate culture of supporting managers ho are
wrongly accused.
Gives managers a sense of security and confidence' their
decisions.
Economic
a. Parties pay for 0 lawyer instead of two ..I
b. Especially helpfu ifone party is picking up the tab for bour
Disadvantages
1. Strategic clashes
2. Less than forthcoming ployee-defendants can undermine the dJfense of
the employer 1
Restricted attomey/clien privilege3.
B. ABA Model Code ofProfession
1.
So it can be done.....but should it be do e?
A. Advantages
1. Legal
a.
b.
B.
n.
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C. Special case - Sexual Harassm I
1. When harassment cu . ates in a "tangible employment Iaction"
(Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998».
a. This is typically a quidpro quo case. i
b. The position of he employer and the supervisor are g~erally
aligned. I
c. Especially true w en both argue that the conduct did not ocfur.
d. Joint defense agre ents are easier to accomplish here. J
2. When the harassment d es not culminate into a "tangible empjoyment
action" (Burlington Ind., nco v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998». i
a. This is typically a hostile environment case. I
b. The interests of e supervisor and the employer will oft,n be at
odds. jl
c. Especially true hen the employer argues that the su ervisor
engaged in the c nduct, but the employer took prompt medial
action to remedy the conduct or that the employee fail to use
available reportin procedures.
d. Joint defense agre ents are less likely to be appropriate h reo
D. Special Case - no individualliab lity for the supervisor
1. Under Title vn and KR Chapter 344, only employers, not indo .duals,
can be liable for disc . ation or harassment (though there is in 'vidual
liability for retaliation).
2. Representing the indivi supervisor only for the purposes 01 a Rule
12(b)(6) motion is unlike y to raise a conflict.
3. The aforementioned p blems may arise if the 12(b)(6) m tion is
unsuccessful.
(2)
2.
How does joint representation affect the attorney/client privilege?
A. Attorney/client privilege of the c rporation
1. Disclosure of an emp oyer's confidential information to a current
employee may not cons tute a "disclosure to a third party," and ay not
be a waiver of the corpo tion's attorney/client privilege.
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), held that comm 'cations
between corporate co sel and an employee of the corpora 'on are
privileged when:
(1) The communica ons were made at the direction of c rporate
superiors to obtai legal advice from counsel, and
The communica ons concerned matters within the scop of the
employee's duti s and the employee was aware the being
questioned so the orporation could obtain legal advice.
The Joint Defense privilege 1
I. Protects communication that are part of an ongoing and joint fIort to
establish a common defe se strategy. (Travelers Cas. & Sur.Co. Excess
Ins. Co., 197 F.R.D. 601 S.D. Ohio 2000».
2. Protects comments mad by one defendant in front of a co-defen ant and
communications made b tween defendants. '
B.
m.
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3. Applies when: r
a. The communicati ns were made in the course of a joint efense
effort;
b. The communicati ns were designed to further the effort.
c. The privilege was not waived.
IV. How does joint representation affect tri ?
A.
B.
Inconsistent verdicts t:
Danger that J'ury will find in f: vor of the supervisor but still find ag' t the
employer, or vice versa.
1. In this situation, the los' g defendant will want to appeal and the . . g
defendant will not.
2. The winning defendant y have to return to trial.
3. Can the defendant/emp oyer seek indemnity or contribution if the
employee wins a verdict?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
Degenerv. Hall ontracting Corp., 27 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2 ).
Outpatient clinic ted privileges to a doctor named Sal
The clinic emplo ed an assistant for Salazar, who accus him of
hostile environm t sexual harassment under KRS Chapter 44.
The clinic filed a -party indemnity claim against Salaz .
Kentucky Sup e Court upheld the clinic's right 0 seek
indemnity
(1) The clinic d Salazar were not in pari delicto.
(2) The clinic as liable only because ofthe acts ofSal ar.
The fact that S azar could not be individually liable for the
harassment was 0 no consequence.
This result woul be impossible under Title Vil, because there is
no federal comm law right to indemnity.
Salazar was prob ly an independent contractor. ~
(1) The case y tum out differently ifhe were an emp oyee.
(2) Acts of employee are the acts of the empl yer, so
indemnity for acts ofemployees may not be possibl .
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ETHICS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW
THE COURT'S PERSPECTIVE
I. Employment Discrimination Class Actions
A. Communications
1. Solicitation of non-represented potential class members
a. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3: Direct Contact with
Prospective Clients -- (a) A lawyer shall not by in-person, live
telephone or real-time electronic contact solicit professional
employment from a prospective client when a significant
motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary
gain, unless the person contacted:
(1) is a lawyer; or
(2) has a family, close personal, or prior professional
relationship with the lawyer.
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a
prospective client by written, recorded or electronic
communication or by in-person, telephone or real-time
electronic contact even when not otherwise prohibited by
paragraph (a), if:
(1) the prospective client has made known to the lawyer a
desire not to be solicited by the lawyer; or
(2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment.
(c) Every written, recorded or electronic communication from
a lawyer soliciting professional employment from a
prospective client known to be in need of legal services in a
particular matter shall include the words "Advertising
Material" on the outside envelope, if any, and at the
beginning and ending of any recorded or electronic
communication, unless the recipient of the communication is
a person specified in paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(2).
(d) Notwithstanding the prohibitions in paragraph (a), a
lawyer may participate with a prepaid or group legal service
plan operated by an organization not owned or directed by
the lawyer that uses in-person or telephone contact to solicit
memberships or subscriptions for the plan from persons who
are not known to need legal services in a particular matter
covered by the plan.
b. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981). The EEOC and
Gulf Oil reached a conciliation agreement wherein Gulf
agreed to cease discriminatory practices, instate an
affirmative action program, and provide backpay to alleged
victims based on a formula. Class action based on separate
discrimination charges involving allegations that Gulf Oil
discriminated on the basis of race was filed subsequently,
seeking to vindicate the rights of many people receiving
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settlement offers from Gulf. Gulf sought to limit parties and
counsel from communicating with potential class members.
The court entered an order banning all communications
between parties and their counsel and actual or potential
class members without prior approval of the court. A divided
panel of the 5th Circuit upheld the district court order finding
no violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 or prior restraint on speech
in violation of the First Amendment. An en banc rehearing
was granted and the 5th Circuit reversed the panel decision,
finding the district court order was a prior restraint and
violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determined the scope of the district court's
power to limit communications between named plaintiffs and
their counsel to prospective class members.
(1) Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 requires the court to exercise
control over a class action and enter appropriate
orders narrowly tailored to prevent abuse while
balancing the potential interference with the rights of
the parties.
(2) The district court's order was too broad and contained
no factual findings, legal argument, or record for
appellate review.
(3) The court also noted "... we do not decide what
standards are mandated by the First Amendment in
this kind of case, we do observe that the order
involved serious restraints on expression." Id. at 104.
c. Courts often state that class actions are particularly
susceptible to abuse. Three often-mentioned abuses
recognized in Gulf Oil are:
(1) the susceptibility of nonparty class members to
solicitation amounting to barratry;
(2) the increased opportunities of the parties or counsel
to 'drum up' participation in the proceeding; and
(3) unapproved communications to class members that
misrepresent the status or effect of the pending
action.
d. Williams v. U.S. District Court, 658 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1981).
The named plaintiff in the class action brought suit against
his employer on behalf of former and present employees for
racial discrimination. A Local Rule prohibited
communication between parties and counsel to potential
class members without consent of the court (the Local Rule
was patterned after the same Manual for Complex Litigation
model order after which the district court in Gulf Oil
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patterned its order). The Local Rule was designed to
prevent attorney solicitation of clients, funds, and fee
agreements. The 6th Circuit, citing Gulf Oil, found that the
Local Rule and the district court's order were invalid
because they unduly frustrated the policies underlying Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23. Further, the district court exceeded its
rulemaking authority as the Local Rule was inconsistent with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
e. Shapero v. Ky Bar Assn., 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988). A
Kentucky attorney sought to solicit clients known to have
pending foreclosure actions against them through the mail
via a letter stating: "It has come to my attention that your
home is being foreclosed on. If this is true, you may be
about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you to keep
your home by ORDERING your creditor to STOP and give
you more time to pay them. You may call my office anytime
from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for FREE information on how
you can keep your home. Call NOW, don't wait. It may
surprise you what I may be able to do for you. Just call and
tell me that you got this letter. Remember it is FREE, there is
NO charge for calling." Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.135
(b) (i) and Model Rule 7.3 banned targeted, direct-mail
advertising. The Supreme Court ruled that such a ban
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (See
current version of Model Rule 7.3 supra).
2. When are class members represented?
a. Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n., 95 F.R.D. 372 (N.D.III
1982). This class action charged the ADA with unlawful
employment practices which discriminated against women.
The plaintiff sought a protective order barring defendant's
counsel from communicating with unnamed class members.
The order was granted because once class certification
occurred, unnamed class members were represented by
counsel, and the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not contact an opposing party
known to be represented by counsel without opposing
counsel's permission. Unnamed class members are
represented by counsel once the class has been certified.
In a footnote, the court states that until class certification,
unnamed class members are not represented.
b. Parks v. Eastwood Ins. Services, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1082
(C.D.Cal. 2002). In this representative action for unpaid
wages and overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"), the court held that a defendant employer may
communicate with prospective plaintiff employees who have
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not yet opted in, as long as the communication does not
undermine the court's own notice to prospective plaintiffs.
(See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b) and explanation infra, under "Age
Discrimination.") The court stated that opposing counsel may
communicate with potential class members in a Rule 23
class action until the class has been certified, at which point
the class members are deemed represented, and compared
the class action scenario to the representative action before
the court.
3. EEOC as Plaintiff
a. The EEOC is not the victims' representative and cases
brought by the EEOC do not have to be certified under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23. Nonetheless, cases brought by the EEOC can
produce monetary remedies for injured parties. While an
action brought by the EEOC is not technically a class action,
class-action terms are used by the courts for convenience
and brevity.
b. Williams v. U.S., 665 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ore. 1987). When
the EEOC brings actions under its own name, it seeks to
vindicate the rights of aggrieved individuals as well as the
public interest. The EEOC's interests may not always
coincide with specific victims, which is why individuals may
intervene. The EEOC does not establish an attorney-client
relationship with "class members." Furthermore, the EEOC
does not owe a duty to the potential claimants and cannot
be found negligent in treatment of them.
c. Bauman v. Jacobs Suchard, Inc., 136 F.R.D. 460 (N.D. III.
1990). Communications between EEOC attorneys and
potential claimants are privileged because the EEOC acts as
de facto attorney for the claimants.
d. EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motors, 102 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1996).
The EEOC commenced an action on behalf of current and
former female employees at Mitsubishi. Each side sent
notice to the "class members." The EEOC's notice advised
the class members that they were not obligated to
communicate with Mitsubishi about any aspect of the case.
Mitsubishi objected, claiming that the notice would cause
employees not to report harassment and discrimination to its
Human Resources department, subjecting Mitsubishi to
further liability. The district court ordered the EEOC to send
a second notice telling the class members that the first
notice should not be read to suggest that complaints should
not be sent to the HR department, the EEOC or the court, at
the employee's option. The court also ordered that each
side give the other, and the court, ten days' notice prior to
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making any other unprivileged communications with the
class to prevent any further misleading remarks. The EEOC
appealed the order. The 7th Circuit held that while the
court's order may have been construed as a restraint on free
speech if Mitsubishi complained, the EEOC, as a part of the
Executive Branch, does not have rights under the First
Amendment.
B. Age Discrimination
1. Representative actions under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., differ from class actions
under Title VII because they are governed not by Fed. R. Civ. P.
23, but by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), incorporated in the
ADEA by 29 U.S.C. § 626 (b).
a. The FLSA requires that an individual may become a party
plaintiff only by filing a consent with the court.
2. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989). In this
age discrimination representative action, the Supreme Court held
that a district court could implement 29 U.S.C. § 626 (b) by
facilitating notice to potential ADEA plaintiffs. The district court
ordered the defendant to disclose the names and addresses of all
discharged employees and authorized the plaintiffs to send a court-
approved consent form and a notice indicating that the court
authorized the consent but had taken no position on the merits of
the case. The Supreme Court did not address the content of the
district court's order.
C. Settlement
1. A class action may not be dismissed or compromised until the court
independently approves the settlement agreement. Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 23 (e).
2. Judicial Consent Required
a. In determining whether to approve a settlement, courts
consider whether the agreement favors named plaintiffs;
strength of the plaintiffs' case compared to the amount or
type of settlement offer; whether the agreement is consistent
with the public interest; the likely complexity, length, and
expense of litigation; the number of objectors to the
agreement; and the judgment of experienced counsel for the
parties. Ronald M. Green, Practising Law Institute, Settling
Employment Litigation (1986).
b. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th
Cir. 1978). Class action settlements are more susceptible to
abuse than pure adversarial adjudications. Lawyers'
interests may diverge from the class, and individual class
members' interests may diverge. Certain interests may be
wrongfully compromised or "sold out"without drawing the
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court's attention. The court must determine whether the
proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable and
not the product of collusion between the parties.
c. Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479
(6th Cir. 1985). Class action brought by minority firefighters
to address alleged racial discrimination in promotion
practices. The plaintiffs sought relief including an affirmative
hiring and promotion program to eliminate the effects of past
discriminatory practices. Local 93 intervened, complaining
that any promotions criteria other than competence denies
promotions to those most capable and denies the city of the
best firefighting possible. The plaintiffs and defendant
agreed to a consent decree containing affirmative action
language, and the intervenors objected. The court adopted
the consent decree, finding that the affirmative action
provisions were not unreasonable in light of the long pattern
of discrimination proven in the case. The intervenors
appealed, asserting that the consent decree unlawfully
infringes on the rights of non-minority firefighters. The court
determined that the affirmative action plan within the
consent decree was fair and reasonable to non-minorities
that might be affected by it, and was not prohibited by 42
U.S.C. § 2000 e - 2 (h) or -5(g).
3. A proposed settlement which provided backpay, damages, and
attorneys' fees for the plaintiff representative, but provided only
injunctive relief for the unnamed class members, was found to be
abusive of the class action procedure. Munoz v. Arizona State
University, 80 F.R.D. 670 (D.C. Ariz. 1978).
4. Courts have refused to approve settlements that have large
disparities in benefit allocations. For example, a district court's
approval of a settlement agreement awarding $10,000 and a
promotion to one named plaintiff, $500 to another named plaintiff,
$47,000 in attorney fees was reversed. The remaining class
members received only an agreement from the employer to treat
the class members equally and an opportunity to bring their
individual claims before the Magistrate Judge. Franks v. Kroger
Co., 649 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1981).
II. Witnesses
A. General Rules
1. Model Rule 1.2(d), Kentucky Supreme Court Rule (USCR")
3.130(1.2)(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent. ")
2. Model Rule 3.3(a)(3), SCR 3.130(3.3)(a)(3) (prohibiting lawyer from
"knowingly... offer [ing] evidence that the lawyer knows to be
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false...." and requiring lawyer to take remedial measures)
3. Model Rule 3.4(b), SCR 3.130(3.4)(b) (lawyer "shall not... falsify
evidence, counselor assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an
inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law....")
4. Model Rule 8.4(c), SCR 3.130(8.3)(c) ("It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to... engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.")
5. Model Code DR 7-1 02(A)(6) (lawyer must not "[p]articipate in the
creation of preservation of evidence when he knows or it is obvious
that the evidence is false.")
B. Permissible Preparation
1. Common forms of preparation: discussing witness's perception and
possible testimony; reviewing documents and other evidence with
witness; explaining how law applies; reviewing factual context;
discussing role of witness and courtroom demeanor; discussing
probable lines of cross-examination; rehearsal. Richard Wydick,
The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1995)
(citing RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 176 cmt. b
(Preliminary Draft No.1 0, 1994)); Liisa Renee Salmi, Note, Don't
Walk the Line: Ethical Considerations in Preparing Witnesses for
Deposition and Trial, 18 REV. LITIG. 135, 140 (1999) (citing
Wydick).
2. Reasons for allowing preparation
a. Legitimate reasons for statements to witness: investigating
facts; finding out what witness perceived; determining likely
accuracy of witness's perception (conditions, memory, etc.);
refreshing memory; testing ability to communicate
recollections accurately; testing truthfulness; discovering
credibility issues; discovering bias, influence by others;
preparing witness for courtroom environment; telling to listen
to questions carefully, not guess, not volunteer, etc.;
instructing on appearance. Wydick at 16-18.
b. Courts have noted the importance of witness preparation
(1) In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum
Prod. Antitrust Litig., 502 F.Supp. 1092, 1097
(C.D.Cal. 1980)(noting necessity of refreshing
memory because often years will have passed since
events occurred)
(2) State v. McCormick, 259 S.E.2d 880, 882 (N.C. 1979)
(preparation, such as explaining law, reviewing
questions and answers, and putting witness at ease,
to produce most effective testimony "is the mark of a
good trial lawyer" and "promotes a more efficient
administration of justice and saves court time").
(3) State v. Earp, 571 A.2d 1227, 1235-36 (Md. 1990)
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(noting prudence of reviewing facts known by witness,
and recommending attire, and refreshing recollection)
(4) Hamdi & Ibrahim Mango Co. v. Fire Ass'n of
Philadelphia, 20 F.R.D. 181, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y.,
1957)("[W]ithout some previous preparation to refresh
his memory in such cases, [a witness's] testimony
would be nearly or quite valueless.").
C. Dangers of Preparation
1. Generally
a. Conflicting interests: permitting partisan case development
to flesh out the relevant facts v. impairing fact-finding.
Wydick at 15.
b. General rule: don't put words in witness's mouth.
(1) State v. McCormick, 259 S.E.2d 880, 882 (N.C. 1979)
("Nothing improper has occurred so long as the
attorney is preparing the witness to give the witness'
testimony at trial and not the testimony that the
attorney has placed in the witness' mouth and not
false or perjured testimony.")
(2) State v. Earp, 571 A.2d 1227, 1235-36 (Md. 1990)
("[I]n the interviews with and examination of
witnesses, out of court, and before the trial of the
case, the examiner, whoever he may be, layman or
lawyer, must exercise the utmost care and caution to
extract and not to inject information, and by all means
to resist the temptation to influence or bias the
testimony of the witnesses.") (quoting State v. Papa,
32 R.1. 453, 80 A. 12, 15 (1911». The court notes
that the line between preparation and impermissible
influencing is sometimes "fine and difficult to discern."
c. Malleability of memory
(1) Witness's original perception colored by
"temperament, biases, expectations, and past
knowledge." Witness perceives only parts of event,
fills perception gap by inference. Wydick at 9.
(2) Perception gap makes witness suggestible. E.g.: use
of "smashed" instead of "hit" when asking witness
about car accident increased perceived speed of car
and made witnesses twice as likely to report non-
existent broken glass on ground. Salmi at 166-70
(citing Monroe H. Freedman, Counseling the Client:
Refreshing Recollection or Prompting Perjury?, lITIG.,
Spring 1976, at 45); Wydick at 9-10.
(3) Over time, "I don't remember a knife" may turn into
"He didn't have a knife." Wydick at 11.
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(4) New material introduced by lawyer tends to be
incorporated into testimony, sometimes in place of
original perception. Wydick at 10.
2. Types of Impermissible Coaching
a. Grade One
(1) Grade one coaching- "where the lawyer knowingly
and overtly induces a witness to testify to something
the lawyer knows is false." Wydick at 3-4.
(2) '''Knowingly,' 'Known,' 'Knows' denotes actual
knowledge of the fact in question. A person's
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances."
Model Rules Terminology section; SCR Terminology
section.
b. Grade Two
(1) Wink and nudge
(a) Grade two coaching- "where the lawyer
knowingly but covertly induces a witness to
testify to something the lawyer knows is false."
Wydick at 3-4.
(b) Plausible deniability because not explicitly
asking witness to lie, just suggesting reasons
to lie or implying that a lie would be desirable
.Wydick at 25-37
(c) E.g.: Lecture scene from "Anatomy of a
Murder" where Jimmy Stewart tells client
permissible defenses for murder and leaves
him to think about his story.
(d) E.g.: Employee witness says, "I think Employer
may have said X." Attorney says, "You say
'you think;' so that means that you don't
know?" where said in a way that suggests that
original answer was a bad one. Wydick at 33
(e) E.g.: Attorney asks, "Did E say X at the
meeting?" Witness says, "I think so." Witness
is sure of testimony but B gave different
version of events. Attorney says, "B told me
that E actually said X at the tea shop after the
meeting. Does that refresh your memory?"
Whether unethical depends on intent of lawyer.
Wydick at 36-37.
(2) Manipulating unwitting witness
c. Clearly Unethical Conduct (suborning perjury)
(1) Encouraging witness to make untrue statements.
Salmi at 148-50.
(2) Instructing a witness to claim lack of memory or
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knowledge when witness does not want to answer.
Salmi at 150-52 (noting tendency to use "I don't
know"when not sure, when memory unclear, when
nervous, when truth is trouble).
(a) United States v. Barnhart, 889 F.2d 1374,
1376-77, 1380 (5th Cir. 1989)(finding sufficient
evidence of perjury in case where defendant
would "get dumb" to avoid answering
questions, would claim not to recall).
(b) Sheriff, Clark County v. Hecht, 710 P.2d 728,
729 (Nev. 1985) (per curiam) (where attorney
tells client to claim not to remember when
asked about prior conviction on cross-
examination).
(3) Implying the acceptability of false testimony (such as
by suggesting that ends are more important than
means). Salmi at 151.
(4) Encouraging evasion. Salmi at 151-54.
(a) Schmidt v. Ford Motor Co., 112 F.R.D. 216,
221 (D.Colo. 1986)(dealing with evasive
answers and concealment of evidence).
(b) In re Complaint as to the Conduct ofA., 554
P.2d 479 (Or. 1976) (where attorney told
witness not to volunteer information and not in
his interest to broach certain topic).
d. Grade Three
(1) Grade three- "where the lawyer does not knowingly
induce the witness to testify to something the lawyer
knows is false, but the lawyer's conversation with the
witness nevertheless alters the witness's story."
Wydick at 3-4.
(2) Dangerous conduct:
(a) Refreshing recollection (particularly prior to
hearing witness's version)- risks implanting
memory or causing intentional conformance.
Salmi at 144-47,157-59.
(b) Giving overly restrictive instructions not to
volunteer information- suggests use of evasion
("prisoner of war" instruction). Salmi at 144-47.
(c) Telling witness what facts to report (only close
to permissible where clarifying wording). Salmi
at 144-47.
(d) Suggesting word choice- can affect not only
clarity, accuracy, and emotional impact (e.g.,
removing jargon, not using prefatory language,
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not improperly using legal terms) but
substantive meaning as well; danger that
suggestions will alter witness's perception,
change the true meaning, or lead witness to
leave things out. Salmi at 160-63.
i) Some courts not concerned about word
choice suggestions because of
availability of cross-examination to
uncover. See State v. Blakeney, 408
A.2d 636, 643 (Vt. 1979)(not concerned
about change from "could" breathe to
"could not," creating "substantial risk of
death," after recess and consultation
with attorney); Haworth v. State, 840
P.2d 912, 917 (Wyo. 1992) (noting that
"use of the word "cut" [rather than
stabbed] was de minimis considering
the nature and amount of the other
evidence in the case describing the
fight").
(e) Suggesting demeanor- suggesting confidence
can create problems where witness is
uncertain but is told to seem certain-
misrepresents perception; jury strongly swayed
by witness's confidence; question is whether
change will cause jury to draw erroneous
conclusions. Salmi at 163-65.
(f) Explaining legal effect of answers (lecture on
the law}- potential for both suggesting how to
answer and giving motive to dissemble. Salmi
at 144-47, 154-57 (citing Tim Wyatt, Law
Firm's Memo in Asbestos Lawsuit Sparks
Ethics Debate: Baron & Budd Founder Says
Papers to Prepare Witnesses are Appropriate,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 28, 1997, at A1).
(g) Repeated Rehearsals- helpful for witness who
will be particularly nervous when testifying but
danger that the filling in of gaps and
preparation for cross-examination questions
will lead to less than the full truth; rehearsal
very suggestive because of repetition; also
making witnesses more confident may cause
jury to give too much weight to uncertain
witness or proper weight to nervous witness.
Salmi at 165-66 (citing John S. Applegate,
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Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 299
(1989».
3. Effectiveness of Cross-examination
a. Some courts have suggested that cross-examination may
cure distorting effects of coaching. Salmi at 142.
(1) Hamdi & Ibrahim Mango Co. v. Fire Ass'n of
Philadelphia, 20 F.R.D. 181,183-84 (S.D.N.Y., 1957)
(but noting that preparation may be used to put
witness on guard to questions that will be asked on
cross and to craft answers that will suppress the
truth).
(2) Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 89-90
(1975)(noting that skillful cross-examination could
create a record of coaching for use in closing
argument); State v. Blakeney, 408 A.2d 636, 643 (Vt.
1979) (quoting Geders).
(3) State v. McCormick, 259 S.E.2d 880, 882-83 (N.C.
1979) (improper coaching a matter to be explored on
cross-examination).
b. But cross-examination may not be sufficient where it fails to
uncover preparation or extent of preparation, especially
where attorney's coaching has been incorporated into the
witness's memory or the witness has been instructed not to
mention the preparation session. Salmi at 142-43 (citing Bob
Van Voris, Client Memo Embarasses Dallas Firm: Baron &
Budd Coaching of Witnesses Called Improper, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 13, 1997, atA30).
How to Avoid Impermissible Coaching
1. Questions for attorney to ask self: 1) Will question or statement
overtly tell witness to testify to something I know is false? 2) Will
question or statement send covert message to witness that I want
him to testify to something I know is false? 3) Is there a legitimate
reason for the question or statement? 4) Am I making the question
or statement in the way least likely to harm the quality of the
testimony? Wydick at 38-39.
2. In tea shop example, could have asked about what happened after
meeting in series of questions without specifically pointing out tea
shop or manner in which said- would have caused witness to arrive
at what was said at tea shop on his own. Wydick at 40-41.
3. Non-Suggestive Interviewing: Don't just ask leading questions,
show documents spelling it out, tell witness what others have said,
or lecture the witness about the consequences of particular
testimony. Instead:
a. Recall first, then recognition (ask to state all details witness
can remember (high accuracy), then fill in blanks by asking
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specific questions about details (less accurate but more
facts»;
b. Ask neutral questions since the memory is sensitive ("Did
you see the thin man in the blue suit?" more suggestive than
"Did you see a thin man in a blue suit?" which does not
presuppose his existence);
c. Ordering of questions (people remember things in different
ways,-some chronologically, some by characters or events--
may be able to tap into memory in different ways to get more
details before resorting to suggestion). Wydick at 42-44.
4. Cognitive Interview: 1) Reinstate context (ask witness to put himself
back in the same position); 2) tell everything, regardless of
perceived relevance (allowing full, open-ended narration before
asking probing questions to flesh out details); 3) recall event in
different orders; 4) change perspectives. Wydick at 45-46.
5. Additional things to keep in mind:
a. Start out by admonishing witness to tell the truth; sets the
stage for ethical preparation by establishing that attorney is
seeking the whole truth. Salmi at 141 and n.26 (citing James
M. Altman, Witness Preparation Conflicts, L1TIG., Fall 1995,
at 38,39).
b. Be aware of the malleability of memory and be careful of
word choice (broken glass example), order of questions,
incorporating new (unrecalled) details into questions,
repetition, perception gaps. Salmi at 166-70.
c. Reduce interview to writing to limit later distortion. Salmi at
170-74.
d. Tell witness to admit to lack of knowledge where appropriate
E. What to Do About Perjury
1. Model Rule 3.3(a)(3), SCR 3.130(3.3)(a)(3) ("A lawyer shall not
knowingly ... [o]ffer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If
a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.").
2. Rule 3.3 requires attorney to inform court of perjury by client during
trial or deposition if client will not rectify injury, even if it involves
revealing a client's confidence. Henry Hecht, Deposition Perjury by
Your Own Witness: How to Prevent It, Deal With It, and Survive It,
11 NO.5 INSIDE L1TIG. 7, 8 (1997).
3. How to Prevent:
a. During preparation, warn witness to tell the truth and of
consequences of lying. Hecht at 8.
b. During deposition, if client straying dangerously close,
(1) First, decide whether ambiguity in question may be
causing confusion. If so, object if there is a legitimate
reason to do so; this may result in a clearer
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rephrasing or signal the witness of counsel's
concerns. Hecht at 8.
(2) Else, after the offending answer, seek a break to
confer with client and ask why answer differs from
version in preparation - this allows counsel to
determine if there is a reason for the change and
whether perjury is likely occurring. Hecht at 8.
(3) If client persists in perjurious testimony, lawyer should
warn of consequences, including lawyer's duty to
inform court, withdraw, and/or disaffirm the evidence.
Hecht at 8.
(4) If client still persists, should suspend deposition
before additional perjury occurs (prevents further
damage and leaves open possibility of further
discussion with client). Hecht at 8.
(5) If rectification necessary, can have witness correct
testimony at resumption of deposition or clarify record
after resumption by questioning after direct
examination. Hecht at 8.
(6) If counsel learns of perjury after the deposition is
over, counsel should take steps that will least invade
confidentiality; first talk to client and urge to rectify
immediately. Hecht at 8.
(a) Client may rectify by recanting before
testimony 1) substantially influences
proceeding or 2) it becomes apparent that
falsity would have been exposed anyway; see
18 U.S.C. § 1623(d). Note that recanting
before getting caught suggests good faith.
Hecht at 9.
(b) Counsel can offer an additional deposition of
the client or make changes to transcript to
correct misstatements. Hecht at 9.
(7) If client refuses to rectify, lawyer must take steps to
prevent fraud, such as disclosing, withdrawing, and/or
disaffirming. Must withdraw, but still with duty to
disclose; withdrawal and disaffirmance may be
another option. Hecht at 9.
c. Many of the same principles apply to testimony at trial.
4. Sanctions for Perjury
a. Rule 37(a) motion to compel in response to incomplete or
evasive disclosure, treated as failure to disclose, possibly
having to pay reasonable attorney's fees for motion; Rule
37(c)(1) sanctions for failure to correct error in deposition
testimony of expert as required by Rule 26(e)(1). Hecht at 9.
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(1 ) United States v. Shaffer Equipment Co., 158 F.R.D.
80,87 (S.D.W.V. 1994)(sanctioning attorneys who
failed to reveal what they knew of expert's perjury
under Rule 26(e); also noting inherent authority to
punish attorneys for litigation abuses).
(2) Rule 37(c)(1) sanctions include being prevented from
offering evidence (mandatory if no substantial
justification), reasonable attorney's fees and
expenses, informing jury of failure to disclose. See
also Rule 37(b)(2) (where party fails to comply with
court order, allowing order that designated facts be
taken as established, striking of defenses or claims,
dismissing of claims, default judgment). Hecht at 9-
10.
b. For witness- impeachment, loss of credibility, contempt; for
client- tainting judgment, alienating judge. Hecht at 10.
c. For lawyer-loss of reputation, financial loss from loss of
suit, possible suit by client claiming suborning of perjury,
possible suit by other party. Hecht at 10.
(1) Blain v. Doctor's Company, 222 Cal.App.3d 1048,
1063 (CaI.App. 1990)(dismissing suit by perjurious
client because of unclean hands); but see Feld &
Sons v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfee, Rounick, and
Cabot, et al., 458 A.2d 545 (Pa. Super. 1983)(barring
compensatory and punitive damages under in pari
delicto but allowing contract suit to recover attorney's
fees).
(2) Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 71-72
(2d Cir. 1990)(allowing suit in equity based on fraud
to relieve plaintiffs from settlement where defendants
had failed to disclose requested documents to
plaintiffs during litigation).
d. More importantly, the attorney might be subject to formal
disciplinary proceedings. Hecht at 10.
(1 ) Committee on Professional Ethics V. Crary, 245
N.W.2d 298, 307 (Iowa 1976) (unethical for lawyer to
knowingly permit client to commit perjury or to resume
two days later without correcting).
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